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ABSTRACT
The thesis is made up of three chapters:
The rst chapter estimates the e¤ects of antitrust investigations on the market value
of the investigated rms. This analysis o¤ers insights on the performance of competition
policy and its enforcement. The interest is on investigations carried out by the Italian
Competition Authority between 1991 and 2007. We nd that the start of the investigation
is associated with an average drop of 0.6% in the market value of investigated rms and a
later infringement decision implies an average drop of 1%. The event associated with the
highest impact is the decision of the last Court of Appeal. When the last Court upholds
the Authoritys infringement decision the market value of rms drops between 3% and 6%.
Interestingly, there is no e¤ect when the last Court annuls the Authoritys decision.
The second and third chapters study the e¤ects, on retail fuel prices, of a price comparison
policy (a typical consumer policy intervention) introduced in the Italian pay-toll highways
refueling market. In particular, the second chapter performs an empirical analysis while the
third chapter presents an agent based computational economic (ACE) model, which aims to
rationalize the empirical evidence and to inform the policy design.
Di¤erently from what was expected (by policy makers and consumers associations),
the empirical analysis nds that the price comparison policy is associated with a small,
but statistically signicant, increase in the average price of fuel (0.55 euro cents per liter).
Nevertheless, despite this average increase in fuel prices, the policy might help (active)
consumers make informed choices and save around 1 euro cent per liter.
The ACE model predicts that the introduction of price comparison has a limited e¤ect on
market prices as price competition among retailers is only marginally fostered. In addition,
the model suggests that consumers that make use of price comparison might save around 0.5
euro cents per liter. These results are consistent with the empirical ndings in suggesting
that the price comparison policy had a limited impact on fuel retail prices and the overall
e¤ect on consumers is mixed.
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CHAPTER 1
ANTITRUST INVESTIGATIONS AND FIRMSMARKET
VALUE: EVIDENCE FROM THE ITALIAN CASE
Abstract
This paper uses standard event studies techniques (parametric and non-
parametric) to estimate the impact of antitrust investigations on the stock price
of investigated rms. The interest is on the investigations carried out by the
Italian Competition Authority between 1991 and 2007. We consider two types of
violations: abuse of dominance and cartelization practices. The investigations we
study consist of three di¤erent steps: start of investigation, Authoritys decision,
Court of Appeals decision. The start of the investigation is associated with an
average drop of 0.6% in the market value of investigated rms. An infringement
decision by the Authority implies an average drop of 1% in the market value
(although marginally statistically signicant). An acquittal decision has no ef-
fect on market value. Finally, the decision of the last Court of Appeal, when it
upholds the Authoritys decision, has the greatest impact on rmsmarket value
(drop between 3% and 6%).
1.1 Introduction
This paper studies the stock market reaction to antitrust investigations. The interest
is on the antitrust investigations carried out by the Italian Competition Authority (ICA),
also known with the name of "Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato" (AGCM),
between 1991 and 2007. We look specically at the two types of antitrust investigations:
abuse of dominance cases and anticompetitive agreement cases (i.e. cartels cases). These
are violations of article 2 and article 3 of the Italian competition law (these two articles can
be seen as the Italian counterpart of article 101 and article 102 of EU competition law)1.To
estimate the impact of antitrust investigations on the market valuation of the investigated
1Notably, this study does not deal with merger investigations cases.
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rms we use standard event studies techniques2.
A typical Italian antitrust investigation consists of three main events: 1) start of the in-
vestigation; 2) decision of the Antitrust Authority; and 3) decisions of the Courts of Appeal3.
For the last two events we can further distinguish between two di¤erent realizations. Indeed,
both the Authoritys and the Court of Appeals decision can have "positive" or "negative"
e¤ects on rms, while we assume that the start of the investigation is always a negative
realization for the investigated rms. About the Authoritys decision we can observe an in-
fringement (negative) decision or an acquittal (positive) decision. For the Court of Appeals
decision we can observe an upheld (negative) decision or an annulment (positive) decision.
In the empirical analysis we look in turn at these three di¤erent events and their re-
alizations and we estimate the market reaction over some dened event windows. To our
knowledge this is the rst work that applies event study techniques to study Italian antitrust
investigations. Close to this paper there are similar studies that consider antitrust investiga-
tions carried out by other authorities. Bosch and Eckard (1991) conduct a similar study for
the US by looking at federal indictments (they nd that indicted rms lose around 1.08% of
their market value) whereas Bizjak and Coles (1995) look, always for the US, at the e¤ects of
private antitrust litigations (they nd an average wealth loss of around 0.6% after the ling
of the private action), Mariniello (2006) study the OFT (O¢ ce for Fair Trading) investiga-
tions in the UK4 Finally Langus et al. (2010) study the impact of EU investigations relating
to art. 101 and art. 102 TFU violations (they nd a reduction of around 2% following a
dawn raid). Although it is not the aim of this paper, this work might also be related to the
literature that studies the impact of antitrust authorities. About the Italian Competition
Authority a paper with this clear aim is Sabbatini (2008).
The analysis is conducted both on the full sample (1991-2007) and on two smaller sub-
samples (1991-1997 and 1998-2007). In doing so we can check if the market reaction to
antitrust investigations has changed over time. We break our sample around 1998 because
there is evidence of a change in the enforcement of competition law and use of nes (Ghezzi
and Polo (2001)). For the empirical analysis we build a novel dataset consisting of 155
2In particular we follow two estimation procedures to perform both a parametric and a fully non-
parametric event studies. Event studies is an established tool in economics and nance studies that has
been widely applied to examine antitrust events (for a recent survey see Cichello and Lamdin (2006)).
3In this paper we look in detail only at the decision by the last court of appeal known as Consiglio di
Stato. The ruling of the Consiglio di Stato is independent of the ruling of the rst court of appeal (i.e. the
TAR, Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale).
4Only the single rms event studies are reported as there is no aggregation over rms.
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case/rms observations in which the investigated rm is listed (or it is owned by a listed
parent company).
For the event start of investigation we nd that rms on average lose 0.6% (statistically
signicant) of their market value. Interestingly, there is a clear di¤erence between the impact
observed pre-1998 and the one post-1998 as in the former sample the loss is around 1%
(statistically signicant) whereas in the latter sample we nd no e¤ect.
At the stage of the Authoritys decision we distinguish between two events: infringement
decisions and acquittal decisions. For the former we nd a negative e¤ect that is around 1%
(but marginally signicant), for the latter case we nd a positive e¤ect but not statistically
signicant. As for the event start of investigation we nd that, for infringement decisions,
the market reaction is much stronger (negative) and signicant in the period pre-1998.
About the last Court of appeal we distinguish between upheld and annulment decisions.
When the last Court upholds the Authoritys decision we nd a negative impact of around
2% (statistically signicant). For the annulments we nd a positive e¤ect but not statistically
signicant5.
The paper proceeds as following. Section 1.2 describes Italian antitrust enforcement and
the relevant details of Italian antitrust investigations. Section 1.3 describes how we apply
event studies techniques to perform the analysis and describes the selected sample. Section
1.4 presents the results of the empirical analysis. Finally Section 1.5 concludes the paper.
1.2 Italian antitrust enforcement
The application of competition law in Italy is a matter of recent history. Only in 1990,
exactly one hundred years after the American Congress passed the Sherman Act, the Italian
legislator drew up a law to discipline market competition. It is with the law no. 287 of
10th October 1990 (The Competition and Fair Trading Act) that competition policy starts
in Italy. The same act, beyond introducing competition law, also establishes the body
responsible for its enforcement: the Italian Competition Authority (ICA), known with the
name of "Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato" (AGCM6). Since its origin, the
Authority was granted the status of independent agency to shield it from the interference of
the government and the other political institutions.
5For the event last court of appela we do not perform a pre-1998 post-1998 comparison because of the
small sample size.
6In the rest of the paper we will refer to the Italian Competition Authority both with the acronym of
ICA or AGCM.
3
Aguzzoni, Luca (2011), Three Essays in Competition and Consumer Policy 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/31849
The Authority monitors the functioning and competition of markets and intervenes when-
ever competition rules are violated. It has two main areas of action: on the one hand it
oversees over agreements (cartels), mergers, acquisitions and cases of abuse of dominant po-
sition; on the other hand it oversees over misleading and comparative advertising, and on
conict of interest.
The ICA cooperates and works jointly with the European Commission as the Italian
competition act was drawn in light of the already established European Competition law.
There are in place specic guidelines that determine the area of competence of the two
jurisdictions, however the distinction is not always clear. Indeed, there are cases, such as
mergers and acquisition cases, for which the distinction is clear cut (for example it is based
prots thresholds), while for other cases, such as cases of cartels and abuses of dominant
position, the distinction is less clear. For these latter cases, usually, whenever the case has
only national relevance it falls within the single member state jurisdiction. On the contrary,
for cases that have an impact on the commerce between member states, the European law
should be applied. Nonetheless, member states are free to apply stricter restriction on their
domestic market. However even when only national jurisdiction is applied, member states
should not leave unpunished conducts that violate the Article 101 or 102 of the European
Law7.
In this paper the interest is on two kinds of competition law infringements: cartels
(anticompetitive agreements) and abuses of dominant position. Hence we restrict our analysis
to violations of article 2 and the violation of article 3 of the Italian competition law. These
two articles are the Italian counterpart of article 101 and article 102 of EU competition
law. Article 2 regulates cartels (we do not consider concentrations cases) while Article 3
disciplines abuses of dominant position. In addition to these two types of violations, we
also consider violations of Article 101 and Article 102 of the EU competition law directly
enforced by the Italian Competition Authority.
The next sessions describe the di¤erent steps (i.e. events) of a typical Italian antitrust
investigation. We describe how the Italian Competition Authority works, takes its decision
and communicates its decision and we show how we exploit these features for the purposes
of our analysis.
7Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on com-
petition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (Text with EEA relevance)
4
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1.2.1 How an antitrust investigation develops
To study the impact of antitrust investigations we rst have to analyze and understand
how the competition Authority operates and what its specic features imply for our analy-
sis. The rst event of interest is the start of the investigation. This event, as we explain
below, is itself the outcome of a preliminary condential pre-investigation following internal
examinations or external complaints.
Indeed, the AGCM, among other duties, continuously monitors the market. Within the
Authoritys instruments for monitoring the market there is the launching of the so called
"Indagini conoscitive del Mercato" which are general market-wide investigations meant to
study in depth the functioning of a specic market and to deter and uncover possible infringe-
ments of competition law. Such general investigations can be started either by the Authority
itself or following the suggestions of other public bodies (other regulatory authorities, gov-
ernment, public administration). As an o¤spring of these general market investigations the
Authority can then undertake specic rm level investigations for competition law infringe-
ment. In addition to internal examinations, also external formal complaints can be presented
to the Authority in order to report competition practices deemed anticompetitive. Subjects
that can le such formal complaint are rms public administration bodies, and even private
citizens.
Once there is a formal request to start an investigation, either from within the Authority
or from an external complaint, the case is then assigned to the relevant directorate, within
the AGCM, that proceeds with a preliminary analysis of the case. The preliminary analysis
serves to provide evidence to the Authority on whether there are the conditions to proceed
with a formal investigation or whether the case should be dropped. In case the decision is to
proceed, the parts directly involved (rms) are contacted and the Authority formally starts
the antitrust investigation.
Usually, the Authority sets also a timeframe of 240 days within which it is bound to
close the investigation. During the investigation phase the relevant information about the
case is collected. Both the plainti¤ (in case there is one) and the defendant are expected to
collaborate with the Authority and can access the unrestricted documentation supporting
the case. The antitrust o¢ cials have also power of inspection and can dawn raid8 the
headquarters and o¢ ces of the accused rms to seek evidence of violation.
Usually, 30 days before the set end of the investigation the Authority communicates the
8In this activity the Antitrust o¢ cials are attended by the Guardia di Finanza o¢ cers (a police corp
responsible for border control and for investigating fraud) .
5
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results of the preliminary inquiry to the parts. Then the parts have some time (until 5 days
before the end of the investigation) to present further memoirs.
At the end of this process there is the second event of interest of the antitrust inves-
tigation, that is the decision of the antitrust Authority. At this stage all parts convene at
the nal hearing in front of the Collegio (College), composed by the President and the four
componenti (members) of the Authority. The Authoritys decision is then taken in private,
by a majority vote by the 5 members of the Collegio, taking into consideration the results
of the investigation and the nal documentation provided by the parts.
In case the defendant is found guilty of violating competition law, the ICA orders the
ceasing of the identied anticompetitive conduct. Moreover, the Authority can also inict a
monetary ne up to 10% of the convicted rmsannual turnover, depending on the gravity
of the violation. A ne is also contemplated in cases in which convicted rms fail to put an
end to their misconducts. In extreme cases, when convicted rms repeatedly fail to cease
the anticompetitive behaviors, the Authority can also order the closure of the rms for up
to 30 days. The Italian legislator, in line with European law, did not envisage any penal
consequences for competition law violation.
After the rst two above events the nal event of interest is represented by outcome of the
appeal procedure that for the Italian case consists of two separate stages. Convicted rms
can indeed appeal against the antitrust Authority decisions to the regional administrative
Court (Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale, TAR). To this Court private subjects can appeal
against decisions of the public administrations or other public bodies such as the Antitrust
Authority. Usually the TAR decides on the legitimacy of the Authoritys decision and verify
if there were irregularities in the decisional process. TAR decisions can then be appealed
both by the AGCM, in case the TAR annuls the Authoritys decision, and the defendant,
in case the TAR upholds the Authoritys decision. The Court of last resort is called the
Consiglio di Stato (CdS) after whose decision the sentence come to judgement.
After identifying the three events of interest, in the next section, we describe how the
information about the outcome of these events is disclosed to the public.
1.2.2 Disclosure of event information
For the purpose of our research it is important to look at how the di¤erent bodies taking
the relevant event decisions (i.e. AGCM, TAR and CdS) communicate their decisions to the
6
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public. Indeed, whenever novel information, about the antitrust proceedings, is released to
the general public the investors of the rms under investigation acquire novel information
that might change their future expected protability of the rms and as a consequence their
present market valuation.
For the sake of our analysis, we focus rst on the two critical communications made
by the Authority: the o¢ cial start and the end of the investigation. Then we consider the
information disclosure taking place after the decision of the Courts of Appeal.
About the ICA we nd that the Authority is conscious of the possible destabilizing
e¤ects its news might bring to the stock market9. Hence, the Authority claims to release
information only when stock markets are closed. About the events we nd that soon after
formally starting an investigation the Authority releases a press statement on its website10.
At the same time major press agencies are informed. By doing an extensive analysis on the
press coverage of these releases we indeed nd that, for all the considered investigations,
the major newspapers and press agencies report the news the day after the ICA publishes a
notice of the investigation on its website.
Furthermore we nd no evidence of leakages of information during the internal pre-
investigation stage as we nd notice of the start of an antitrust investigation only after the
Authority o¢ cial press release.
The second critical press release made by the ICA relates to the end of the investigation,
in which the Authority communicates its nal decision about the case. Di¤erently from
the start of the investigation, at this stage investors might have already formulated some
expectation about the nal decision of the Authority. However, there is no reason to believe
that investors correctly anticipate the decision, for instance the exact amount of the ne or
the extent to which the Authoritys decision will a¤ect certain practices. Hence also at this
stage there is some degree of novelty in the information disclosed.
The press statement of the Authority at the end of the investigation phase appears to
be quite transparent as a large amount of unrestricted information relating to the discussed
case is made public. Again, when we perform a check on the press coverage of past events,
we nd that major newspapers and press agencies report the news the day after it appears
9For instance see: "Istruttoria Antitrust su Mediaset ma il comunicato era un abile falso", La Repubblica,
30 October 2007.
10Comunicati Stampa, www.agcm.it. Together with the press statement the authority also publishes
relevant unrestricted documentation about the case supporting its decision to start the investigation.
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on the ICAs website. Moreover, during the entire investigation process we nd no evidence
of leakages of information about the Authority proceedings11.
Thus for what concerns the Authority information disclosure procedure we can state it
is, at the same time consistent, timing, transparent and prudential about the management
of sensible information.
Unfortunately we do not nd the same transparency and the same clarity when we deal
with the last event of the antitrust proceeding. Indeed both the TAR and the Consiglio di
Stato decisions do not communicate in a similar straightforward and transparent way. Also,
for both the TAR and the Consiglio di Stato, we nd the presence of two important stages of
the decisional process, the decision (sentenza) and the publication of the judgment (deposito
della sentenza) that do not take place at the same time and both might have some degree
of novelty. Sometimes it can be the case that, at the rst stage (decision), investors already
have all the relevant information about the case (annulment or not of the ICAs decision)
while other times relevant details might be disclosed only at the stage of the publishing of
the judgment. Moreover, around these two dates we nd, on the press, an increasing level of
speculation about the nal outcome of the cases. Hence it is clear that for these last stage
the date of the event is not exactly identied.
The following section presents some descriptive data on the antitrust investigations, and
incidental decisions, carried out by the Italian Competition Authority between the period
that goes from 1991 (when enforcement of competition law started in Italy) until July 2007.
1.2.3 Italian antitrust investigations
This paper studies the impact of the di¤erent events of a typical antitrust investigation
on the market value of the investigated rm(s). The interest is on the investigations carried
out by the Italian Competition Authority in the period between 1991 and 2007. The above
sections described the di¤erent steps of a typical Italian antitrust investigation, including
the appeal procedure, and document the process of information disclosure relevant to each
step. This section provides some information about the sample of antitrust investigations
carried out by the ICA and explains the selection of the sub-sample of cases for the empirical
analysis.
To conduct the empirical analysis we rst build a dataset containing all the publicly
available antitrust investigations, for which the ICA has already reached a decision, from 1991
11O¢ cials of the antitrust authority are also bound by an ethical code not to disclose sensible information.
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until June 200712. We then select only the decisions relating to cases of abuse of dominance
and cartels case. As Table 1.1 shows we nd a total of 159 cases. Among these cases, 15
lead to an acquittal decision whereas the other 144 ended with an infringement decision.
The infringement decision makes always provision for the ceasing of the anticompetitive
practice but it is not always followed by a ne. This is especially true during the early
years of antitrust enforcement Ghezzi and Polo (2001). Indeed for only around half of the
infringement cases (77 cases) the Authoritys infringement decision also makes provision for
a ne for some, or all, the convicted rms involved in the antitrust case.
Table 1.1: Authority decisions by type of violations, cases
Type
Decision Tot. Cases Cartel Abuse Cartel & Abuse
Infringement and ne 77 51 23 3
48% 66% 30% 4%
Infringement w/o ne 67 28 29 10
42% 42% 43% 15%
No Violation 15 3 4 8
10% 20% 27% 53%
Total 159 82 56 21
100% 52% 35% 13%
Note 1: Selected Italian antitrust investigation from 1991 until June 2007. Art. 2 infringements
only includes cartel cases.
Note 2: art.101 and art. 102 infringements are included respectively in art. 2 and art. 3 infringe-
ments.
Note 3: Percentages in column 2 are column percentages; while in column 3, 4 and 5 are row
percentages
Table 1.1 also presents the breakdown of the Authoritys decisions by type of infringe-
ment. Looking at the breakdown for the entire sample, we notice that the majority of the
investigations are for cartel violations (52%) while only 35% are abuse of dominance cases.
Another, 13% of cases are investigations for both types of violations13. The breakdown is
12For all antitrust investigation it is possible to access the unrestricted documenatation via the Authoritys
website (www.agcm.it). For each case we nd the documents making the case for the start of the investigation
and those relative to the Authoritys nal decision. Such documents provide an accurate description of the
case under discussion with details about all actors involved. It is from these documents that we can recover
the judgement relative to each individual rm, and in case of a ne the amount of the individual ne.
13These are cases in which a dominant rm is investigated both for abuse of dominance and for anticom-
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slightly di¤erent if we focus on those cases for which the ICA inicts a ne. Indeed, among
these cases about 66% are related to cartel infringements, 30% abuse of dominance and only
4% of cases refer to both types of violations. Regarding the cases in which there is an in-
fringement decision without ne, the percentage of cartel cases is similar to the percentage
of abuse of dominance cases (42% and 43% respectively). From this descriptive analysis it
is clear that cartel cases are more likely to imply a ne.
Among the analyzed 159 cases, those for which the investigation resulted in a clearance
is relatively small (less than 10% of the total). Most likely conducting a condential pre-
investigations before starting the o¢ cial investigation limits the number of "mistakes".
In our analysis we are mainly interested at the e¤ects that an antitrust investigation has
at the individual rm level. We hence disaggregate the sample analyzed in the above table
and look at the individual rms that are involved in each case14.
Table 1.2: Authority decisions by type of violations, rms
Type
Decision Tot. Firms Cartel Abuse Cartel & Abuse
Infringement and ne 388 336 27 25
70% 87% 7% 6%
Infringement no ne 127 71 37 19
23% 56% 29% 15%
No violation 37 12 4 21
7% 32% 11% 57%
Total 552 419 68 65
100% 76% 12% 12%
Note 1: Selected Italian antitrust investigation from 1991 until June 2007. Art. 2 infringements
only includes cartel cases.
Note 2: art.101 and art. 102 infringements are included respectively in art. 2 and art. 3 infringe-
ments.
Note 3: Percentages in column 2 are column percentages; while in column 3, 4 and 5 are row
percentages
From table 1.2 we can see that in the 159 cases selected, there are a total of 552 rms
involved (observations) 15. The ned rms account for the 70% of the total while only
petitive agreements with its smallers competitors.
14This is possible because from the documentation of the authoritys proceedings we can recover all the
relevant information relating to the single rms involved in each case.
15Some rms are repeat o¤enders and appear in the sample more than once. We indeed dene the
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23% of the rms violated antitrust law but did not receive any ne. This nding might be
consistent with the fact that cartel cases in which a large number of rms is involved are
more likely to be punished in a harsher way. Finally, for only the 7% of the observations
in our sample the investigation resulted in a clearance of the case. As expected, among the
ned cases the great majority of observations relates to cartel decisions (87% of the sample).
The high number of rms involved in cartel violations compared to the number of rms
involved in abuse of dominance should not be surprising since cartels usually involve groups
of rms whereas abuse of dominance usually involves a single o¤ender. For the cases in which
there is an infringement decision without nes the majority of observations relate again to
cartel violations (56%). About the category No Violation it is the joint Cartel and Abuse
investigation that has the highest percentage of observations (57% of the total).
About the magnitude of the sanctionatory activity we nd that, between 1991 and July
2007, the Authority has ned rms for a total of roughly 2 billions euros with the amount of
individual nes ranging from symbolic nes (of one thousand euros) to a record ne of 290
million euro16. The Authoritys decisions are usually appealed. Among the antitrust cases,
in which the Authority issues a ne, we nd that in 78% of cases at least a convicted rm
appeals against the decision. When we look at the rm level data we nd that 331 of the
388 ned rms appealed against the decision. At the individual rm level we also nd that
the average ne is about 5 million euros however given a standard deviation of 20 million
euro the sample is highly dispersed. Also, a median ne of only 0.24 million euros suggests
that the ne distribution is highly right skewed.
1.2.3.1 Antitrust nes
From chart 1.1 we can see the evolution over time of the average ne given by the ICA
for cartel and abuse of dominance cases. The chart shows the average ne (bars), by year,
from 199217 until 2007 (monetary values are expressed in 2007 euros). The chart clearly
shows that during the last years of activity the average amount of nes increased sharply.
Moreover, we nd that in the period 1992-1997 the Authority inicts a ne in only 43% of
the infringement cases whereas in the subsequent period (1998-2007) the Authority inicts
a ne in the 65% of the infringement cases18. As remarked by Ghezzi and Polo (2001), it is
case/rm combination as our observation of interest.
16Fine given to the rm ENI SpA for the case Eni-Trans Tunisian Pipeline in 2006.
17No ne was inicted in year 1991 by the Italian Competition Authority.
18The exceptionally high value registered in year 2006 is explained by the record high ne of 290 million
euro given to ENI SpA for the case Eni-Trans Tunisian Pipeline in 2006.
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Figure 1.1: Antitrust Fines and Cases
only from 1997 that nes become to be used more frequently and systematically. During the
early years of the ICA nes were mostly seen as the last resort and, for this reason, they were
used only in exceptional cases. Also, from the chart we can see (solid line) that the majority
of the cases that are in our sample are in the years between 1997 and 2004, as in the two
periods 1992-1996 and 2005-2007 the Authority administered a relatively lower number of
cases.
Given the judicial process in place, the ne inicted by the Italian Competition Authority
might be annulled or reduced during the appeal procedure. To study the impact of antitrust
nes on rmsmarket value we also have to look at the realizations of these events. For
instance, in the extreme case that in the appeal procedure all decisions taken by the antitrust
Authority are annulled we would expect no reaction after an antitrust conviction.
Hence, below we provide some descriptive analysis about the relationship between the
initial ne and the nal ne a convicted rm has eventually to pay.19. Table 1.3 shows
the breakdown of initial and nal ne by type of violation20. On average nes for abuse of
dominant position are the highest. However we do nd wide variation in the amount of the
ne, given the high standard deviations the group averages. If we compare the average nal
ne with the average initial ne for the three groups we nd that the size of the nal ne,
19We take as nal ne the ne amount established in the decision of the last court. The last court is
usually the Consiglio di Stato, however not all the cases are appealed beyond the Authoritys decision or
beyond the rst court of appeal.
20For this table we restricted the sample to the cases that had both initial and nal ne (i.e. cases that
were appealed and that come to judgement).
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as a share of the initial ne, goes from 56% to 78%.
Table 1.3: Initial and nal ne by type of Violation
Average ne mln euro Ratio
Types of violation Firms Initial ne Final ne Final/Initial
Cartel 286 4.52 2.52 56%
(13.72) (10.47)
Cartel & Abuse 25 1.89 1.48 78%
(2.57) (2.64)
Abuse 26 10.92 7.13 65%
(31.38) (22.99)
Total 337 4.82 2.8 58%
(15.4) (11.59)
Note 1: Standard deviations in parenthesis
We investigate further the issue of ne reduction and, in the next table, we compare the
average reduction found in the Italian sample against the average reduction that is found for
the European Commission nes.
Table 1.4: Antitrust nes reduction: Italian vs European cases
Fine reduction Share upheld cases
period # cases avg. reduction stdv % of uphelded stdv
ICA all
1991-1997 19 22% 42% 79% 42%
1998-2007 53 31% 40% 64% 48%
1991-2007 72 28% 40% 68% 47%
EC all
1979-1997 39 36% 42% 59% 50%
1998-2004 22 28% 37% 73% 46%
1979-2004 61 33% 40% 64% 48%
Note 1: ICA all, Italian Competition Authority Cartel and Abuse of dominance cases
Note 2: EC all decisions by European Commission Cartel and Abuse of dominance cases
Table 1.4 presents the descriptive statistics for two di¤erent samples. The sample ICA all
refers to cartel and abuse of dominance investigations carried out by the Italian Competition
Authority, whereas the sample EC all refers to the investigations, for the same sort of
violations, carried out by the European Commission. The sample covers slightly di¤erent
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periods of time respectively 1991-2007 for the Italian sample and 1979-2004 for the European
sample. For both samples we present two statistics, the average percentage reduction in
ne21, and the percentage of cases that are upheld22 by the last Court of appeal. The
statistics are presented for the whole period and for two sub-periods with the time break
xed at the year 1998 for both samples.
Looking at the whole period for both samples we see that the average ne reduction and
the percentage of cases that are upheld is fairly similar for the two samples with the average
ne reduction being around 30% and the average share of upheld cases being around 66%.
However, if we break the time period at the year 199823 we can isolate two opposite trends.
For the Italian sample we nd that the average ne reduction increased over time while the
share of upheld cases decreased. The opposite is true for the European sample where average
ne reduction decreased and the share of upheld cases increased. It seems that for the Italian
case the higher use of nes after 1998 was accompanied by both a higher level of reduction
in nes and higher annulment of the decisions taken by the antitrust Authority.
These ndings can help us shade some light on the results of the econometric exercise
both when we look only at the Italian data and when we compare the Italian results to the
ndings at the European level24.
So far we have only showed some descriptive statistics about the investigations and
incidental decisions of the Italian Competition Authority. To study the impact of these
events on the investigated rmsmarket value we have to resort to econometric techniques.
Also, to undertake this study we need to restrict our sample to only those rms that have
some traded security, which means, that we will be focusing on those cases in which at least
a rm is listed on a stock market.
21We only consider cases that are appealed and that come to judgement. The percentage ne reduction is
computed as follows: % reduction = (final fine initial fine)initial fine :The data are rst averaged at the single antitrust
case level from which we then compute the sample average, This is done because large cartel cases, in which
it is likely that all rms experience the same level of reduction whould otherwise bias our estimate.
22We consider a case uphelded if the nal ne is weakly higher than the two third of the initial ne.
23For both the Italian and the European antitrust enforcement we can nd some elements that justify
the presence of a structural break around 1998. For the Italian case see Ghezzi and Polo (2001) and for the
European case see Langus et al. (2010).
24The ndings at the European level are taken from Langus et al. (2010).
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1.3 Using Event Study to detect the impact of antitrust investigations
Event study methodology uses nancial market data25 to measure the impact of eco-
nomics events on rms market value. This methodology has been widely used in nancial
and economics literature and typical events examined are corporate and nancial decisions,
regulatory changes and legal actions. Event studies have been extensively applied to an-
titrust in particular to the study of mergers and to a lesser extent to the study of abuse of
dominance or price xing practices (for a survey see Cichello and Lamdin (2006))
Event studies estimate the abnormal return of a rmssecurity at the realization of the
event of interest and, assuming market rationality, provide the measure of the (unanticipated)
change in rmsmarket value that is due to the event realization. In this paper we perform
what is known as a short term event study that looks at the market reaction immediately
after the event realization and capture the (unanticipated) expected impact of the news.
The impact captured using short term event study might di¤er from the actual long term
e¤ect of the event realization. Indeed, only long term event studies or other measures that
look at rmsrealized prots over time might be employed to estimate the long term actual
impact of the news. However, these two latter methods would require a longer time horizon
and would introduce other biases. Indeed, as the time window considered gets larger it will
be even more di¢ cult to isolate the e¤ect of the event of interest from other confounding
events that may occur over time. For these reasons, assuming rational expectations, short
term event studies provide a powerful tool to identify the unanticipated expected e¤ect of
the event.
Our empirical analysis relies on the theoretical foundation of event studies set forward
by Campbell et al. (1997). Following their approach the typical roadmap of a standard event
study evolves according to the following step procedure:
 Dene event of interest
 Dene period in which security price is analyzed (i.e. Event window)
 Selection criteria for the inclusion of rms
 Compute normal return and derive abnormal return
 (Statistically) Test results
25Event studies are usually performed using data about common stock prices. However other types of
traded securities might be used.
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In the following sections we present how we adapt the above event study methodology
to our case study.
1.3.1 Event denition
This paper studies the impact of antitrust proceedings on rmsmarket value. The
investigation and decision process cannot be summarized by a single event as they consist
of several subsequent steps. Hence, we consider all the three main events (described above
in section 1.2.1) that characterize a typical Italian antitrust inquiry.
1. Start of an antitrust investigation
2. Decision of the Italian Competition Authority:
(a) infringement (with or without a ne), or
(b) acquittal
3. Decisions of the last Court of appeal (only in case of appeal)26.
Along the investigation process the above events mark clearly the time at which novel
information reach the investors. Under the e¢ cient market assumption, with rational in-
vestors, the price of a security should reect the discounted sum of future dividends and at
any given point in time the security prices fully reect all available information. Hence, we
expect the price to be highly correlated with current and expected future protability of the
rm. We claim that the outcome of each of the above steps adds new information about the
expected future protability of the rms. Therefore, if the event realization is unanticipated
(i.e. it has not yet been discounted by investors), it should be reected in an immediate
change in the price of the security.
As stated, we then treat the realizations of the three events as unanticipated. However,
we could also think that the realizations of the above steps are not totally unexpected. For
instance, the market might form an opinion or speculate about the likelihood of the outcome
of each single event. Still we can think that at each stage the realization of the event adds
some new information to the market. Hence, our estimates will identify that part that was
not (correctly) anticipated by the market.
26In the Italian system before the last court of appeal, the Consiglio di Stato, there is a rst court of
appeal called Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale (TAR). However we do not study this event as it is only
an intermediate step between the ICA decision and the nal decision of the last court of appeal.
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Taking, as an example, the rst event (i.e. the start of investigation) the stock market
might have already formed the expectation that some rms will be investigated by the ICA.
However, the exact timing and extent of investigation is unknown until it realizes.
Similarly, if we think about the second event (i.e. the decision of the competition Au-
thority) the stock market might well expect a negative decision implying the ceasing of the
anticompetitive practice and a possible ne (both reducing the protability of the rm),
however only when the Authority releases its decision the market will know the exact details
and implication of the decision. The same can be said for the Court of Appeal where some
degree of unexpectedness remains as the Court of appeal can also overturn the decision of
the competition Authority.
In conclusion as we cannot control for the part that the market has already discounted
what we aim to estimate is the stock market reaction to the unanticipated information that
each event carries.
1.3.2 Event window
After assuming that markets are e¢ cient and investors rational we have to make con-
jectures about the timing of market reaction. If the reaction is quick we could expect that
the price of the security is discounted the same day an unexpected news hits the market.
However, there might be reasons why we should extend this event window. In similar studies
(for instance, Langus et al. (2010); Bittlingmayer and Hazlett (2000) and Bosch and Eckard
(1991)) it is common to nd event window of three or more days. Usually, having a time
horizon that starts some days before the event allows to include in the analysis potential
lead e¤ects (e.g. leakages of information acquired by the market). Similarly, having a time
horizon that includes some days after the event accommodates for late reactions to the
announcement.
Indeed, there is no specic rule on how to choose the event window. However, there
is a clear trade-o¤, indeed as we include more days we allow for the possibility that other
events confound our results, thus losing precision in our estimates. In this paper to dene
the size of the event window of reference, for each event, we study the process of information
disclosure. Hence, for each event we dene an event window that depends on the observed
information disclosure pattern.
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1.3.3 Selection criteria
To perform the event study we need the stock price of the investigated rmstraded
securities. Therefore we have to restrict our starting sample to only those rms that are listed
on a stock market27. This rst selection reduces our starting sample from 552 observations
to 155. Table 1.5 shows the breakdown of this selection by the type of violation and type of
rm. The columns from 2 to 5 ("All listed") refer to all the observations for which either
the single investigated rm or its mother company are listed. In the columns from 6 to 9
("Italian sub-sample") we further reduce the sample of listed rms to only those rms that
are listed in the Italian stock market (Milan Stock Exchange also known as Borsa Italiana)
and for which the investigated rms are directly listed (i.e. the nancial entity listed coincide
with the rm under investigation28).
We perform this latter selection in order to gain in the signicance and magnitude of our
estimates. Indeed, the closer is the match between the business unit under investigation and
the nancial entity for which we have the stock price the lower is the bias in our estimates.
This is an issue that naturally arises in this type of study. Indeed, the announced event
(in this case an antitrust event) has to signicantly a¤ect the expected protability of the
nancial entity under study if we are to expect a measurable e¤ect29.
From table 1.5 we see that the distribution of the observations across the types of decision
is similar to what we saw in table 1.2 for all rms (not only the listed ones). As expected
the observations relating to cartels in which there is an infringement decision accompanied
by a ne are in great number compared to the other types of violation and decisions. Also,
the distribution of the observations in the two selected sub-samples seems to follow the
proportions found in the initial larger sample.
For instance, in the sample All Listed we have 99 observations in which the ICA nds
a violations of competition law and also inicts a ne. Then we have 41 cases in which the
infringement decision is not followed by a ne and 15 observations in which the ICA nds
27In case of multiple listing we give preference to stock listed on the Italian stock market. In case rms
only had foreign listing we choose the most important in terms of capitalization.
28For instance if a rm under investigation is owned by a listed mother company we do not include it in
our sample. This selection method does not rule out that the listed company might be a multi-product rm
and the antitrust investigation might involve only a single product.
29For instance, in our study there are many cases in which the rm under investigation is the Italian
subsidiary of a foreign based multinational. If the Italian rm does not account for a high share of the
total aggregate revenue and it is not independetly listed than we would expect that an Italian antitrust
investigation would have only a marginal impact on the stock prices of the multinational rm. Other studies
have used di¤erent approaches, for instance Mariniello (2006) includes in his sample only the rms for which
the activity under investigation represents at least 10% of total aggregate turnover.
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no violations of competition law.
Table 1.5: Sample Selection
a) All listed b) Only Italian
Decision Cartel Abuse Cartel & Abuse Total Cartel Abuse Cartel & Abuse Total
Infringement and ne 78 14 7 99 32 11 0 43
79% 12% 7% 64% 74% 20% 0% 58%
Infringement no ne 20 17 4 41 12 12 3 27
49% 27% 9% 26% 44% 29% 10% 36%
Acquitt 7 2 6 15 0 1 3 4
47% 9% 29% 10% 0% 13% 43% 5%
Total 105 33 17 155 44 24 6 74
68% 16% 10% 100% 59% 23% 8% 100%
Note 1: This sample includes all the observations for which the rm is listed in a stock market
Note 2: This sub-sample includes only the rms listed in the Italian stock market and for which the nancial
entity correspond to the investigated rm
Note 3: Percentages in columns 5 and 9 are column percentages; while in columns 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8 are row
percentages
When we look at the sub-sample Only Italian we have a total of 74 observations, roughly
half of the All listed sample. Among these observations there are 43 observations related to
infringement decisions in which the Authority inicts a ne. Then there are 27 observations
of infringement decisions (without ne) and only 4 cases in which there is an acquittal
decision.
Table 1.6 presents some descriptive statistics about average and total nes for the selected
observations. For the whole sample we can see that in aggregate terms the observations
selected account for a total of 1.63 billion euro of nes given by the Italian Competitions
Authority, with an average ne of 16 million euro (however as suggested by the high standard
deviation the ne amount varies considerably across observations). If we compare these data
with the data presented in section 1.2.3 we can see that the observations, in the selected
sample represent only the 25% (99 out of 388) of the total number of observations for which
there is an infringement decision accompanied by a ne. However, the nes inicted in these
99 observations represent the 80% of the total nes given by the Authority for cartel or abuse
of dominance cases.
Also the average ne for the selected sample amounts to 16 million euro whereas in the
starting sample the average ne is only 5 million euro. This follows from the fact that nes
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Table 1.6: Sample Selection Fines
ICA ne Final ne Avg. Ratios
All Appeal Appeal nal/initial ne/cap.
(ml. euro) (ml. euro) (ml.euro)
All listed
Avg. 16.47 15.87 9.70 57% 0.39%
(38.01) (28.75) (22.41) (45%) (0.87%)
total 1630.98 1222.22 746.76 61%
Only Italian
Avg. 23.98 21.24 15.10 48% 0.72%
(51.72) (35.19) (29.96) (46%) (1.15%)
total 1031.00 658.59 468.19 71%
Note 1: Standard deviations in parenthesis
Note 2: The total for the nal initial ne ratio represent the ratio between total initial
ne and total nal ne
Note 3: The capitalization refers to the single stock, i.e. it is not consolidated
Note 4: The columns Appeal only selects those observations for which there was an
appeal against AGCM decision
are proportional to rms turnover and as listed rms are usually larger, than non listed ones,
we expect to nd higher absolute level of nes among listed rms.
In Table 1.6 we also compare the ne inicted by the ICA to the ne that rms actually
pay.after the appeal procedure (we compare only the nes for the observations that appeal
against the Authoritys decision and for which the appeal procedure has ended). In aggregate
terms we see that during the appeal procedure a total of 475 million euro of nes is annulled
(from 1222 million to 746 million) and the total nal nes represent only the 61% of the total
initial ne. Among the observations in which we have an appeal the average ne declines
from 15.9 million euro to 9.7 million euro and on average the nal ne that each rm has
to pay is only the 57% of the initial ne. In order to compare the size of the ne to the
capitalization of the convicted rms we also compute the average ne capitalization ratio for
the selected samples. From the table we see that on average the ne inicted by the ICA
represents the 0.4% of the investigated rmscapitalization.
Table 1.6 also presents the same statistics for the sub-sample of Italian rm. This smaller
sample accounts for roughly 1 billion euro in terms of total ne and the average ne is around
24 million. Hence it seems that the Italian rms ned by the Authority receive, on average,
higher nes than foreign based ones. In addition, when we select only the observations for
which there is an appeal, we nd that during the appeal procedure there is a reduction of
200 million euro in nes with the total sum collected by the Authority being the 71% of the
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initial level. When we look at the impact on the individual rms we nd that on average
the nal ne only represented the 48% of the initial ne.
Table 1.7: Antitrust nes reduction: Italian vs European cases with listed rms
Fine reduction Share upheld cases
period # cases avg. reduction stdv % of uphelded stdv
ICA all
1991-1997 8 25% 46% 75% 46%
1998-2007 28 37% 42% 63% 49%
1991-2007 36 34% 43% 66% 48%
EC all
1979-1997 16 39% 45% 56% 51%
1998-2005 21 33% 39% 71% 46%
1979-2005 37 35% 41% 65% 48%
Note 1: ICA all, Italian Competition Authority Cartel and Abuse of dominance cases
Note 2: EC all decisions by European Commission Cartel and Abuse of dominance cases
Finally, Table 1.7 compares the selected sample of listed rm to a sample of listed rms
ned by the European Commission30. The comparison is similar to the one carried out in
section 1.2.3.1 (see Table 1.4) the only di¤erence is that both samples (the Italian and the
European) are now restricted only to listed rms, the ones used in the econometric exercise.
Again we look at the average reduction in nes31 after the appeal procedure and at the share
of cases that are upheld32 by the last Court. This analysis conrms the results found for the
entire sample (table 1.4) where we nd that over the all period the Italian and European
sample exhibit similar percentage ne reductions and share of upheld cases. Also the data
conrms the above ndings that for the Italian sample the average reduction in ne increased
over time while the share of upheld cases decreased and the opposite is true for the European
sample. Hence it seems that the samples of listed rms are subjects to the same patterns of
the non-listed rms.
Again, these ndings can help us shade some light on the results of the econometric
exercise both when we look at the Italian data in isolation and when we compare the Italian
30This sample of European Commission cases is the one used in Langus et al. (2010).
31We only consider cases that are appealed and that come to judgement. The percentage ne reduction is
computed as follows: % reduction = (finalfine initial fine)initial fine :The data are rst averaged at the single antitrust
case level from which we then compute the sample average, This is done because large cartel cases, in which
it is likely that all rms experience the same level of reduction whould otherwise bias our estimate.
32We consider a case uphelded if the nal ne is weakly higher than the two third of the initial ne.
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results to the ndings at the European level33.
1.3.4 Normal and abnormal returns
The aim of event studies is to examine the performance of rmssecurities around the
date of the event. The challenge is then to disentangle the e¤ect of the event from other
rm level or market level e¤ects. This is usually done by looking at the abnormal return, as
dened by equation 1.1. Such an equation says that the abnormal return, ARit; of security
i at time t is given by the actual return, Rit
34; minus the expected normal return Rnit (Xt
is the conditioning information). Where the normal return represents the return that would
be expected had the event not taken place.
ARit = R

it   E [RnitjXt] (1.1)
Hence, before being able to say something about the abnormal return we rst have
to make some assumptions about how we construct the normal return. In this paper we
estimate normal returns assuming that individual rmsreturns are related to the market
return as in the market model (equation 1.2). The market model relates individual rms
return to a constant  and the return on a market index, Rmt (i.e. Xt =  + R

mt), and
a rm specic return, it; unrelated to the overall market and with an expected value of
zero. This model is widely used in nancial and event study literature and although other
statistical and economic models have also received some interest35 it has been shown that
they do not o¤er particular gains over the market model (Campbell et al. (1997)).
Rnit = + R

mt + it (1.2)
We then proceed by estimating, in the estimation window, the unknown parameters 
and  that are then used, in the event window, to estimate the normal and abnormal return.
We estimate the parameters of the market model with two di¤erent methods(see section
33The ndings at the European level are taken from Langus et al. (2010).
34Here return Rit is dened as the percentage change in the price of a securities i between two consecutive
trading days (i.e.t and t  1). Rit is dened as: Ri;t = ln(Pi;t)  ln(Pi;t 1);where Pit is the price of security
i at time t.
35For instance the simplest choice could be the constant mean market model in which Xt is only a
constant. Other statistical models have been proposed like the factor model and the market adjusted return
model. In addition also some economic models have been put forward like the capital asset pricing model
and the arbitrage pricing theory model (for a description of these model see Campbell et al. (1997)).
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1.7 in Appendix B for details): rstly using a standard OLS estimation (section 1.7.0.3);
and secondly using a non-parametric approach (section 1.7.0.4) known as Theils estimation
(rstly suggested by Theil (1950) and reported in Dombrow et al. (2000)).
1.3.4.1 Abnormal returns and aggregation
Once established the method to compute the, daily and rms specic, normal return
we can estimate the abnormal return for all the days in the event window (values between
T2and T3 in Figure 1.2). In our analysis the interest is not exclusively on the abnormal
performance observed on the day of the event but it extends to the abnormal performance
observed over an interval of days around the date of the event. Indeed depending on the
specic event (start of investigation, Authoritys decision, last Court decision) and on the
observed pattern of information disclosure (i.e. release of unexpected news), we restrict our
attention to event windows of varying length, that at least contain more than one day. Also
the interest will not be on the single stock price reaction but on the average reaction across
the sample. Hence we have to aggregate the daily and individual abnormal return both over
the length of the event window and over the observations in the sample.
We dene the daily average abnormal return (DAAR) as the aggregation across rms
of the daily abnormal returns as in (1.3). Then by aggregating the DAAR over the event
window we dene the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) as in (1.4). When we do
not aggregate across rms but only over time at the single rm level we dene the cumulative
abnormal return (CAR) as in (1.5).
DAARt =
1
N
NX
i=1
ARit (1.3)
CAAR =
T3X
t=T2
DAARt (1.4)
CARi =
T3X
t=T2
ARit (1.5)
The above three measures are used to investigate the impact of the event under di¤erent
perspectives. The CAAR provides evidence on the average (unexpected) e¤ect of the event
on an average rm during the selected event window. The DAAR shows the average impact
of the event at each di¤erent day of the event window. Finally, by looking at the CAR we
can study the heterogeneous impact of the event on the cross section of observations.
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1.3.5 Testing for statistical signicance
The above statistics measure the magnitude of the impact of the event but are not
informative about the statistical signicance of the impact. In the empirical analysis we
then employ standard test statistics to say something about the statistical signicance of
the e¤ect. In section 1.7.1 (Appendix B) we outline the testing framework and provide a
test statistics for each of the aggregate abnormal return measures. As we adopt two di¤erent
estimation strategies for the market model, we also adopt two di¤erent testing framework.
For the OLS estimates we use a standard parametric test (section 1.7.1.1) while for the
Theils method estimates we adopt a nonparametric test (section 1.7.1.1). Both tests are
derived under the null hypothesis that the event under study has no impact on the mean or
variance of returns (i.e. the expected abnormal return equals zero).
1.4 Results
In the following sections we present the results of the empirical analysis. The events
that we consider for the empirical analysis are:1) Start of the investigation; 2) Decision of
the Italian Competition Authority; 3) Decision of the last Court of appeal (see 1.3.1).
For each event we rst dene an hypothesis that we then test in the empirical analysis.
To formulate our hypotheses we follow the results of the modelling framework outlined in
Langus et al. (2010). In their paper, the authors model the procedure of a typical European
antitrust investigation to predict the sign of the impact of three di¤erent events: the dawn
raid; the Commissions decision; and the decision of the last Court of appeal. The same
modelling framework seems to well represent also a typical Italian antitrust investigation.
Therefore, we use their results to inform our hypotheses about the sign of the impacts that
are of interest for our case. Box 1 summarizes these predictions36. For the event Start of the
investigation we predict to observe a negative e¤ect. For the event Decision of the ICA and
Decision of the last Court of appeal we di¤erentiate the predictions based on the outcome
of the event. In the former case we predict a negative e¤ect after a decision of infringement
(with or without ne, although they will di¤er in magnitude with the latter been higher).
Di¤erently we predict a positive e¤ect after a decision of acquittal. For the last event (Court
of appeals decision) we predict a negative impact when the Court uphold the Authoritys
decision and we predict a positive e¤ect when the Authoritys decision is annulled.
36In Langus et al. (2010) the authors have no information about the acquittals, neither at the dawn
raid stage nor at the Commissions decision stage. Di¤erently in this paper we also observe these type of
occurrences, however the sign of the impacts are not a¤ected by this.
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1. Start of an antitrust investigation (- negative sign)
2. Decision of the Antitrust Authority, divided in:
(a) infringement decision
i. with sanction (- negative sign)
ii. without sanction (- negative sign)
(b) acquittal (+ positive sign)
3. Decision of the last Court of Appeal (Consiglio di Stato), divided in:
(a) upheld Authority decision (- negative)
(b) annull Authority decision (+ positive)
Box 1: Prediction of the sign of the e¤ects of the event
Given the above predictions for each specic event we formulate the following one sided
hypotheses:
Hypotheses + positive sign - negative sign
null H0 : AR < 0 H0 : AR > 0
alternative HA : AR > 0 HA : AR < 0
Finally we also make use of another set of results developed in the same paper. Langus
et al. (2010) nd that, both with a higher ne or a higher probability that the last Court
of appeal upholds the ne, we should expect a stronger impact of the events on the stock
market valuation of rms. We investigate this latter set of hypotheses looking at two di¤erent
samples: the rst for the years from 1991 to 1997 and the second from 1998 onwards. This
two periods appear to be di¤erent under both dimensions, the level of nes and the likelihood
to have an upheld decision.
The following sections present and discuss the results for each event.
1.4.1 Start of an antitrust investigation
Following the predictions outlined in the above section, for this event we test the hy-
pothesis that the start of the investigation has a negative impact on the market value of the
investigated rms. The event study aims to measure the market reaction to the unexpected
portion of the event realization. For what concerns this event we do not nd evidence of the
market shortly anticipating the event. Indeed when we look at the press coverage we nd
evidence of event coverage only after the event realization, usually one or two days after the
ICA issues a press release. At the start of the investigation investors should not anticipate
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Table 1.8: Start of Investigation Results
All rms (N=154) Italian sel. (N=73)
Event Window OLS Theil OLS Theil
31 days (-20;+10) AR 0:34 1:52 1:92 3:26
test 0:34  1:06 1:44 0:19
11 days (-5;+5) AR  0:14 0:20 1:28 1:76
test  0:28  0:56 1:68 1:46
6 days (-1;+5) AR  0:22  0:01 0:98 1:24
test  0:56  0:34 1:63 1:51
3 days (0;+2) AR  0:66  0:57  0:59  0:46
test  2:62  1:95  1:53  1:09
Estimation Window (-230;-30)
Abnormal Returns as percentage
One-sided test, signicance levels *** 1% ** 5% * 10%
which investigation will lead to an infringement decision and which not, therefore we can
look at our aggregate sample of 154 observations altogether. We also estimate the impact
only for the selected subsample of Italian observations.
Table 1.8 presents the results. Given the type of event and the evidence gathered about
the process of information disclosure, for this event we are mostly interested on the market
reactions taking place immediately after the event realization, that is in the window (0;+2).
When we look at the full sample we nd that after the start of the investigation, on average,
the market value of the rms under investigation decreases by around 0.66% (signicant at
5%). Also, as robustness check, we nd that this estimate has the same magnitude and
statistical signicance for the two estimation methods employed (OLS and Theil). When we
look only at the Italian selection we nd an impact of similar magnitude and sign however
only the OLS estimate is statistically signicant (at 10%). Surprisingly, it seems that the
market reaction on the foreign rms is higher than the reaction for Italian rms. When
we look at the cross section of observations we nd that, in the event window (0;+2) 87
observations have a negative sign while 67 have a positive sign.
In table 1.8 we also report the estimates for other selected event windows. However, we do
not nd any evidence of others statistically signicant e¤ects in longer event windows. Given
the nature of the event and the clear event date realization we are indeed more condent in
restricting our analysis only to the shorter event window.
We also check if the market reaction to the event has changed over time. As we argued
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Table 1.9: Start of Investigation Results: Pre vs Post 1998
Pre-1998 All rms (N=61) Italian sel. (N=41)
Event Window OLS Theil OLS Theil
3 days (0;+2) AR  1:06  0:98  0:44  0:35
Test  2:56  2:01  0:81  0:72
Post-1998 All rms (N=93) Italian sel. (N=32)
Event Window OLS Theil OLS Theil
3 days (0;+2) AR  0:40  0:30  0:79  0:59
Test  1:26  0:77  1:44  0:77
Estimation Window (-230;-30)
Abnormal Returns as percentage; One-sided test, signicance lev-
els *** 1% ** 5% * 10%
above we separate our sample in two periods Pre-1998 and Post-1998.
Table 1.9 presents the event study for the two sub-periods. From the results we can see
that the impact of the event is higher during the Pre-1998 period (for the full sample we nd
a statistically signicant e¤ect of -1%). Surprisingly it seems that in the period Post-1998,
despite the higher resort to nes from the ICA, the event start of the investigation has no
statistically signicant impact on the market value of the rms under investigation.
We investigate further this issue and we regress the 154 individual CARs37 (3-day event
window, 0;+2) on a constant, on the rm capitalization, on a time trend and on a dummy for
the observation in the Italian subsample38, on a dummy for the type of infringement (abuse or
cartel) and on a dummy that captures the outcome of the Authoritys decision (infringement
or acquittal). Table 1.15 (Appendix C), in the rst column, presents the results of this
regression. About the presence of a time e¤ect we nd that the coe¢ cient of the time trend
(datestart) is positive and statistically signicant (at 1%)39. We can interpret the coe¢ cient
as that, ceteris paribus, an extra year is associated with a higher 3-day CAAR by 0.15
percentage points. This is consistent with the ndings that over time we observe a decrease
37The CAR is the individual rms Cumulative Abnormal Return (cfr. 1.3.4.1 )
38As said above the observations in the Italian subsample are those observations for which the rm under
investigation is Italian and it is not owned by a mother company, hence it is directly listed on a stock market
(usually the Milan stock market). For these observations we expect to nd a higher e¤ect than in the case
the listed nancial entity is the mother company or the rm is a foreign rm.
39We also check for the presence of a quadratic time trend but we reject this specication in favor of the
linear trend.
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in the (negative) e¤ect of the event start of investigation. From the regression we obtain some
other interesting ndings. The coe¢ cient of the dummy that controls for the outcome of the
decision (infringed) is not signicant. It seems that at this rst stage the market reaction
is independent of the future decision of the Authority (infringement or acquittal decision).
Also we nd that the coe¢ cient of the Italian dummy is not statistically signicant. Hence
the impact for Italian rms, directly listed in the stock market, is not di¤erent than the
impact of any other rm in the sample. The coe¢ cient on market capitalization is positive
and signicant meaning that rms with higher capitalization are less a¤ected by antitrust
investigations40 and that the magnitude of the impact is not correlated with the rmsmarket
capitalization. Finally the coe¢ cient on the type of infringement is not signicant.
Overall these results suggest that the event start of investigation has a limited impact on
the market valuation of investigated rms and the e¤ect is limited to the days immediately
after the event realization. Also, di¤erently from what expected, the market reaction for
Italian rms is not greater than that for the foreign based (or owned) rms. Moreover there
is evidence that while before 1998 the impact was sizeable, over time this e¤ect vanished.
The regression analysis also suggests that the sample does not su¤er from correlation issues
as regression estimates conrms the results of the aggregated event study.
1.4.2 Decision of the Antitrust Authority
In this section we study the central event of the investigation, the decision of the antitrust
Authority. In our modelling, at the decision stage, the Authority can take two decisions:
infringement, in case a rm is found guilty; and acquittal in case no evidence has been
found41. In turn, in case of an infringement decision, the Authority can sanction or not the
convicted rms. Finally, in case of a ne, the Authority sets the amount of the ne.
Following the predictions developed in Box 1 we proceed to test them on our sample.
We start by looking at the infringement decisions and then we discuss the acquittal decisions.
1.4.2.1 Infringement decisions
Table 1.10 reports the estimates of the event study conducted for the infringement deci-
sions. For this analysis we further divide the sample in Fine and No ne cases in the attempt
40Another explanation might be that rms with higher capitalizations are rms that are foreing and
multiproduct hence we expect a lower impact on their market valuation.
41In our sample we do not have any case in which there is an application of leniency or in which the case
is closed with committments taken by the parts.
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to isolate the e¤ect of the ne. As for the event start of investigation, also the Authoritys
decision takes place during a specic and clearly identied time period. We can be quite
condent of correctly identifying the date of this event. Indeed by inspectioning the press
coverage around the date of the event we do nd evidence that the information disclosure
takes place the same day or immediately the day after the Authoritys press release. For this
reason also in this case we look mainly at the CAAR observed during a short event window.
For this case we select as our best estimate the event window, of length 3 days, that span
from one day before the event to one day after the event. The event date is chosen as the
day in which we nd press coverage about the decision, and this is usually the day after the
Authority issues an o¢ cial press release. We then include the day before and the day after
the event to capture for the (possible) early and late responses to the news. Nonetheless,
table 1.10 also reports the estimates for larger event windows to check for other movements
around the date of the event.
Starting from the ned cases and the All rms sample, we nd that the impact, on
the 3-day window, has a negative sign but it is not statistically signicant for both the
parametric and nonparametric estimates. We nd some negative (between 0.5% and 0.9%
respectively for Theils and OLS estimates) and statistically signicant (at 10%) estimates
when we allow the event window to include up to 5 days after the event date. This might be
justied on the ground that when foreign traded rms are included it might take more time
before we observe a reaction to events taking place in Italy. Di¤erently if we restrict the
analysis only to the Italian subsample of ned cases we do nd a sizeable impact of around
1% and 1.3%, respectively for the OLS and the Theils estimates, and both estimates are
statistically signicant (respectively at 10% and 5%). For this event in presence of a ne we
nd that Italian rms directly listed experience a higher loss in market value than foreign
ones.
When we look at the subsample of cases in which there is an infringement decision not
followed by a ne we still nd an e¤ect of the expected (negative) sign, however at the 3-day
event window only the nonparametric estimate for the All rms subsample is statistically
signicant (at 10%).
Also for this event we check if the stock market reaction has changed over time. In table
1.11 we present two event studies, conducted on the whole sample of infringed rms (we do
not di¤erentiate between ned and not ned). The rst event study refers to the decisions
taken before 1998 and the second to the decisions taken after. In line with what we nd for
the event start of the investigation for the decision we nd an even more marked di¤erence
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Table 1.10: Authority Decision Results:Infringed
Fine No ne
All rms Italian Sel. All rms Italian Sel.
(N=98) (N=42) (N=41) (N=27)
Event Window OLS Theil OLS Theil OLS Theil OLS Theil
31 days (-20;+10) 0:13 1:75 0:33 2:71 1:88 3:11 1:77 2:93
test 0:10 0:39 0:13 0:82 1:09 0:35 0:79  0:03
11 days (-5:+5)  0:87  0:34 0:00 0:71 0:44 0:74 0:38 0:63
test  1:14  0:84 0:00 0:74 0:45  0:06 0:30 0:06
6 days (-1...+5)  0:91  0:54  1:29  0:74  0:26  0:08  0:08  0:01
test  1:53  1:37  1:17  0:67  0:33  0:05  0:08 0:08
3 days (-1...+1)  0:43  0:28  1:06  1:32  0:60  0:54  0:60  0:55
test  1:10  1:27  1:62  1:85  1:19  1:48  0:92  1:26
Estimation Window (-230;-30)
Abnormal Returns as percentage; One-sided test, signicance levels *** 1% ** 5% * 10%
between the two time periods. Before 1998 the estimates have all a negative sign and are
between -1.1% and -1.55% with a higher impact for Italian rms. The estimates are strongly
statistically signicant (at 1%) and the two estimation methods o¤er very similar results.
As in the previous section we nd evidence that in the second period (Post-1998) the mar-
ket does not react to antitrust events and indeed we do not nd any statistically signicant
estimate. Again despite the Authority making a more systematic use of its sanctionatory
power, after 1998, we nd that antitrust infringement decisions and nes have, on average,
no e¤ect on the market value of the convicted rms.
We also conduct a regression analysis to examine further the presence of a time trend
and to inspect the determinants of the individual CARs. We regress the 3-day CARs (event
window -1;+1), for the 139 observations for which there is an infringement decision, on a
constant, on a time trend, on the size of the ne, on a dummy for the type of infringement, on
a dummy for the Italian subsample and on the market capitalization of the nancial entity.
Table 1.15 (Appendix C), column 2, presents the results for this regression. The coe¢ cient on
the time trend (t_datedec) is positive and statistically signicant (at 10%) suggesting that
an extra year is associated with a higher CAR by a 0.14 percentage points The magnitude
of the trend is similar to the one found for the start of the investigation. Also we nd that
the coe¢ cient on the Italian dummy is negative but not statistically di¤erent from zero.
Most likely once we control for capitalization (signicant at 10%) we do not nd di¤erences
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Table 1.11: Authority Decision Results:Infringed, Pre vs Post 1998
Pre-1998 All rms (N=54) Italian sel. (N=38)
Event Window OLS Theil OLS Theil
3 days (-1...+1)  1:17  1:09  1:55  1:45
test  2:62  2:81  2:71  2:44
Post-1998 All rms (N=85) Italian sel. (N=31)
Event Window OLS Theil OLS Theil
3 days (-1...+1)  0:04 0:11  0:41  0:14
test  0:10  0:01  0:47  0:09
Estimation Window (-230;-30)
Abnormal Returns as percentage; One-sided test, signicance lev-
els *** 1% ** 5% * 10%
across rms. About the other regressors we nd that neither the amount of the ne nor the
dummy for the type of infringement have coe¢ cients that are statistically signicant. To
analyze these two regressors further we run two other regressions in which we regress the
CARs only on the nes and on the nes as a share of the rmsmarket capitalizations. The
results for these two regressions are presented in table 1.15 (Appendix C), columns 3 and 4.
None of these coe¢ cients is statistically di¤erent from zero. Finally we also check whether
the magnitude of the CARs depends upon the type of infringement. To do so we regress the
139 3-day CARs on a dummy that takes the value of 1 when the type of infringement is an
abuse of dominance and 0 in case of a cartel case. The results from this regression (table
1.15 Appendix C, columns 5) nds that the type of violation has no statistically signicant
e¤ect on the estimated CARs. Hence we conclude that the main determinant for the size of
the individual CARs are the time period, and the capitalization of the convicted rms.
1.4.2.2 Acquittal decisions
At the decision stage the other type of action the Authority can take is to acquit the
rm(s) under investigation. In our sample we do not have many of these cases as the
Authority conducts a preliminary investigation before opening a new case and many decisions
to not proceed further are taken at that stage. Nonetheless given the sample we have we can
test the prediction developed in box 1 also for this type of event. In particular we test the
hypothesis that after an investigation was started the event Authority acquit the rm should
have a positive impact on the market value of the rm object of the acquittal decision.
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Table 1.12: Authority Decision Results:Acquitted
All rms (N=15) Italian sel. (N=9)
Event Window OLS Theil OLS Theil
31 days (-20;+10) 2:97 2:41 3:57 2:55
0:98 1:36 0:85 1:17
11 days (-5;+5) 1:38 1:15 1:76 1:32
0:80 0:92 0:74 0:85
6 days (-1;+5) 0:35 0:29 0:29 0:14
0:26 0:53 0:15 0:36
3 days (-1;+1) 0:51 0:51 0:69 0:68
0:58 0:74 0:56 0:76
Estimation Window (-230;-30)
Abnormal Returns as percentage; One-sided test, signicance lev-
els *** 1% ** 5% * 10%
In the regression analysis we nd that for the event start of the investigation the impact
is similar across the rms and it is not related to the nal outcome of the investigation. This
might well suggests that after a "negative" event, a positive event (acquittal decision) should
have a positive impact on rmsmarket valuation, at least to recoup the small loss in value
we nd at the start of investigation stage.
We perform another even study and again we select as our event window of reference
the 3-day event window that contains the day of the event plus the day before and the one
after. Table 1.12 presents the results for this window and other di¤erent event windows of
interest.
When we look at the full sample or only at the Italian subsample we nd that the esti-
mates have all the expected (positive) sign but almost none is statistically signicant. Across
all the event window there is only one statistically signicant estimate (the Theil estimates
for the 31 days window). However, the respective OLS estimates is not signicant and more-
over there is no reason to expect a reaction to take place during that event window. Hence
we are condent in saying that the we do not nd any impact following an acquittal decision
once an investigation had started. In part this nding is consistent with the ndings of the
rst event in which we saw that the market barely reacts after the start of an investigation.
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1.4.3 Last Court of Appeals decision
The last stage of the antitrust trial that we consider is the decision of the last Court
of appeal. As we said above there is another intermediary step between the decision of the
Authority and the last Court of appeal, however since it is only an intermediate step before
the nal judgement we restrict our attention to the nal decision.
However, we do observe some cases in which, after the rst appeal, the case is not brought
to a third Court and we consider this decision as being the last and nal decision.
The last Court can take two di¤erent decisions either to upheld or annul the decision of
the Authority. In section 1.2.2 we document that for this last stage the information disclosure
process is less clear cut with respect to the previous stages. Indeed, we nd that: rstly,
the decisions of the last Court of appeal do not receive the same press coverage observed for
the rst two events; secondly, although we know the dates in which the last Court takes its
decisions we do not know when part or the all content of these decisions is made public.
We nd press coverage about the decisions of the last Court either around the date of
the decision, taken by the jury room (camera di consiglio), or around the date in which
there is the publication of the judgement (pubblicazione dispositivo sentenza). For this type
of event we take as our event window of reference a relatively larger window of a total of 31
days going from 20 days before the event date until 10 days after the event. The event date
is instead considered the date in which we nd some press coverage about the decision (we
use the rst day in which we nd the news). When we do not nd any press coverage of the
decision, we use the date in which the jury room takes the decision.
1.4.3.1 Last Court upheld the Authoritys decision
In this part we present the results for the event in which the last Court upheld the
decision of the antitrust Authority. Table 1.13 presents the results. The rst four columns
of table 1.13 report the estimate for all the observations (in which we found evidence of a
nal decision). The last four columns report the estimates for the subsample of observation
for which we nd some press coverage. For event, following the predictions developed in box
1, we test the hypothesis that an upheld decision from the last Court has a negative impact
on rms market value. If we look at the rst four columns for the 31-day event window we
see that the event has a negative impact of around 2% and the estimates are statistically
signicant either when we look at the full sample or when we look at the Italian subsample
(although the Theil estimate is not statistically signicant).
If we restrict our analysis only to the observations for which we nd press coverage we
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Table 1.13: Last Court Decision Results:Upheld
(a) full sample (b) observations with press coverage
All rms Italian Sel. All rms Italian Sel.
(N=49) (N=17) (N=21) (N=10)
Event Window OLS Theil OLS Theil OLS Theil OLS Theil
31 days (-20;+10) AR  2:82  2:03  5:03  2:05  3:58  3:05  6:71  5:04
test  1:40  2:02  1:08  1:54  1:74  2:45  2:29  2:59
11 days (-5;+5) AR  0:89  0:30 0:19 1:51  0:92  0:38  0:62 0:25
test  0:78  1:11 0:07 0:05  0:79  1:13  0:37  0:67
6 days (-1;+5) AR  0:77  0:35  0:27 0:69  1:20  0:65  2:10  1:30
test  0:85  1:12  0:13 0:26  1:30  1:19  1:59  1:04
3 days (-1;+1) AR 0:12 0:31 0:98 1:46  0:73  0:38  0:43  0:04
test 0:21 0:54 0:72 2:17  1:20  0:92  0:51 0:16
Estimation Window (-230;-30)
Abnormal Returns as percentage; One-sided test, signicance lev-
els *** 1% ** 5% * 10%
see that the size of the impact gets larger, going from -3% to -6.7% (with the impact being
larger for the Italian selection) and we gain statistical signicance. This suggests us that
those events that receive higher attention from the media (for which we nd press coverage)
are also associated with a higher loss in market value.
The shorter event windows do not capture any signicant e¤ects. However given the
rumors and speculations we nd around the date of the event we believe that the full e¤ect
for this event is better captured by a relatively longer event window.
We run a regression on the individual CARs also for this event to analyze the presence of
a time trend and the determinants of the CARs magnitude. We regress the CARs on a time
trend, on the CARs found at the decision stage, the CARs found at the start of investigation,
on a dummy for Italian rms, and on a dummy for the presence of a press release. Table
1.16 (Appendix C, column 1)presents the estimates of this regression. For this data we nd
a statistically signicant time trend. Also, we nd that the CAR at the decision stage is
positively correlated with the CARs at the last Court stage (the coe¢ cient for the CAR at
the start of investigation is not signicant). This suggests that the impact at both stages is
of the same (negative) sign. If a rm has lost market value after the infringement decision it
is likely to lose value also after an upheld decision of the last Court. The other coe¢ cients
are not statistically signicant.
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Table 1.14: Last Court Decision Results:Annulments
(a) full sample (b) observations with press coverage
All rms Italian Sel. All rms Italian Sel.
(N=27) (N=14) (N=22) (N=13)
Event Window OLS Theil OLS Theil OLS Theil OLS Theil
31 days (-20;+10) AR  0:50 0:73 2:53 4:68 0:19 1:25 4:15 5:92
test  0:25  0:66 0:89 0:04 0:09  0:70 1:46 0:31
11 days (-5;+5) AR 0:56 1:28 2:42 3:31 0:61 1:29 2:87 3:65
test 0:50 0:23 1:50 0:69 0:51  0:15 1:76 0:70
6 days (-1;+5) AR 0:56 0:84 0:85 1:22 0:51 0:73 1:33 1:59
test 0:64 0:37 0:67 0:20 0:53  0:07 1:04 0:27
3 days (-1;+1) AR  0:48  0:34  0:46  0:26  0:66  0:52 1:59 0:18
test  0:84  0:75  0:56  1:08  1:08  1:12 0:27  0:80
Estimation Window (-230;-30)
Abnormal Returns as percentage; One-sided test, signicance lev-
els *** 1% ** 5% * 10%
1.4.3.2 Last Court annuls the Authoritys decision
In this last part we look at the impact of the annulment decisions. As stated in box 1 for
this event we predict to nd a positive impact on the market value of rms. We predict to
nd this positive reaction both in the case in which the last Court only annuls the ne and
also in the case in which the last Court nds no infringements hence we do not di¤erentiate
between these two cases.
Table 1.14 presents the results for this event study and likewise the upheld event we
present the analysis for two di¤erent subsamples depending on whether we nd or not press
coverage of the event.
When we look at the 31-day event window we nd that most of the estimates have
the expected (positive) sign. However only one estimate is statistically di¤erent from zero
(at 10%). Moreover when we restrict the sample only to those observations for which we
nd press coverage we nd a higher (positive) impact of this event but still we do not gain
much statistical signicance. For shorter event windows the results do not change, we still
nd mostly positive e¤ects but the estimates are not statistically signicant. We do nd a
statistically signicant estimate (2.87% signicant at 5%) in the 11-day event window.
We run a regression on the individual CARs to analyze the presence of a time trend and
the determinants of the CARs magnitude. We regress the CARs on the same regressors
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we used in the case of an upheld decision. Table 1.16 (Appendix C, column 2) presents the
estimates of this regression. From the estimates we nd that the CAR found at the start of
investigation stage is negatively correlated with the CAR found in case of annulment. Hence,
a negative CAR at the initial stage is associated with a positive CAR after an annulment
decision. This suggests that there is a possibility to recoup the lost market value. The e¤ect
seems to be strong as the coe¢ cient is larger than 1 (in absolute terms). Hence if the loss
in market value at the initial stage was of 1% there is a gain of 1.2% after an annulment
decision. This large e¤ect might realize because the total loss might not be all concentrated
around the start of investigation but also in other periods and the gains after the annulment
have to make up for all losses due to the antitrust investigation. Di¤erently, the coe¢ cient of
the CAR at the decision stage is not signicant. The regression does not nd a statistically
signicant impact for having a press release or for Italian rms
1.5 Conclusions
This paper studies the stock market reaction to antitrust investigations carried out by
the Italian Competition Authority. We study two types of antitrust investigations: abuse
of dominance cases and cartel cases. To estimate the impact of antitrust investigations on
the market valuation of the investigated rms we use standard event studies techniques. In
particular we follow two estimation procedures and perform both a parametric and a fully
non-parametric event study.
We dene the three events of a typical Italian antitrust investigations: 1) start of the
investigation; 2) decision of the Authority; and 3) decisions of the Court of Appeal. The
analysis is conducted both on the full sample (1991-2007) and on two smaller sub-samples
(1991-1997 and 1998-2007). We do so to check if the market reaction to antitrust investi-
gations has changed over time. We break our sample around the year 1998 because there
is evidence of a change in the enforcement of competition law and in the use of nes made
starting from 1998 (Ghezzi and Polo (2001)). For the empirical analysis we build a novel
dataset consisting of 155 case/rms observations in which the investigated rms are listed
(or owned by a listed parent company).
For the event start of investigation we nd that rms on average lose 0.6% (statistically
signicant) of their market value. Interestingly there is a clear di¤erence between the impact
observed pre-1998 and post-1998. In the rst sample there is a loss of around 1% (statistically
signicant) whereas in the latter sample we nd no e¤ect.
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At the stage of the Authoritys decision we distinguish between two events: infringement
decisions and acquittal decisions. For the former we nd a negative e¤ect that is around
1% (but marginally signicant), for the latter we nd a positive e¤ect but not statistically
signicant. As for the event start of investigation we nd that, for infringement decisions,
the market reaction was much stronger (negative) and signicant in the period pre-1998.
About the last Court of appeal we distinguish between upheld and annulment decisions.
When the last Court upholds the Authoritys decision we nd a negative impact of around
2% (statistically signicant). For the annulments we nd a positive e¤ect but not statistically
signicant42.
Our estimates suggest some interesting ndings. First of all the size of the impact, on
the market value of the investigated rms seems to be in line with the e¤ects found in similar
papers (e¤ects ranging from 0.6% to 2%, see Bizjak and Coles (1995), Bosch and Eckard
(1991), Mariniello (2006) and Langus et al. (2010)). In general it is informative to observe
that larger impact is found at the last stage of the whole process, after the last Court of
appeal decision.
This might happen, at least for the Italian case, because the Court of appeal seems to
reject a considerable number of cases. We nd that 35% of the cases are annulled by the last
Court of appeal (27 annulled cases against 49 upheld) and that the nal ne is on average
only the 57% of the initial ne. This evidence might well suggests that investors might wait
until the last step before assessing the impact of the investigation on the market value of
rms43.
To this respect it is not surprising that the start of investigation and the last Court
decision are the event with higher statistical signicance while the Authoritys decision leaves
the market almost una¤ected on average. The start of investigation represents the "surprise"
that a rm might be subject to a ne and to the ceasing of anticompetitive practice, and
hence it entails some market reactions, while the last Court conrms or invalidates this
expectation. It is in line with this argument the fact that in case of acquittal or annulments
the market does not react.
42For the event last court of appeal we do not perform a pre-1998 post-1998 comparison because of the
small sample size.
43This view is also shared by some article in the specialized press. See for instance "LE REGOLE TEMPI
DURI PER I GARANTI Antitrust", La Stampa, Section Economia, Raphael Zanotti, February 11, 2007;
"In borsa Eni ed Erg più forti dellindagine Antitrust", Milano Finanza, Giovanna Nardi, January 25, 2007;
and "LAntitrust disarmata" La Stampa, Front Page, February 13, 2007.
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Another interesting nding relates to the change in the average market reaction that we
nd over time. Despite the Authority being "tougher" after 1998 the market seems to react
less to antitrust interventions. Both for the start of investigation and for the Authoritys
decision we nd much larger and signicant e¤ects for the pre-1998 period than the post-
1998 one. At a rst sight this might contradict the fact that antitrust enforcement actually
got tougher. However this might be explained by two other facts. First of all the share of
upheld cases went from 75% (pre-1998) to 63% (post-1998) and the average ne reduction
went from 25% to 37% over the same period of time. Secondly the market, over time, might
have learned that Authoritys decisions might only be transitory and might well be annulled
in the appeal process. Market reactions might have been larger in earlier periods (antitrust
enforcement in Italy started only in 1990) to then reduce as market operators learned about
the high rate of annulments.
Another explanation to the above ndings is given by Sabbatini (2008) where, in his
assessment of the Italian antitrust enforcement, he asserts that cartels do not simply break
up after uncovering them, as cartel might very well continue as "well established" rules.
Finally it is di¢ cult to say if the estimated e¤ects are large or small, however we believe
it is informative to compare these e¤ects with those found in similar papers and to look at
the evolution of market reactions over time. This type of analysis can then provide evidence
on the market perception on antitrust investigations considered in their entirety (from the
start of the investigation to the appeal process).
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1.6 Appendix A: Figures
Figure 1.2: Event Study Timeline
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1.7 Appendix B: Model estimation
1.7.0.3 OLS estimation
In the rst approach we follow the standard OLS estimation of the market model outlined
in Campbell et al. (1997). For each rm in our sample we use OLS to estimate the market
model in 1.6. There we regress the daily returns of security i; on a constant, and on the
daily market return Rm 44.
Rit = 
OLS
i + 
OLS
i Rmt + it (1.6)
The model 1.6 is estimated in the estimation window represented in Figure 1.2 as the
space between T0 and T1. There is no specic rule on how to choose the estimation window
and for our study we take a window of 201 days that span from 230 to 30 days before the
event realization. The length of the event window is usually chosen to be between 100 and
250 days45. It is also common not to extend the estimation window to the days just before
the event as to avoid the model picking up movements in the returns due to information
leakages.
Under general conditions OLS is a consistent estimator of the market model parameters
and under the normality condition it provides the minimum variance among all unbiased
estimators. From the OLS regression, for each rm, we obtain the parameters [OLS and
[OLS that we will use to estimate the expected normal return (Rnit in equation 1.1) for each
day of the event window. For each day in the event window we can then compute the
abnormal return AROLSit as in equation 1.7 (where R

i and R

m are respectively the actual
return on the rm i security and the actual return of the chosen market index).
AROLSit = R

it   ([OLSi +[OLSi Rmt) (1.7)
1.7.0.4 Theils method
OLS estimation of the market model is the traditional choice in the majority of event
studies. However Dombrow et al. (2000) show that when the normality condition fails to
hold other non-linear estimators may be preferred. The same authors argue for the adoption
44The market return is chosen to be the leading market index of the stock market in which the rm
security i is listed. The market indexes used are Milan Mibtel, DAX 200, FTSE 100, Dow Jones Industrials,
Nikkei 225, Swiss Market, OMX Helsinki, SBF 250 and Brussels all share.
45Corrado (2010) suggests using an estimation window of 250 days that corresponds approximately to the
number of trading days in a calendar year.
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of robust statistics when the underlying distribution of the errors is uncertain. They then
propose to use a nonparametric estimator, suggested by Theil (1950), for its high e¢ ciency
and ease of computation and implementation46. In contrast to OLS the Theils estimator
does not need any distributional assumptions and can be implemented as follows47:
for each case in the sample:
1. Sort the L1 (L1 = T1   T0 + 1) data pairs of (Rmt; Rit) in ascending order of Rmt:
2. Separate the data into two groups based on the median48 .
3. Calculate the slope parameters Theil
i;(j;j+
L1
2
)
; in 1:8, for all the L1
2
pair and choose the
median value, Theili .
Theil
i;(j;j+
L1
2
)
=
R
i;j+
L1
2
 Ri;j
R
m(j+
L1
2
)
 Rmj (1.8)
4. Use the estimated\Theili to estimate the L1 parameters:
\Theilit = Rit  \Theili Rmt
:
5. Choose\Theili as the median of the L1 \Theilit .
Then, similarly to equation 1.7, for each day and rm we proceed to estimate the non-
parametric abnormal returns as in equation 1.9.
ARTheilit = R

it   (\Theili +\Theili Rmt) (1.9)
Notice that given the median based nature of this estimator the undue inuence of out-
liers is removed. Both the OLS and Theils estimators are easy and fast to compute and
implement. However the latter one does not need any distributional assumptions on the error
term. Moreover, Dombrow, Rodriguez and Sirmans nd that Theils nonparametric estima-
tion has relatively greater power, than OLS, to detect abnormal performance in presence of
non normally distributed errors and o¤ers comparable results to OLS under normality.
46For an event study that uses the Theils estimator see Nicolau (2001) and Saleh (2007).
47The step procedure follows closely the methodology outlined in Dombrow et al. (2000).
48In case of an odd numbered interval we drop the median observation.
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1.7.1 Testing for statistical signicance
1.7.1.1 Parametric test
The parametric test builds upon the OLS estimators to derive the statistical properties of
abnormal returns. Under the assumption that asset returns are jointly multivariate normal,
independently and identically distributed through time, it can be showed that the OLS model
estimated in (1.6) is a consistent and e¢ cient estimator for the market model parameters.
From the OLS model it is then possible to derive the statistical properties of the abnormal
returns, under the null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns (Campbell et al. (1997)):
E[dARijRmt] = 0 (1.10)
Vi = I
2
 +X

i (X
0
iXi)
 1X
0
i 
2
 (1.11)
where Vi is the variance covariance matrix of abnormal returns. Xi and Xi are respec-
tively a ((T3 T2) X 2) and a ((T1 T0) X 2) matrices of regressors (market return, Rm;and
a constant) at the event window and at the estimation window. 2 is the variance of the
errors estimated from the OLS estimation of the market model.
From this we can then estimate:
V =
1
N2
NX
i=1
Vi (1.12)
that is the aggregate variance matrix of the average daily abnormal returns.
From the above results we can then construct the three test for the above statistics 1.3,
1.4, and 1.5. These are respectively:
[V AR(DAARt) = vtt (1.13)
where vttis the (t; t) element of the variance covariance matrix V:
[V AR(CAAR) = 0V  (1.14)
where  is a vector of 1s of dimension (T3   T2).
[V AR(CARi) = 0Vi (1.15)
From which we can derive the appropriate three tests as:
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JDAAR
t
=
DAARtq
[V AR(DAARt)
a
~N(0; 1) (1.16)
JCAAR =
CAARq
[V AR(CAAR)
a
~N(0; 1) (1.17)
JCAR
i
=
CARiq
[V AR(CARi)
a
~N(0; 1) (1.18)
where the distributional results are for large samples and not exact because the estimator
of the variance appear in the denominator.
Non Parametric Test
For the nonparametric estimates, derived by estimating the market model using Theils
method, we also use a nonparametric test statistics. Hence we follow the advice of Dombrow
et al. (2000) and perform what they call a complete nonparametric event study. The non-
parametric test we use is known as the rank test and was outlined by Corrado (1989). The
test is developed as follow. First, for each case, compute abnormal returns for all the days
considered both in the estimation and event window. Then for every case i convert all the
daily abnormal returns into their rank within the distribution of abnormal returns of that
case.
Kit = rank(dARit) (1.19)
Higher values of rank K denote an higher abnormal return. This transformation turns
the distribution of the abnormal returns into a uniform distribution of the possible ranks.
Under the null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns the expected rank is just one plus half
the number of days considered (if we run the analysis for 250 days the expected rank is
125,5). Then two tests, depending on the level of aggregation, are computed as follow:
SDAARt =
1
N
NX
i=1
(Kt;i   (T+12 ))vuut 1
T
TX
t=1
"
1
N
NX
i=1
 
Kt;i   (T+12 )
#2
a
~N(0; 1) (1.20)
The test in 1.20 refers to daily average abnormal return estimates and T represents the
sum of days both in the event and estimation window (i.e. T = T1   T0 + T3   T2 + 2):
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When we aggregate the daily average abnormal return to construct the CAR measure
we then use the following test proposed by Cowan (1992) in which he extends the original
test proposed by Corrado (1989) to multi day event window assuming that the daily return
ranks within the window are independent.
SCAAR = (T3   T2 + 1) 12
1
T3 T2+1
T3 T2+1X
d=1
"
1
N
NX
i=1
(Kd;i   (T+12 ))
#
vuut 1
T
TX
t=1
"
1
N
NX
i=1
 
Kt;i   (T+12 )
#2
a
~N(0; 1) (1.21)
Under the null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns on the event window and using the
result that the asymptotic null distribution of test 1.20 and test 1.21 are standard normal
we can then test the null hypothesis.
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1.8 Appendix C: Tables
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Table 1.15: Regressions Results: Start of Investigation and Decision
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES CAR_start CAR_dec CAR_dec CAR_dec CAR_dec
(0;+2) (-1;+1) (-1;+1) (-1;+1) (-1;+1)
t_datestart 0.147**
(2.202)
capmvc 8.76e-05*** 8.17e-05*
(2.814) (1.894)
n_ent_ita 0.315 -0.690
(0.628) (-1.227)
infringed 0.940
(1.148)
Abuse -0.0178 -0.844 -0.377
(-0.0337) (-1.325) (-0.656)
t_datedec 0.140*
(1.916)
ne -0.0111 -0.00608
(-1.331) (-0.760)
ne_capmvc 22.16
(0.639)
Constant -16.59** -14.05* -0.407 -0.527* -0.366
(-2.512) (-1.900) (-1.463) (-1.926) (-1.172)
Observations 154 139 139 139 139
R-squared 0.098 0.085 0.004 0.003 0.003
t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.16: Regressions Results: Last Court
(1) (2)
VARIABLES CAR_last upheld CAR_last annulled
CAR_dec 0.792** 0.236
(2.010) (0.363)
CAR_raid -0.222 -1.206***
(-0.419) (-2.317)
t_datedec 0.872* -0.128
(1.825) (-0.251)
n_ent_ita -2.410 5.186
(-0.849) (1.024)
has_press -1.133 1.628
(-0.423) (0.348)
Constant -90.81* 6.613
(-1.861) (0.126)
Observations 48 27
R-squared 0.185 0.318
t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.17: F irm s and Antitrust Cases
ART . F irm Start of Inv. Decision Last Court F ine AGCM Final ne Decision App eal Case
date date date (m l euro) (m l euro) typ e typ e id
2 A llstate 21/09/1999 31/07/2000 28/02/2002 1 0 I377
2 Azurita lia Spa 21/09/1999 31/07/2000 28/02/2002 0.000 0.000 1 1 I377
3 F iat Ferrov iaria 15/05/1998 13/01/1999 0.008 0.008 1 0 A209
2 Cam Petroli Srl 08/06/2001 06/03/2003 12/05/2004 0.017 0.017 1 1 I474
2 UNICALCESTRUZZI Spa 24/09/1996 11/04/1997 11/04/1997 0.019 0.019 1 0 I210
2 M erck Sharp , Dohme
Italia Spa, Istituto Gentili
Spa, Neopharm ed Spa
18/03/1998 19/03/1999 0.034 0.034 1 0 I333
2 Cementir Spa 17/04/1995 27/03/1996 0.076 0.076 1 0 I123
2 Assita lia Spa 24/11/1997 17/12/1998 0.093 0.093 1 0 I305
2 E lyo Ita lia Srl, Opam O ils
Spa, Nelsa Srl
08/06/2001 06/03/2003 12/05/2004 0.102 0.102 1 1 I474
2 ASSITALIA -LE ASSICU-
RAZIONI DITALIA Spa,
FATA ASSICURAZIONI
Spa
31/05/1996 10/10/1997 12/01/2001 0.114 0.114 1 1 I193
2 ZURIGO Sa 31/05/1996 10/10/1997 12/01/2001 0.114 0.114 1 1 I193
2 Unip ol Spa 24/11/1997 17/12/1998 28/01/2004 0.114 0.114 1 1 I305
2 Agip Petroli Spa, Atrip lex
Srl
08/06/2001 06/03/2003 12/05/2004 0.118 0.118 1 1 I474
2 Abbott Spa 12/05/1999 16/03/2000 02/07/2002 0.172 0.098 1 1 I328
2 Unicem Spa 17/04/1995 27/03/1996 0.185 0.185 1 0 I123
101 M ilte Ita lia Spa 15/07/2004 20/10/2005 23/01/2008 0.198 0.149 1 1 I623
3 A lita lia Spa 04/03/1996 21/11/1996 0.214 0.214 1 0 A102
2 CALCESTRUZZI Spa,
ITALCALCESTRUZZI
Spa
24/09/1996 11/04/1997 11/04/1997 0.309 0.309 1 0 I210
2 Cemencal Spa, Calces-
truzzi Spa
22/01/1992 28/05/1992 0.393 n .a . 1 0 I32
2 Ita lcem enti Spa 17/04/1995 27/03/1996 0.442 0.442 1 0 I123
3 Telecom Italia Spa 07/01/1997 06/11/1997 09/02/2007 0.491 0.491 1 1 A178
2 M ediaset Spa (RTI) 12/03/1997 28/12/1998 23/10/2001 0.507 0.507 1 1 I283B
2 EM I Italiana Spa 01/11/1996 22/10/1997 17/11/2000 0.536 0.536 1 1 I207
3 Telecom Italia Spa 17/07/1998 11/02/2000 0.645 0.645 1 0 A255
2 Heinz Ita lia Srl 12/05/1999 16/03/2000 02/07/2002 0.667 0.530 1 1 I328
2 Toro Spa 28/06/1993 09/06/1994 18/01/1997 0.698 0.000 1 2 I74
2 Polygram Italia Srl 01/11/1996 22/10/1997 17/11/2000 0.707 0.707 1 1 I207
2 Nestlè Ita lia Spa 12/05/1999 16/03/2000 02/07/2002 0.719 0.644 1 1 I328
2 Nutric ia Spa, M ilupa Spa 12/05/1999 16/03/2000 02/07/2002 0.756 0.332 1 1 I328
2 Sony Music Enterta inm ent
Spa
01/11/1996 22/10/1997 17/11/2000 0.773 0.773 1 1 I207
2 Generali Spa 28/06/1993 09/06/1994 18/01/1997 0.827 0.000 1 2 I74
2 Warner Musica Ita lia Spa 01/11/1996 22/10/1997 17/11/2000 0.847 0.847 1 1 I207
2 Unip ol Spa 28/06/1993 09/06/1994 18/01/1997 0.897 0.000 1 2 I74
2 L loyd Adriatico Spa 28/06/1993 09/06/1994 18/01/1997 0.909 0.000 1 2 I74
2 Fondiaria Spa 28/06/1993 09/06/1994 18/01/1997 0.929 0.000 1 2 I74
2 M ilano Spa 28/06/1993 09/06/1994 18/01/1997 0.944 0.000 1 2 I74
101 AstraZeneca Spa 17/11/2004 29/05/2006 13/12/2007 0.975 0.000 1 2 I639
101 Boero Attiva Marine, P ro-
tective Coatings Genova
S.p .A .
20/04/2005 09/02/2007 1.080 p ending 1 0 I646
101 International Paint Ita lia
S .p .A .
20/04/2005 09/02/2007 1.080 p ending 1 0 I646
2 Augusta Assicurazion i Spa 21/09/1999 31/07/2000 28/02/2002 1.081 0.000 1 2 I377
2 Assita lia Spa 28/06/1993 09/06/1994 18/01/1997 1.212 0.000 1 2 I74
2 RAS Spa 28/06/1993 09/06/1994 18/01/1997 1.238 0.000 1 2 I74
2 Farmades Spa, Schering
Spa
09/02/2000 07/12/2000 06/03/2007 1.395 n .a . 1 2 I337
101 M ilupa Spa, Nutric ia Spa 15/07/2004 20/10/2005 23/01/2008 1.567 1.175 1 1 I623
2 A lita lia Spa 20/12/2000 08/08/2002 20/06/2007 1.582 1.582 1 1 I446
3 SNAM Spa 26/11/1997 10/03/1999 1.851 1.851 1 0 A221
2,3 Sch ind ler Spa, G . Caim i
E levatori Srl
02/03/1999 29/05/2000 31/01/2001 1.934 0.000 1 2 A256
3 Ita lcem enti Spa 21/07/1994 01/03/1995 19/04/2000 1.937 0.000 1 2 A76
2 V ittoria Assicurazion i Spa 21/09/1999 31/07/2000 28/02/2002 1.994 0.000 1 2 I377
2,3 Abbott Spa 26/04/2001 15/05/2003 29/11/2005 2.000 2.000 1 1 I461
2 Sai Spa 28/06/1993 09/06/1994 18/01/1997 2.077 0.000 1 2 I74
2 Helvetia 21/09/1999 31/07/2000 28/02/2002 2.106 2.070 1 1 I377
102 ENEL S.p .A . 15/03/2002 12/12/2003 24/05/2006 2.500 2.500 1 1 A333
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Table 1.17: F irm s and Antitrust Cases
ART . F irm Start of Inv. Decision Last Court F ine AGCM Final ne Decision App eal Case
date date date (m l euro) (m l euro) typ e typ e id
2 S isa l Spa 24/07/2003 07/12/2004 01/11/2007 2.800 1.395 1 1 I570
2 Sodexho Pass Srl 09/07/2001 01/07/2002 17/08/2005 3.193 0.973 1 1 I463
101 Nestlè Ita lia Spa 15/07/2004 20/10/2005 23/01/2008 3.300 2.475 1 1 I623
101 Heinz Ita lia Srl, P lada
S .r.l.
15/07/2004 20/10/2005 23/01/2008 3.301 2.476 1 1 I623
2 L inde Spa 24/03/2004 20/05/2006 24/01/2008 3.600 0.000 1 2 I603
2,3 Kone Ita lia Spa 02/03/1999 29/05/2000 31/01/2001 3.631 0.000 1 2 A256
2,3 Ceam Srl, E levat Ascen-
sori Srl, O tis Spa
02/03/1999 29/05/2000 31/01/2001 3.761 0.000 1 2 A256
102 ENI Spa 02/11/2001 07/10/2004 06/06/2006 4.500 n .a . 1 1 A329
2 Royal, SunA lliance, Royal
Insurance, L loyd Ita lico
Spa
21/09/1999 31/07/2000 28/02/2002 5.310 0.000 1 2 I377
2,3 Bayer Spa 26/04/2001 15/05/2003 29/11/2005 6.000 6.000 1 1 I461
2 SOL 24/03/2004 20/05/2006 24/01/2008 6.800 0.000 1 2 I603
2,3 O rtho C lin ica l D iagnostics
Spa
26/04/2001 15/05/2003 29/11/2005 7.500 7.500 1 1 I461
2 Lottomatica Spa 24/07/2003 07/12/2004 01/11/2007 8.000 4.953 1 1 I570
2 A llianz Subalp ina Spa 21/09/1999 31/07/2000 28/02/2002 8.038 n .a . 1 0 I377
101 Total Spa 17/12/2004 20/06/2006 20/11/2007 8.860 8.860 1 1 I641
2,3 Roche D iagnostics Spa 26/04/2001 15/05/2003 29/11/2005 9.000 9.000 1 1 I461
2 Holcim Calcestruzzi S .r.l.,
Cave Rocca S .r.l., Holcim
Cementi
09/04/2003 09/08/2004 9.800 0.000 1 0 I559
2 Unicalcestruzzi Spa 09/04/2003 09/08/2004 11.000 0.000 1 0 I559
2 Calcestruzzi Spa , Cem en-
cal Spa
09/04/2003 09/08/2004 11.850 0.000 1 0 I559
2 R ivoira Spa, SIAD 24/03/2004 20/05/2006 24/01/2008 14.000 0.000 1 2 I603
3 Coca-Cola Bevande Ita lia
Srl
06/07/1998 17/12/1999 25/06/2002 15.808 15.808 1 1 A224
2 Gemeaz Cusin Srl 09/07/2001 01/07/2002 17/08/2005 16.356 2.210 1 1 I463
2 AXA Spa 21/09/1999 31/07/2000 28/02/2002 16.872 16.840 1 1 I377
2 Fondiaria Spa 21/09/1999 31/07/2000 28/02/2002 17.005 16.990 1 1 I377
2 Shell Ita lia Spa 13/10/1999 08/06/2000 28/06/2001 18.418 0.000 1 2 I165
2 M ilano Spa 21/09/1999 31/07/2000 28/02/2002 20.562 20.550 1 1 I377
2 W interthur Spa 21/09/1999 31/07/2000 28/02/2002 21.294 21.280 1 1 I377
2 A ir L iqu ide 24/03/2004 20/05/2006 24/01/2008 23.100 0.000 1 2 I603
2 Toro Spa, Nuova T irrena 21/09/1999 31/07/2000 28/02/2002 24.272 16.110 1 0 I377
2 Unip ol Spa, M eie Spa,
M aeci Spa, Duomo Spa
21/09/1999 31/07/2000 28/02/2002 25.428 17.040 1 1 I377
102 A lita lia Spa 18/07/2000 13/07/2001 15/05/2007 26.852 0.000 1 2 A291
2 Assita lia Spa 21/09/1999 31/07/2000 28/02/2002 27.364 27.320 1 0 I377
2 Erg Petro li Spa 13/10/1999 08/06/2000 28/06/2001 28.931 0.000 1 2 I165
2 Generali Spa, Fata Spa 21/09/1999 31/07/2000 28/02/2002 32.146 30.520 1 1 I377
2 Sai Spa, Nuova MAA 21/09/1999 31/07/2000 28/02/2002 40.171 36.310 1 1 I377
2 RAS Spa 21/09/1999 31/07/2000 28/02/2002 48.944 48.960 1 1 I377
2 Philip Morris (tota l ne) 04/07/2001 28/03/2003 16/07/2003 50.000 50.000 1 1 I479
2 Telecom Italia Mobile Spa 08/01/1999 01/10/1999 13/12/2000 51.869 19.570 1 1 I372
101 Shell Ita lia Spa 17/12/2004 20/06/2006 20/11/2007 56.460 56.460 1 1 I641
3 Telecom Italia Spa 25/11/1999 02/05/2001 27/01/2007 59.524 31.600 1 1 A285
101 Esso Ita liana Srl 17/12/2004 20/06/2006 20/11/2007 66.690 66.690 1 1 I641
2 Esso Ita liana Srl 13/10/1999 08/06/2000 28/06/2001 75.929 0.000 1 2 I165
2 Agip Petroli Spa 13/10/1999 08/06/2000 28/06/2001 111.558 0.000 1 2 I165
101 ENI Spa 17/12/2004 20/06/2006 20/11/2007 117.000 117.000 1 1 I641
3 Telecom Italia Spa 13/06/2003 19/11/2004 14/02/2006 152.000 115.000 1 1 A351
102 ENI Spa 04/02/2005 15/02/2006 290.000 p ending 1 0 A358
2,3 SIP 28/07/1992 05/04/1993 2 0 A27
3 SIP 08/07/1993 03/11/1993 1 0 A55
2,3 ANSALDO TRASPORTI
Spa
30/06/1993 23/12/1993 1 0 I78
3 ALITALIA Spa 29/10/1993 03/08/1994 1 0 A58
3 AUTOSTRADE Spa 08/02/1994 05/08/1994 1 0 A68
2,3 FIAT Spa 30/06/1993 01/03/1994 2 0 I79
2,3 ANSALDO TRASPORTI
Spa
30/06/1993 01/03/1994 2 0 I80
2,3 FIAT FERROVIARIA Spa 30/06/1993 01/03/1994 2 0 I80
2,3 ABB TRAZIONE Spa 30/06/1993 01/03/1994 2 0 I80
3 SIP 05/07/1994 16/06/1995 1 0 A64
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Table 1.17: F irm s and Antitrust Cases
ART . F irm Start of Inv. Decision Last Court F ine AGCM Final ne Decision App eal Case
date date date (m l euro) (m l euro) typ e typ e id
3 STET-SIP - So cietà Ita l-
iana p er lEserciz io delle
Telecomunicazion i Spa
05/07/1994 10/05/1995 1 0 A65
3 SIP - So cietà Ita liana p er
lEserciz io delle Telecomu-
n icazion i Spa
05/07/1994 11/01/1995 1 0 A71
3 PIONEER HI-BRED
ITALIA Spa
03/01/1996 22/08/1996 2 0 A124
3 AUTOSTRADE Spa 01/02/1996 12/07/1996 1 0 A84
2,3 TELECOM ITALIA MO-
BILE Spa
29/09/1995 19/06/1996 2 0 A90
2,3 MOTOROLA ITALIA Spa 29/09/1995 19/06/1996 2 0 A90
2 MONTESHELL Spa 21/04/1995 03/04/1996 1 0 I124
2 FINA ITALIANA Spa 21/04/1995 03/04/1996 1 0 I124
2 C IR IO FINANZIARIA
Spa
11/08/1995 27/03/1996 1 0 I134
2 Arnoldo Mondadori Edi-
tore Spa
07/12/1995 09/07/1996 1 0 I157
2 RCS Libri, G randi Op ere
Spa
07/12/1995 09/07/1996 1 0 I157
2,3 TELECOM ITALIA Spa 11/11/1995 03/05/1996 1 0 I167
2 UNILEVER ITALIA Spa 17/05/1996 08/01/1997 1 0 I212
2 NESTLE ITALIANA Spa 17/05/1996 08/01/1997 1 0 I212
3 TELECOM ITALIA Spa 15/11/1996 12/06/1997 1 0 A156
2 ALLIANZ PACE Spa 31/05/1996 10/10/1997 1 0 I193
2 AUGUSTA ASSICU-
RAZIONI Spa
31/05/1996 10/10/1997 1 0 I193
2 SAI Spa, MAA ASSICU-
RAZIONI Spa
31/05/1996 10/10/1997 1 0 I193
2 GENERALI Spa 31/05/1996 10/10/1997 1 0 I193
2 LA FONDIARIA Spa,
LA PREVIDENTE AS-
SICURAZIONI Spa, M I-
LANO ASSICURAZIONE
Spa+B79
31/05/1996 10/10/1997 1 0 I193
2 LABEILLE Spa 31/05/1996 10/10/1997 1 0 I193
2 M ILANO ASSICU-
RAZIONE Spa
31/05/1996 10/10/1997 1 0 I193
2 RAS Spa 31/05/1996 10/10/1997 1 0 I193
2 TORO ASSICURAZIONI
Spa
31/05/1996 10/10/1997 1 0 I193
2 UNIPOL Spa 31/05/1996 10/10/1997 1 0 I193
2 AXA ASSICURAZIONI
Spa
31/05/1996 10/10/1997 1 0 I193
2 INTERCONTINENTALE
ASSICURAZIONI Spa;
31/05/1996 10/10/1997 1 0 I193
101,102 STREAM Spa 15/04/1999 21/06/2000 2 0 A274
101,102 TELEPIÙ Srl 15/04/1999 21/06/2000 2 0 A274
3 TELECOM ITALIA Spa 17/09/1999 13/07/2000 1 0 A280
3 ALITALIA Spa 18/07/2000 05/12/2001 2 0 A306
2 BLU 27/10/2000 19/07/2001 2 0 I445
2 W IND TELECOMUNI-
CAZIONI Spa
27/10/2000 19/07/2001 2 0 I445
2 TELECOM ITALIA MO-
BILE
27/10/2000 19/07/2001 2 0 I445
2 OMNITEL PRONTO
ITALIA
27/10/2000 19/07/2001 2 0 I445
2 American Express SER-
VICES EUROPE Ltd
12/02/2001 08/07/2002 2 0 I452
2 THE DINERS CLUB EU-
ROPE Spa
12/02/2001 08/07/2002 2 0 I452
2,3 AUTOGRILL Spa 23/09/2002 28/07/2003 1 0 I523
102 MEDIASET S.p .A . 24/03/2005 28/06/2006 1 0 A362
102 G laxoSm ithK line S .p .A . 13/03/2005 21/02/2006 1 0 A363
102 Enel S .p .A . 13/04/2005 27/12/2006 1 0 A366
101,102 TELECOM ITALIA MO-
BILE S.p .A
01/03/2005 28/05/2007 2 0 A357
101,102 VODAFONE OMNITEL
N.V
01/03/2005 28/05/2007 1 0 A357
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Table 1.17: F irm s and Antitrust Cases
ART . F irm Start of Inv. Decision Last Court F ine AGCM Final ne Decision App eal Case
date date date (m l euro) (m l euro) typ e typ e id
102 M erck Sharp , Dohme
(Ita lia) S .p .A
14/03/2005 25/03/2007 1 0 A364
102 ENI S.p .A . 18/11/2005 09/03/2007 1 0 A371
102 GNL Italia S .p .A 18/11/2005 09/03/2007 1 0 A371
Decision typ es: 0 acqu itta ls; 1 in fringem ent.
App eal typ es: 0 no app eal; 1 app eal to on ly 1st court; 2 app eal to 1st and 2nd court.
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CHAPTER 2
DOES PRICE COMPARISON MATTER? THE CASE OF
ITALIAN HIGHWAY REFUELING
Abstract
This paper estimates the e¤ects, on retail prices, of a fuel price comparison
policy introduced in the Italian pay-toll highways. The policy deployed roadside
electronic displays to compare fuel prices. We nd that the price comparison pol-
icy is associated with a small, but statistically signicant, increase in the average
price of unleaded fuel of around 0.55 euro cents per liter. The average price of
diesel fuel also increases by around 0.5 euro cents per liter. The market minimum
prices (the prices that active consumers are expected to pay) increases by roughly
the same amount. Nevertheless, the policy might help some consumers. A con-
sumer who, after the policy change, would chose the lowest price retailer would
save around 1 euro cent per liter, for both fuels (i.e. a saving of 0.77% on the
per liter price). The above gures gain economic signicance when compared to
the observed price range (the di¤erence between the market maximum and min-
imum price is on average 2 euro cents per liter) and retailersmargins (around
4 euro cents per liter). We conclude that although the policy can help some
consumers nding lower prices it has not been e¤ective in fostering competition
among retailers.
2.1 Introduction
Price transparency is often perceived, by consumers, their advocates and policy makers,
as a factor that increases market competition and in turn lowers retail prices. The consumer
protection argument is that availability of price information should help consumers make
informed choices, increase price sensitivity and consequently intensify competition and lower
prices. Economists do not share this view and acknowledge that retailers also can take
advantage of price transparency. However, theoretical models that consider both sides of the
market often makes ambiguous predictions regarding the impact of transparency on retail
prices. Hence whether transparency lowers retail prices remains an empirical issue.
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This paper studies the implementation of a price transparency policy implemented with
the explicit aim to help consumers make informed choices and with the implicit aim to lower
retail prices1. The market we study is the Italian pay-toll highway refueling market, a market
that accounts for more than 10% of all the automotive refueling in Italy. Fuels prices are
not advertised and consumers learn fuel prices only after their decision to stop at the service
area2. These features imply that consumers face relatively high search costs (mostly in terms
of cost of time) that make it optimal to just shop randomly3.
In April 2007 the Italian parliament approved a law (Law 2 April 2007 n.40) with the
aim to foster price competition among retailers and reduce retail prices. The law required
highway concessionaires to introduce some remedies to increase price information and ease
price comparison. The most important remedy was the deployment of physical roadside
price comparison electronic displays (for a picture see Figure 2.7) comparing self-service fuel
prices of the next four consecutive refueling stations. The roadside displays were gradually
introduced in three di¤erent waves between July 2007 and January 2009. The policy was
welcomed by consumers associations that had demanded the adoption of price comparison
devices for a long time. Moreover, expected savings of up to 8 euro cents per liter were
foreseen (a saving of 3.2 euro for a 40 liter rell or a 6% reduction on fuel expenditure4).
In this paper we estimate the impact of the roadside price comparison displays on prices.
We test the e¤ect of slashing search cost for consumers while retailers remain informed about
prices. The outcome variable of interest is the nal (per liter) price, asked by retailers, for
a self-service rell of unleaded and diesel fuel, the two main fuel variants5.
We consider the e¤ects for two types of consumers, active and inactive, where we say
that a consumer is active if she acquires and processes price information before making any
1Price transparency in general can mean that buyers and sellers are fully informed about prices. Since
there are several dimensions in which buyers or sellers might lack information price transparency remedies
are all those actions or policies that aim to provide more information to market participants. In this paper
whenever we refer to price transparency we refer to the implemented price comparison policy unless otherwise
stated.
2There are of course repeated sales, hence commuters might learn fuel prices over time.
3Consumerssearch costs are at least higher in the (Italian) pay-toll highway than in normal roads. For
instance to learn the retail price consumers need to slow down, divert their trip and enter the service area
while on normal roads usually the learning process only entails looking at a price board.
4If we consider a reference price for unleaded and diesel fuel of 1.3 euro per liter. Consumersassociation
CODACONS expected savings up to 8 euro cents per litre.17 July 2007 (ANSA news).
5In Italy it is common to have both the self-service and the full-service rell options at each service
stations. The price comparison policy is specically targeted to self-service prices.
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purchase, and inactive otherwise.
We look at four di¤erent price measures considered relevant to understand the e¤ect of
price comparison on the two categories of consumers. First, we look at the average price
as this is the expected price paid by consumers that are inactive both before and after the
policy change. Second, we look at the minimum price as this price is the relevant price for
consumers that are active both before and after the policy change6. Third, we look at the
savings made by those consumers who are inactive before the policy change and that become
active after the introduction of the policy7. Finally, we estimate the potential savings that
a consumer would make if she would switch from inactive to active after the policy change.
This last measure identies the incentive to become active after the policy change.
We have a panel dataset in which we observe the daily prices asked by 170 service stations
for a total of 255 days between October 2007 and November 20088. For a subset of 87 stations
we know the date of the policy implementation (this group refers to the second wave of the
policy implementation, Summer 2008). To control for time varying factors, other than the
policy change, that might confound our estimates, we exploit the step wise implementation
strategy and dene a control group composed of those stations that received the treatment
during the rst wave9. We then estimate the average e¤ect of the policy on treated stations
(i.e. we estimate the ATT10).
We nd that, after the introduction of the policy, an inactive consumer is expected to
pay 0.55 euro cents more, per liter, for unleaded fuel, and 0.5 euro cents more for diesel fuel
(respectively an increase of 0.42% and 0.38% on a reference price of 1.3 euro per liter). This
translates in negligible total expenditure increases on a typical rell of 40 liters (respectively
6These consumers are those that in absence of the roadside price comparison displays use the price
comparison website to learn fuel prices.
7These consumers are those that without the roadside display do not nd optimal to search prices on
the price comparison website.
8The daily prices were collected through a spider, a software that, on a daily bases (although with some
gaps), downloaded the retailers price information from the publicly available website made available by
ASPI.
9For these stations we only observe prices after the policy introduction. Hence, on these stations, we
cannot estimate the e¤ect of the policy introduction with a before and after setting. In an appendix (available
from the author) we show how, for these stations, we can estimate the e¤ect of the policy using a matching
estimator. However given the reduced sample size the results does not seem to be robust to changes in the
matching strategy.
10ATT: Average treatment on the treated
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22 and 20 euro cents)11.
To estimate the e¤ect of the policy on consumers that are active both before and after
the policy change we consider the minimum prices asked in the four-stations submarkets
(the sub-markets dened by the roadside display). We nd that also this category has not
beneted from the policy. Consumers in this group pay slightly higher prices as the increase
in minimum prices are between 0.55 and 0.8 euro cents.
Consumers that become active after the policy change are marginally better o¤. They
save 1 euro cents per liter (or 0.77% for a reference price of 1.3 euro per liter) compared
to the average price they paid before the policy change, when inactive. Finally the price
incentive to become active after the policy change is in the order of 0.8 euro cents per liter
(0.6% for a reference price of 1.3 euro per liter).
We conclude that the policy objective to lower fuel retail prices was not achieved. The
opposite happened, a small but signicant upward shift in prices. The provision of wide-
spread price information to consumers has not triggered any price competition on the retailer
side. The only source of potential savings for consumers is given by the availability of price
comparison and the possibility, for active consumers, to nd lower prices.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the literature; Section 2.3 presents the
case study; Section 2.4 describes the data, presents some descriptive analysis and presents
the results; Section 2.6 draw some conclusions.
2.2 Related literature
This paper is directly related to the literature that studies the relationship between price
transparency and competition. Three recent surveys discuss price transparency in relation
to market competition and consumers policy (Garrod et al. (2008), SCA (2006), Armstrong
(2008)). In general, this literature concludes that increased price transparency on the rms
side unambiguously facilitates oligopolistic coordinations while increased price transparency
on the consumers side can have ambiguous e¤ects. The argument is that increased price
transparency on the consumers side, despite lowering search cost (i.e. pressure to lower
prices), also implies a more elastic demand and this produces two, indirect12, contrasting
11A typical medium-sized car in the Italian market has a fuel tank of around 40 liters.
12Increased price trasparency on the consumers side generates direct and indirect e¤ects. The direct
e¤ect is given by the pressure that the newly informed (or better informed) consumers will exert on lower
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e¤ects. On the one hand, rmsdeviations from collusive prices are more protable. On
the other hand,in case the deviation is discovered, the punishments will be harsher (lower
prots) (Møllgaard and Overgaard (2006)). About the interplay of consumers side and
rms side e¤ects the literature on price transparency concludes that the e¤ect is ambiguous
and dependent on the market specic features (Møllgaard and Overgaard (2006)13, Waterson
(2003)).
This view is somehow in contrast with the conclusions drawn from traditional models
that look at the issue of price dispersion. These models postulate that increased price
transparency leads to lower average prices (for a survey see Armstrong (2008) and Garrod
et al. (2008)). The two classical examples are: 1) the Varian (1980)14 model where both the
average price paid by informed consumers and the (higher) average price paid by uninformed
consumers decrease as the share of informed consumers increases; and 2) the Salop, Stiglitz
model (Salop and Stiglitz (1977)) where the average price in the market falls as the search
cost decreases.
This paper contributes to the recent literature on price transparency, and price disper-
sion, that revamped during the last decades to study the role of information and communi-
cation technologies (ICT) in solving long term market information problems. Indeed, after
the mass adoption of the internet by consumers in the late nineties, and the success of on-
line shopping, economists looked with increased attention at the online price information
provision and the dynamics of online prices. In particular in the early days of internet the
common view was that internet had the potential to reduce, if not slash to zero, the search
prices. The indirect e¤ects are given by the fact that rms, in their pricing decisions, take into account the
changes in the type of demand (composed of more informed consumers).
13Møllgaard and Overgaard (2006) refer to Nilsson (1999), Møllgaard and Overgaard (2001), Møllgaard
and Overgaard (1999), Schultz (2004), Schultz (2005).
14Some recent papers based on the Varian (1980) model draw conclusions on the e¤ect of increased
price information (Morgan et al. (2006), Waldeck (2008), and Lach and Moraga-González (2009)). The
paper by Morgan et al. nd that as the share of informed consumers exogenously increase, keeping xed
the number of rms, the expected price paid by both informed and uniformed consumers decreases. In
the other paper Lach and Moraga-González introduce an increased heterogeneity in consumers types that
results in more realistic (bell-shaped) price distribution. They conclude that policies aimed at increasing
the amount of price information can a¤ect the distribution of prices and welfare and that the magnitude of
the e¤ects vary depending on the shopping behavior of consumers. Waldeck (2008) establish that the link
between information and pricing is not trivial. He also nds an inverse-U shaped relationship between price
dispersion and the share of informed consumers. Then he nds that higher price information might lead
to higher price dispersion and that more intensive search by active consumers might lead to higher average
posted prices.
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costs entailed by consumers (The Economist, 199915, cited in Baye et al. (2004), and Wa-
terson (2003)). It follows that reduced price dispersion and lower prices, at least in online
markets, were expected. Similar savings could then be expected on "real" markets when the
same easiness of price comparison and low search costs are available.
Since then, several papers attempted to test whether online markets, with price com-
parison sites16, were indeed close to perfect competition as it was originally thought. These
papers nd that online price comparison sites o¤er sizable savings (among these papers
Smith and Brynjolfsson (2001), Ellison and Ellison (2009), Baye et al. (2004), Morton et al.
(2001), Brown and Goolsbee (2002)). However, in a review of the literature Baye et al.
(2006) concludes that price dispersion seems to be a pervasive feature of both o¤-line and
online markets and persistent di¤erences between informed and uninformed consumers are
still the key to understand price dispersion.
Our paper is then naturally related to the vast literature that looks at the refueling
market, especially the vast empirical literature on fuel prices. A recent paper Hosken et al.
(2008) reviews both the main theories put forward to study fuel prices, and the empirical
studies that attempt to relate these theories with empirical evidence. In their review of
the theories17 they conclude that although each theory is helpful to explain some aspects
of fuel prices none o¤er an explanation for the observed price dynamics. In their empirical
analysis they focus on the US market and they conclude that retail margins vary substantially
over time and that stations do not follow simple pricing rules as pricing strategy are both
heterogeneous18 and dynamic19. Similar features applies to retail fuel market in Europe
(Lach and Moraga-González (2009), Netherlands, and Foros and Steen (2008), Norway).
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the empirical literature on fuel prices and price
transparency. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to link the empirical ndings
15The Economist, November 20, 1999, p. 112
16A price comparison site can just be seen as an information clearinghouse that is dened as a third
party that provides price information to consumers (possibly at a cost). Examples of clearinghouses are
price comparison websites, newspapers that compare prices of di¤erent rms, magazines. In this paper we
study the e¤ect of a clearinghouse that applies advances in ICT to physical retail markets. The information
clearinghouse is central to derive the Varian (1980) results.
17Hosken et al. (2008) review ve di¤erent types of pricing behavior models: 1) Static games with pure
strategies; 2) Static games with mixed strategies; 3) Repeated games with collusions; 4) History dependent
demand/Asymmetric price adjustment; and 5) Edgeworth cycles.
18Stations with very low or very high prices tend to keep their position more than stations which price is
closed to the mean price.
19Stations often change their relative position in the pricing distribution.
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with the many theories proposed to study price transparency and fuel prices. It has been
showed that the available theories have limits and are not suitable to predict or describe
market outcomes, unless we resort to strong assumptions (Møllgaard and Overgaard (2006),
Waterson (2003), Hosken et al. (2008)). Hence, the scope of the paper is to exploit the
(exogenous) introduction of a price comparison policy to provide empirical evidence on the
e¤ects of price transparency on fuel prices in the Italian highway refueling market.
Finally, in our paper we study a technological platform that is similar to what in the
theory is dened as a clearinghouse. Other papers looked at the e¤ects of clearinghouses for
online markets. Our paper studies the impact of a an ICT based clearinghouse applied to o¤-
line markets20. Thus in our study we also look at the potential for (innovative) information
technologies when they are applied to o¤-line markets (vs the online marketplaces where
extensive price comparison is present).
2.3 Case study framework
This section provides an overview of the case study. The scope of our analysis is to eval-
uate the e¤ect of a consumer policy, implemented in a specic market (highway21 refueling)
taking as given the market structure in place (i.e. an exogenous change in price information
available to consumers). This section rst describes the price comparison policy and its
practical implementation. Then, it briey describes the Italian highway refueling market
with the purpose to explain the environment under study and motivate the relevance of our
case study.
2.3.1 The policy
In early 2007 the Italian government, through a decree-law22, committed to foster com-
petition and increase consumer protection in some consumer sensitive markets, among which
the fuel market23. The parliament then, some months later, approved the government decree
20The clearinghouse we study in our paper di¤ers from other clearinghouses applied to o¤-line markets (for
instance websites dedicated to o¤-line markets, or newspapers, etc...) as, in this setting, price comparison
and purchasing decision can almost be simultaneous, very much like in online shopping.
21In this paper when we refer to "highway(s)" we refer to pay toll high capacity roads designed to carry
fast motor tra¢ c.
22Decree Law 31st January 2007 n.7.
23Other markets considered were: Fixed Line and Mobile Phone; Internet Services; Car Insurance; Mort-
gages; Airline Tari¤s; and "best before date" in food products.
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and turned it into law (Law 2 April 2007 n.4024). From Art.2 of the law, (the one regulating
fuel market) we can read the objectives of the legislator as follow: (1) foster competition, and
(2) price transparency; (3) guarantee an adequate level of knowledge about cost of service,
and (4) facilitate the comparison of alternative o¤ers.
Although the policy objectives are stated clearly, the law is not so clear about the
measures to be taken as to reach the proposed four objectives. Indeed, the law limits only
to recommend the dissemination of information about prices (in comparative form) using
the already available channels or by predisposing new ones. The law then delegates to
an Interministerial Committee of Economic Planning (CIPE) the denition of the specic
guidelines. Accordingly, the CIPE, in July 2007, published its guidelines were it prescribed
concessionaires of main national roads (pay-toll or not) to predispose a price comparison
information system. Nonetheless, also the CIPE guidelines delegated to a forthcoming act
from the Ministry of Transport the denition of the exact procedures to follow.
In the mean time, in anticipation to both the CIPE guidelines and the exact ministerial
specications, Autostrade per lItalia (henceforth ASPI), the largest Italian pay-toll highway
concessionaire, decided to implement the proposed price information measures before the
2007 summer holiday (taking place usually in August, when millions of drivers use highways
to reach their holiday destination). As it appears clear from ASPIs press releases of the time
the decision to act in advance of further regulation or specication was to o¤er an information
service to their customer. This decision has indeed been presented, and marketed directly by
ASPI, within the category of Customer Information Services together with the decision to
install information displays about tra¢ c conditions and the decision to o¤ers several other
customer oriented products to facilitate (and incentive) highway driving25.
There is no evidence that ASPI received particular pressures from public bodies (i.e.
government or parliament) to implement the price information policy, as at January 2009 it
is still the only highway concessionaire to have acknowledged Law 40/7 and complied to it
26. We take these facts as evidence that how ASPI acted in the design and implementation
24Law 40/7 henceforth.
25ASPI, both during the summer period and other periods of the year, launched several customer oriented
initiatives (for instance free co¤e between 00.00-05.00, tra¢ c information in English, dedicated area in
stopping area for babies and pets, help in travel planning). Source: Press conference presentations: "Via
Libera allestate" 2007; "La via per lestate" 2008; Website www.autostrade.it.
26Eventually it happened that the specications adopted by ASPI did not match the ones eventually
approved in the CIPE guidelines of July 2007. The CIPE specications set a maximum of 3 consecutive
stations for each comparison panel (while ASPI display has 4 consecutive stations). Moreover ASPI display
mark with a highly visible green dot the cheapest station and this is not required by CIPE guidelines.
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stage was mostly independent and driven by internal company considerations.
In practice what ASPI did during the months between April and July 2007 was: 1)
First, to create a software platform that stations27 managers could use to communicate, in
real time, the fuel prices o¤ered at their premises; 2) Second, to post these prices (Figure
2.10, Appendix B ), catalogued by highway code, kilometer and direction, in an apposite
section within the ASPI website (www.autostrade.it); 3) Finally, to install physical price
comparison displays28 (like the one in gure 2.7 and 2.8 Appendix B) along their highway
network.
Thus, the two price comparison measures adopted are:1) Price comparison website; and
2) Physical price comparison displays. Although both measures o¤er the same type of
informative content they di¤er under some dimensions. The comparison website is accessible
only through an internet connection (thus there is no simultaneity between information and
purchase29), lists all the stations on the ASPI network, but it entails some positive search cost
(i.e. being aware of the service; time to open the browser; locate the desired highway and pool
of stations). On the other hand, the roadside comparison display only lists four consecutive
stations, it is available for free to everyone (driving by), it entails almost no search cost30, and
the price information and the purchase decision can be potentially simultaneous31. Given
these characteristics we assume that the latter measure (the roadside display) has the highest
potential to disseminate price information and provide price comparison among retailers that
o¤er close substitutes.
The two price comparison measures also di¤er in the way they have been introduced.
Indeed, shortly after the creation of the software platform the price comparison website was
already online covering all the refueling stations on the ASPI network. On the other hand,
the deployment of the roadside displays could not be as instantaneous. It was indeed a long
process that started in summer 2007, with only few displays installed, and came to an end
27We use the words "station", "refueling station", "service station", "retailer", interchangeably to refer
to a facility that o¤er the refueling service.
28We use the words "physical" or "road" comparison panel to refer to a tangible price comparison device
(a "big" display) installed next to the roadway.
29Although recent development in mobile technologies make it possible to browse the web also on the
move.
30There could be an attention cost. To process the information on the panel the driver has to divert some
of his cognitive ability from driving to the acquisition of the informations. Still we assume this cost is a
fraction of the cost required to access the online version.
31The stations listed on the panel are usually within a distance of 2 to 100 km.
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in late 2008 when eventually all stations on the ASPI network were covered by the road
displays. This timing di¤erence implied that some stations were required to post their prices
both on the price comparison website and on the roadside comparison display since July
2007 while, at the same time, some other stations only had to post their prices on the price
comparison website, and only at a later stage were then covered by the roadside comparison
display.
In our analysis we argue that we can exploit this timing di¤erence to estimate the impact
of the introduction of the roadside price comparison displays. To do that we exploit the price
comparison website, for the purpose of data collection32. Then we use information about the
timing of deployment of new roadside displays to identify the e¤ect of the policy.
The following section describes the ASPI deployment decision and it explains how we
can exploit it to estimate the impact of this price information measure on market prices.
2.3.2 The policy implementation
Di¤erently from the price comparison website the deployment of the roadside price com-
parison displays was not simultaneous for all stations on the ASPI network. Institutional and
physical constraints, together with corporate decisions, brought to a deployment in several
stages. As we discussed above, ASPI had since the beginning all the intention to deploy the
price comparison displays as soon as possible on its network. However, it was not possible
to install all the displays in such a short time because of limitation imposed by procurement
law. Indeed, concessionaire of pay-toll highways are required to issue a call for tender, with
European wide publicity, for works with starting value higher than Euro 221,000.
Therefore ASPI decided to split the deployment in two stages: First stage, deploying only
10 displays as to overcome the limitation imposed by the public procurement law; Second
stage, for the remainder of the project, issue a call for tender, with European wide publicity,
assign it and complete the deployment to cover all the ASPI network. For the purpose of our
analysis we identify two clear phases of deployment. The rst phase took place in July 2007
in which all the rst 10 displays were installed; the second phase took place in July 2008
when other 24 displays were installed (Table 2.5 Appendix A shows the display position and
time of deployment). We then exploit these two phases design to empirically test the impact
of the introduction of the price comparison policy.
32The introduction of the price comparison website was simultaneous for all the stations on the ASPI
network. We assume the e¤ect of the website is the same for all the station and the estimate we nd take
as baseline the case in which prices are posted on the web.
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2.3.2.1 Phase 1- A quasi experiment?
During the rst phase only 10 price comparison displays were installed, covering 38
service stations33. As we said above this resulted as an outcome of the trade-o¤ between
the limitations imposed by the institutional constraints and ASPI commitment to o¤er an
information service to its customers before the 2007 summer holiday. Given the low number
of displays installed ASPI had to make a location decision for these rst displays. Such
location decision was not random. Indeed, the objective was to expose the highest number
of customer to this new service. Hence, ASPI targeted the highway sections34 with the
highest road tra¢ c levels. These turned out to be the outbound highway sections close to the
largest cities along the ASPI network. The cities targeted in the rst wave of deployment were
Naples, Rome, Florence, Bologna andMilan. Although not random, the location decision was
based on an observable characteristic (the tra¢ c level, and possibly the outbound direction).
Hence, as long as we nd other highway sections with similar tra¢ c levels and market
conditions we can argue that conditioning on the observable tra¢ c level the decision to
treat35 some service stations, instead of others, was indeed random. We could exploit this
feature and use a matching on observable estimator to estimate the impact of the policy
during the rst phase. Unfortunately, it turns out that the sample size is very limited for
this type of exercise and consequently the results are not robust to slight changes in the
matching strategy36.
2.3.2.2 Phase 2- Before and after analysis
After July 2007 no other display was installed until July 2008 when the second wave
of deployment started. As mentioned above the second phase started only after the assign-
ment of the full procurement, for which ASPI had to issue a call for tender with European
wide publicity. The aim of the second phase was to nish the project started in 2007 and
cover all the ASPI network with roadside price comparison displays (a total of 53 displays
33Actually there are 40 stations that are covered by this rst 10 panels, however two stations were not
surveyed by the website we were monitoring. Only later this inconsistency was xed.
34We use the words "section" and "segments" interchangeably to refer to a part of motorway between
an entry point and the rst exit point on the same direction. Usually there is never more than one service
station for a single segment. Usually for each stations on one segment there is one on the opposite segment,
on the opposite side of the highway.
35We adopt the treatment evaluation terminology where we refer to treated units whenever we mean those
units that are directly a¤ected by the policy. In our case treated stations are those stations that are required
to post their prices on the roadside comparison panel.
36The matching on observables estimates are presented in an appendix available from the author.
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were planned) within the end of 2008. Of this second phase we analyze a specic wave of
deployment that took place in July 2008 just before the summer break.
In this wave a total of 24 roadside displays were installed (concerning other 87 stations)
bringing the total number of active price comparison displays to 34 (concerning a total of
125 stations). Again our objective is to estimate the impact of the introduction of these
displays.
Di¤erently from the rst wave at this stage we do not know the process behind the
selection of the new display location. Thus we cannot use the matching on observable
estimator that we could use in the rst phase estimation. However for the second wave
we have available a richer set of information. We indeed recorded the daily prices, for all
stations on the ASPI network, since July 2007. Thus once the second wave took place we are
able to compare the prices before and after the installation of the new displays (something
we could not do for the rst phase due to the lack of before price information). Accordingly,
in the empirical analysis we use a di¤erence in di¤erences (DID) and before and after (BA)
estimators to estimate the e¤ect of the policy change.
2.3.3 The highway refueling market
This section provides some information about the Italian highway fuel market. It is
beyond the scope of this paper to illustrate in detail and model the market structure in
place. We take the market structure as given and we simply assess the e¤ects of increasing
price transparency on the consumer side when retailers are fully informed. We remain
agnostic about the role of each players (retailers, oil company, highway concessionaire) in
the reaction to the treatment as we are only interested on the e¤ect on the nal price o¤ered
to consumers. Still this section o¤ers an overview of this specic market as to guide us in
interpreting and evaluate our ndings.
In this paper we study the Italian highway refueling market. In Italy there are more
than 6500 Km of pay-toll highways and although this network only accounts for the 2%
of the national road surface, its roads sustains about 25% of the national transportations
needs37. ASPI is the main pay-toll highway concessionaire and has concessions for roughly
3000 Km (almost half of the entire national network). Its network covers almost all the
country with exception of very few regions (Sardinia, Sicily, Calabria, Trentino Alto Adige).
On Italian highways there are more than 450 service stations (of which 21038 on the ASPI
37Source AISCAT Association of Italian Highway Concessionaire, www.aiscat.it.
38Year 2007.
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network) selling a range of fuel products (typically: unleaded, premium unleaded, diesel,
premium diesel). Stations operating on the highways represent only the 2% of the total
service stations operating nationwide, however they supply more than 10% of the total fuel
consumption (respectively 6% for unleaded and 15% for diesel fuel) (Unione Petrolifera 2006
and 2007). By volume the most sold fuel on highways is diesel that accounts for more than
75% of total fuel supply (UP (2007)).
The range of fuels sold by each stations is considered homogeneous (for instance oil
companies even share reneries in some cases). That is, within each category of fuel, prod-
ucts o¤ered by di¤erent brands are qualitatively the same, the only di¤erences that might
arise come from brand di¤erentiation not related to the quality of the fuel (advertisement,
corporate social responsibility, loyalty programme).
There are eight major brands that operates on the Italian highways: Agip, Esso, Erg,
Shell, Q8, Total, Api/IP, Tamoil (di¤erently from ordinary roads on the highways there are
very few "independent" retailers39). All these competitors are vertically integrated rms that
are active at every stage from the production to the distribution process. For what concerns
the end market they all can rely on an extensive network of service stations distributed all
over the country. Such stations can be directly owned by the oil companies or given in
concession to third parties that owns and manage them.
The price setting happens usually in two stages. In the rst stage the oil company
indicates to the station manager a "suggested price". At the second stage the station manager
can discretionally change that price, within a range imposed by the oil company. This range
is implicitly determined by two contractual conditions: the lower bound is given by the price
at which the station manager buys the fuel (assuming they do not sell at a loss); the upper
bound is usually a ceiling on the price the station manager can practice (usually determined
by the oil company in relation to the "suggested price").
Thus the station managers freedom in setting prices appears to be somehow limited,
although oil companies seems to sustain that at the station level managers can still pursue
an independent pricing strategy (AGCM (2007)). Nonetheless, oil companies retain powerful
instruments to inuence these possible independent strategies (i.e. the suggested price and
contractual relations). Indeed by looking at past publications of "suggested prices" 40(not
39Usually known as "pompe bianche" (white pumps). These independent retailers buy the fuel at the
wholesale market, directly from reneries, and then sell it. They are usually characterized by very low
expenditure in marketing or branding and are popular for o¤ering lower prices or discounts
40Available on the "Sta¤etta Quotidiana" an energy sector magazine.
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anymore available after a recent Antitrust ruling) it appears clear that, although oil compa-
nies publish a reference "national suggested price", for all the category of fuels and di¤erent
types of service (self-service vs full service), they also set a variety of price di¤erentials (to
be applied to the reference price) targeting smaller groups of stations (usually dened by
location). It is not rare that oil companies set a suggested price almost for each single station
(this is exactly the case for some stations located on the highways). However, for the sake of
our analysis we are not too concerned about the actual shares of power in the pricing deci-
sion. As we have access to the price posted by the station managers (that in turn represent
the price asked at the pumps) we only focus on the nal price as it has all the information
we need to perform our study.
2.4 Case Study
In the following sections we rst describe our sample, we then present some descriptive
statistics on the refueling market, and nally we employ econometric techniques to estimate
the impact of the price comparison policy.
2.4.1 The service station sample
To conduct our analysis we collected information on 178 service stations (about 40% of
total Italian highway service stations and 85% of ASPI service stations) operating on the
ASPI network. These stations were selected for two reasons: 1) availability of price infor-
mation; 2) location. As we have already mentioned, we collected the daily price information
directly from the ASPI website41. For what concerns the location, among the sample of all
the service stations along the ASPI network, we selected only those located in places relevant
for our analysis (i.e. either they were treated stations or had the potential of being included
in the control sample).
However in the empirical analysis we will not use all the 178 stations indeed depending
on the estimation technique we use and depending on the assumption we make we construct
every time an appropriate control group that we then compare to the treatment group.
For what concern the time dimension of our analysis we have collected price information,
for unleaded and diesel fuel (both in the self-service typology42), for a total of 255 days. The
41We programmed a "spider" that every day downloaded price information from ASPI website
(www.autostrade.it).
42Usually stations o¤ers both self and full service. However we restirct our analysis only to self service.
Indeed, price comparison website and roadside panels only advertise self service prices and full service prices
are not advertised.
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days are not consecutive (there are some gaps43) and span from 26/10/2007 until 11/11/2008.
Again in the econometric analysis we will not make use of all the time information as we
will have to discard some time periods or days44, but this will be explained in more details
in the next sections.
Our panel dataset is unbalanced as for some days we do not have price information for
some retailers. We believe this is due to technical problems not to a strategic use of the
price information platform. However, we consider this issue and, as a robustness check, we
restrict our sample only to those stations for which we have all the daily prices.
As we do not observe relevant control variables (for demand and supply factors) with
enough time variation at the local level we favor a xed-e¤ect estimation and we impose
station-level xed-e¤ect as to capture time invariant factors that might inuence pricing.
Time e¤ects should then control for the cross-section variation in demand and supply specic
factors.
2.4.2 Descriptive statistics
In this section we present some descriptive statistics to guide the econometric analysis
and the interpretation of the ndings.
Service stations located along the toll highways, on average, sell almost three times more
unleaded fuel and eight times more diesel fuel compared to the average station located in a
non-toll road (Table 2.1). This could be taken as evidence that stations along the highway
can experience higher variations in total prots due to small variations in nal price (holding
demand constant). However, stations along the highway are usually of bigger size (higher
xed costs) and have also to remunerate the highway concessionaire, in addition to the oil
company and both these factors might depress the size of nal prots.
43For instance during summer 2008 when the second wave of panel deployment took place no data were
collected. Since we could not recover exactly on which day each new panel was turned on we decided to
restart collecting data once the second wave was over and we knew all the new panel were active.
44For instance some Sundays there were some nation wide promotions on refueling. We discard the
Sundays from our sample because we might pick up price e¤ects that are not related to the introduction of
the price comparison panels.
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Table 2.1: Average Fuel Sales per stations 2006 (ml litres)
location toll highways ordinary roads
service stations #. 461 21989
Unleaded 2.22 0.73
Diesel 6.19 0.74
Total 8.41 1.47
Source: elaboration from Unione Petrolifera 2006, 2007
If we look at price levels we can observe a peculiar characteristic of the retail refueling
market under study: prices seldom move at the station level. For instance if we plot retail
prices against the oil company "suggested price" (the price that should reect cost variations)
we observe that prices at the stations level follow almost one to one the variations in the
suggested price without having signicant independent movements.
Figure 2.1 shows this relation, over a period of two months, for two randomly chosen
AGIP and two randomly chosen Tamoil retailers. The two solid lines are the prices set by
the oil companies and the other two dashed lines depict the retailersprices . From the
gure it seems that once the oil companys suggested price changes the retailers x a margin
(positive or negative) and keep the price xed until a new movement in the suggested price
takes place.
Thus, di¤erently from other papers that have looked at the refueling market (for instance
Foros and Steen (2008)), we do not observe signicant (non-cost related) price variation
neither within the same day nor within the same week. For instance we also check (Table
2.6 Appendix A) if price changes happen systematically on a specic day of the week. We
nd that on average, over the period we consider, 84% of the time stations did not change
their prices, 9% of the time there was a price increase and 7% of the times there was a
price decrease. The other evidence we nd is that almost no station increases the price on
a Sunday. Hence, it does not seems there is any preferred day for a price increase or a price
reduction.
We also check for evidence that retailers adopt mixed strategies in their price setting
decision. In doing so we check that retailers for instance do not always price at the bottom
or at the top of the price distribution. For the purpose of our study if we nd evidence
that retailers adopt mixed strategies it means that retailers can put in practice an e¤ective
price competition (for similar analysis see Lach and Moraga-González (2009)) Figure 2.11
and Figure 2.12 (Appendix B) present some charts, respectively for unleaded and diesel fuel,
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Figure 2.1: Suggested and Retailer Price Variation
depicting the frequency of stations that posted a price in the rst, second, third and fourth
quartile of the price distribution45.
In each chart the y-axis represent the percentage of days each stations posted a price
in that quartile. For instance if a station always had the maximum price we should expect
it to appear on the chart of the fourth quartile with a y = 1, and not to appear in any
of the other charts. By inspecting the charts we can see that there are only few retailers
whose prices are always within a quartile of the price distribution (in the chart we do not
nd signicant bar in correspondence of y = 1), this suggests us that retailers posted prices
that were in more than one price quartile of the daily regional price distribution. Also we
can see, from the charts about the rst quartiles, that for both unleaded and diesel fuel very
few stations never priced in the rst quartile. Indeed we can say that 95% (90%) of retailers
priced unleaded (diesel) fuel in the rst quartile at least once. Again we can take this as
evidence that stations vary their position within the price distribution. Thus although we
saw that rms do seldom change prices, when they do change it the change is sizeable as
45A similar chart can be found in Lach and Moraga-González (2009). To construct this chart we use
the prices in levels. For each day, by regions (to account for local price di¤erences), we look at the price
distribution and assign stations to the relevant quartile. We then average across time this data to construct a
measure of permanence in each quartile for each station. The data refer to 100 stations for 96 days. Sunday
prices were not considered as during Sunday some nationwide promotions o¤ered price discounts.
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this most likely moves them into a di¤erent part of the price distribution. This can be taken
as evidence that in the market there is scope for price competition.
Table 2.8 (Appendix A) presents some descriptive statistics about the sample of service
stations. During the rst phase of display deployment about 21% of service stations are
treated whereas after the second wave a total of 62% of stations are treated. About the
brands representation in our sample Agip appears to be the predominant brand with almost
30% of service stations. Tamoil is the second more frequent brand with a share of 20% and
Esso follows closely at 16%. The majority of the stations in our sample are located along
the two main ASPI highways the A1 (33%) and the A14 (30%). About the geographical
distribution we can see that the majority of service stations are located in the Center (43%)
another 37% are located in the North and the remaining 21% is located in the South of Italy.
On average stations in our sample have more than twenty thousand vehicles transiting
every day on their relevant highway segment (although only a fraction actually stops at the
station for relling services). About 76% of these transits are made by light weight vehicles
(cars or vans) and the rest is made up by heavy weight vehicles (trucks). However stations
di¤er widely in their average transits and the transit distribution looks very right skewed.
2.4.2.1 Observed price dispersion
In this section we provide some information about the average price dispersion. In the
econometric analysis we estimate the impact that price comparison displays have on nal
prices. Thus in order to say something about the magnitude of this e¤ect we need to present
some statistics about the average price dispersion that a customer might expect to nd
when relling her car. Table 2.7 (Appendix A) presents some estimates of the observed price
dispersion. In that table we present an estimate derived from our sample and we compare
it against estimates of price dispersion we found in other studies. For our measure of price
dispersion we constructed a sample of service stations and we computed the range (Max
price - Min price) for the service stations competing in the same local market 46. We nd
46The sample consisted of the service stations of our ASPI sample that were not a¤ected by the rst wave
of price comparison panel deployment. Prices refer to a single day 6/2/2008 (between Phase 1 and Phase 2)
and 84 service stations were included in the sample.
We computed the range instead of other measures of dispersion to compare our results with those of other
studies that also computed the range. However for our sample we can compute the standard deviation that
we use later.
The stations are dened to be competing in the same market when they are within a distance of less than
100 km.
69
Aguzzoni, Luca (2011), Three Essays in Competition and Consumer Policy 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/31849
that on average a customer on the highway can expect prices to vary by less than 2 euro
cents among the di¤erent retailers on a 100 Km interval. This implies a maximum potential
saving of less than 1 euro for a typical rell of 40 liters.
We can then compare our results with those of other studies. If we look at the average
range of price dispersion on another toll highway 47 we nd estimates very similar to ours
(i.e. less than 2 euro cents). On the other hand if we look at price range estimates for service
stations operating in normal road we nd a much higher price dispersion. This dispersion
varies depending on the data source going from 4 euro cents per liter (a savings of almost 2
euros for a 40 liter rell) according to ISTAT (Italian National Institute of Statistics) 48, to
an upper bound of more than 10 euro cents per liter (savings of about 5 euros for a 40 liter
rell) according to FIGISC (Italian Federation of the Relling Service Station Managers).
Thus we can conclude that on average customers on a toll-highways can expect to nd
a lower price dispersion (lower scope for savings) than the one they can otherwise nd on
normal roads.
Another insightful price comparison is to compare the level of fuel prices on the highway
segments and on the close-by urban area. This helps us say something about the possible
degree of competition we can expect between service stations on the urban area and those on
the highway. Table 2.9 presents the mean price for unleaded and diesel fuel in ve provincial
area (Milan, Bologna, Florence, Rome, Naples). The mean price level is reported for both the
service stations operating on the toll highway and for those operating on normal streets. By
comparing the means we can observe that the average price level is higher among the highway
service stations. However there is a signicant overlap between the two price distributions
(for both unleaded and diesel fuel). Thus there seems to be scope for competition between
highway and normal street relling49. For instance retailers operating on highway could use
price comparison displays to attract frequent travellers by o¤ering a price comparable or
lower to prices available on normal roads.
The above evidence both on price dispersion and price levels are consistent with our
expectations. Stations on the highway enjoy higher degree of market power compared to
47A22, managed by Autostrada del Brennero SpA. On the website http://www.autobrennero.it/ they
publish a weekly report on fuel prices.
48ISTAT collects this data to produce its price ination indexes.
49The mean for normal street retailers might be underestimated. Indeed we could only get price informa-
tion about the twenty cheapest service stations operating at the province level.
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stations operating on normal roads. Hence highways fuel prices are expected to show both
a lower dispersion and higher levels.
We can also compare the maximum and minimum price we observe in our Italian highway
stations dataset to the price ranges found in other recent studies that look at fuel markets.
For instance, Lach and Moraga-González (2009) nd that in the non-highway fuel market
in The Netherlands the di¤erence between maximum and minimum price ranged from a
minimum of 17 euro cents to a maximum of 48 euro cents (per liter). Theses di¤erentials
imply potential50 savings in the range of 6.8 to 19.2 euro per a 40 liter rell. Although
these estimates might overestimate the potential savings in The Netherlands it seems that
the Italian fuel market, both on the highway and on normal roads o¤ers a much lower scope
for potential savings. This in turn might have an impact on the willingness to shop for the
lowest price if consumers perceives that their attention to prices do not produce economically
meaningful savings.
2.4.2.2 Highway use and customer attitude to fuel rell
In this section we provide some evidence about the average use51 of the highway and
customers attitude to self service relling. During the year 2007 the average travel on the
ASPI network was 80 Km long. Respectively 75 Km for light weight vehicles (that represents
the 80% of total transits) and 99.7 Km for heavy weight vehicles. During the year the tra¢ c
level seems to be quite constant (except for a peak of light weight travels in August). A
substantial share of trips, 1/3 for light and 1/4 for heavy weight vehicles, is less than 25
Km long and these trips are mainly concentrated around the metropolitan areas on both
inbound and outbound directions.
For what concerns drivers relling habits we can get some information from two surveys
published by ACI (Italian Automotive Club, 2008 and 2002). These studies report that
about 40% of drivers favours self service relling always or often while another 33% opts for
the self service only occasionally. The lower price of the self service seems to be determinant
in the choice of the service for about 45% of the respondent whereas the rest favoured it for
its exibility. The same studies also provide some information about the customer loyalty
50The price di¤erential is computed at the national level, hence the maximum and minimum price might
be posted by stations that do not belong to the same submarket.
51Data come from two surveys: Autostrade per lItalia 2007, Conference Presentation "Estate 2007. "Via
libera in sicurezza "; and Autostrade per LItalia 2008, Conference Presentation "La via per lestate. Le
vacanze iniziano in autostrada".
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and the choice of the service stations. They report that proximity and lower price are the
two determinants for the choice of the relling station. In the urban area most of the drivers
always rell from the same station whereas when outside the urban area there is no delity to
the single service station. We can conclude that the self service relling is relevant for around
half of the population of drivers hence it is a relevant and increasingly more important way
of rell.
2.5 Empirical analysis
2.5.1 Graphical analysis
Figure 2.2 shows the average suggested price for both diesel and unleaded fuel between
April and November 200852. Suggested prices are the prices that the oil majors suggest
to their retailers to practice. In the year 2008 retail fuel prices varied widely as the oil price
soared during the rst part of the year to reach record high prices of more than 140 US$
per barrel in July 2008. After the July peak, in the second part of the year, the oil price
sharply declined and eventually, in December 2008, Oil was traded at around 40 US$ per
barrel (prices are for the NYMEX, WTI/Light Sweet crude).
Figure 2.2: Average Suggested Price
Retail fuel prices are directly a¤ected by oil price movements and price variations are
52The graphical and the econometric analysis exclude the period between June and August 2008. During
those months the panel deployment took place and they are therefore excluded from the analysis.
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almost immediately passed through to retail prices53. In our paper we compare retail fuel
prices at di¤erent points in time, hence we need to control for cost related price variation
in order to identify the variation in prices due to the increased price transparency54. We
can control for cost variation in two ways: 1) taking the di¤erence between prices at the
retailer level and the suggested price of the respective oil major; 2) taking the di¤erence
between prices at the retailer level and a fuel reference price (henceforth Opal price55). In
our analysis we favor the latter approach as the suggested price might also include strategic
pricing decisions in addition to the common cost shocks and to the cost shocks specic to
the single oil major.
Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4 present the group averages of the residual prices (retail price
less the respective Opal price) for the period before and the period after the policy change.
The control group consists of those stations that received the treatment in year 2007 (38
stations) while the treatment group consists of those stations that receive the treatment in
summer 2008 (70 stations). By studying the two series before the policy change we can
inspect whether the parallel trend assumptions appears to be satised. We can see that
both for unleaded and diesel fuel the two groups averages are subject to similar uctuations.
The di¤erence with Opal prices are in general positive and this is expected as the fuel on
highways is on average more expensive than the one available on other roads.
In the empirical analysis we follow a di¤erence in di¤erences approach (with multi-
periods) to estimate the impact of the policy. From the graphical analysis we can already
inspect the raw di¤erences between the two groupsprices to look for possible e¤ects. Figure
2.5 and Figure 2.6.show the di¤erences between the groups price series over time. The
di¤erence between the two groups averages is greater for unleaded than it is for diesel. This
is explained by the fact that in the treated group there are more stations, compared to the
control group, that belong to regions56 in which there are higher taxes for unleaded fuel
53In this paper we are not interested in providing a link between the price variations of oil and the
variations in retail prices. Since we have a treatment and control group we control for the possible di¤er-
ent adjustments in retail prices following increasing or decreasing oil prices. For two contrasting view on
asymmetric price adjustments see Borenstein et al. (1997) and Galeotti et al. (2003).
54If we had a balanced panel both for treated and control station the cost di¤erences would not be an
issue as the control group would already account for those cost related di¤erences.
55We use two di¤erent price indexes, both provided by OPAL (WoodMacResearch available from Datas-
tream):Unleaded ITA Inc. Tax E/kL, for unleaded; and Diesel ITA Inc. Tax E/kL for diesel fuel. Although
the index is based on surveyed Italian prices we believe the index is not endogenous as our highway sample
of stations only represents the 0.8% of stations operating in Italy.
56Campania, Molise, Puglia.
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Figure 2.3: Treatment and Control Prices (Unleaded)
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Figure 2.4: Treatment and Control Prices (Diesel)
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but not for diesel. Absent this di¤erent tax regime for diesel the di¤erence between the two
group prices is much smaller and closer to zero.
To draw some rst evidence on the e¤ect of the policy change we can look at the levels
of the group di¤erences before and after the policy change. From the charts we see that after
the policy change both di¤erences get larger as the mean di¤erence series shifts upwards in
both charts. Moreover the e¤ect seems to be larger for unleaded than for diesel fuel. From
this simple graphical analysis we cannot say much about the signicance of these e¤ects. By
inspecting the 95% interval of condence (the area between the dashed lines in both charts)
it seems that there is substantial overlap before and after the policy change.
We then proceed with a formal econometric analysis to estimate the size of the e¤ects
and to judge on the signicance of the estimates.
Figure 2.5: Group di¤erences (Unleaded)
2.5.2 Econometric analysis
Ideally, to test the e¤ect of increased price information on retail prices, the researcher
would randomly assign price comparison displays to half of the fuel stations operating on
the pay-toll highway network. These stations would correspond to the treatment group and
the control group would consist of the other half of stations. Then a simple comparison
of the average posted prices across the two groups would estimate the causal relationship
between price information and prices. Random assignment would indeed guarantee that the
di¤erence between the outcome variables of interest is independent of all the other factors
that might inuence fuel retail prices.
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Figure 2.6: Group di¤erences (Diesel)
Unfortunately such a theoretical implementation strategy is not the one adopted by
ASPI when it installed the fuel price comparison electronic displays along its pay-toll highway
network. Hence, a simple cross-section comparison of treated and non-treated stations might
produce biased estimates due to an omitted variable problem57. However, we can exploit
some features of the adopted implementation strategy to consistently estimate the causal
e¤ect of price information on retail prices. We claim that we can exploit the panel structure
of the dataset, and the fact that we observe the same stations before and after the policy
change, to reduce the omitted variable bias and consistently estimate the e¤ect of price
information on fuel retail prices. Moreover, we can use the stations treated in 2007 (and not
a¤ected by the 2008 policy) to control for time varying factors that a¤ect the pricing for
highway fuel retailers but that are not related to the policy. Thus we control for time varying
factors, exogenous to the policy, using two strategies. Underlying fuel cost variations are
accounted by di¤erencing price levels with Opal reference price, and time varying industry
specic factors are accounted for using the price variations in the control group.
The main equation we estimate is the following:
pit = + i +
t=TX
t=1
tDt + TrEffit + "it (2.1)
where pit is the price asked by retailer i at time t,  is a constant, i is a station specic
57The simple cross-section comparison would fail to control for all those (unobserved) stations specic
factors that are unrelated to the policy but that a¤ect prices.
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e¤ect, the series of Dt is the full set of time dummies, TrEffit is the interaction e¤ect that
takes the value of 1 only for those stations that are a¤ected by the price transparency policy
after the policy change and takes the value of 0 in all the other cases, and "it is the error
term. It follows that we estimate equation 2.1 using station specic xed-e¤ects58. The
xed-e¤ect estimator is the consistent estimator when the station-specic e¤ect is correlated
with the regressor59. The standard error is estimated using the standard robust variance
estimator with cluster at the individual retailer level. This relaxes the assumption that
repeated observations for the same retailer are independent. The above approach already
accounts for possible serial correlation at the retailer level. As a robustness check, given our
data are serially correlated, we also estimate a variant of equation 2.1 in which we impose
an AR(1) error structure.60
A problem with the above estimation approach might come from the fact that it does
not account for possible correlation between retailers belonging to the same display. Indeed,
it could be plausible that prices of retailers that are compared on the same display might be
correlated.
pipt = + p +
t=TX
t=1
tDt + TrEffit + "ipt (2.2)
To control for this problem we then estimate a di¤erent equation where we specically
account for shocks at the time-display level. We estimate equation 2.2 where we regress
the price of day t for display p and for retailer i on a mean ; on the day xed e¤ects
as above, and on the policy interaction e¤ect TrEffit:The error term takes the following
structure "ipt = pt + ipt;where pt is the display-day shock and the ipt is the idiosyncratic
individual component. We then follow the approach outlined in Angrist and Pischke (2009)
and Bertrand et al. (2004) where it is shown that the simplest and most widely applied way
58In the econometric analysis we also test if a random e¤ect model is more appropriate. We perform
Hausman tests and we always reject the null and conclude that the xed-e¤ect estimator is the consistent
estimator.
59In our econometric analysis we have only one regressor, the interaction e¤ect TrEffit:Still this might
well be correlated with the station specic e¤ects if the stations treated in the second phase have systematic
di¤erences from the control group stations. Note that the control group stations are those stations with the
highest tra¢ c levels and are all located on the outbound direction of the highways departing from ve big
cities (Naples, Rome, Florence, Bologna, Milan).
60Given we use as control group the 2007 treated stations, the proposed econometric approach correctly
identies the ATT only under some conditions, notably that the e¤ect of the treatment received in 2007 can
be captured by a time invariant constant and that the 2007 treatment does not a¤ect the price trend for
2007 treated stations. In Appendix C we deal with this issue and we propose some robustness checks. We
thank Saul Lach for pointing this out.
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to deal with this type of serial correlation is to estimate the model with standard errors
clustered at the display level (and not at the day-display level).
Finally, as a further robustness check, we also control for clustering and serial correlation
by running a simple di¤erence in di¤erences on the time averaged values where the time
periods are collapsed in only two time periods, one before and one after the policy change.
Both in Angrist and Pischke (2009) and Bertrand et al. (2004) this simple aggregation is
identied as a simple, conservative and transparent approach to account for serial correlation.
2.5.2.1 Econometric results
Table 2.2 presents the results of the econometric analysis conducted on mean prices,
both for unleaded and diesel fuel. This analysis is informative about the e¤ect of price
comparison on the average price that an uniformed consumer is expected to pay on a pay-
toll highway. Indeed, as the uninformed consumer does not observe price comparison (or
even if she observes it, she does not process the price information, i.e. inactive consumer),
she is expected to rell randomly and hence pay the average price. If we compare the average
price before and after the policy change we can then test if the policy had any e¤ect on this
price measure. Table 2.2 presents the results from the four types of regressions (for each
fuel) explained in the above section. The rst two regressions are the xed-e¤ects regressions
with robust variance with clusters at the station level (columns 1 and 5) and xed-e¤ects
regressions with AR(1) disturbances (columns 2 and 6)61. The third regression is the xed
e¤ect regression with clusters at the display level (columns 3 and 7). Finally the last two
regressions are the di¤erence in di¤erence regressions on the data collapsed in the two periods
(columns 4 and 8).
For what concerns unleaded fuel the estimates suggest that the policy is associated with
an increase in the average price of around 0.55 euro cents. The magnitude of this e¤ect is
mostly unchanged across the di¤erent regressions and the estimates are highly signicant
in all the regressions considered. About diesel fuel we nd similar results, although the
magnitude of the e¤ect seems to be slightly lower around 0.5 euro cents on average. Also in
this case the estimates are highly statistically signicant in all four econometric specications.
We can then conclude that the policy has not beneted the category of the uninformed
consumers that are now expected to pay a slightly higher price when relling (randomly)
61We do test for the presence of rst order autocorrelation in our data and we reject the hypothesis of
no rst order autocorrelation. The test is the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data (STATA
command xtserial) and the test results are F( 1, 69) = 478.603 and F( 1, 69) = 560.166, respectively for
unleaded and diesel fuel, implying rejection of the null hypothesis in both cases.
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Table 2.2: E¤ect on mean prices, Unleaded and Diesel fuel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Method FE FE AR(1) FE DID 2 per. FE FE AR(1) FE DID 2 per.
FE unl FE unl FE unl 2 unl FE dies FE dies FE dies 2 dies
Dep. Var. res p unl res p dies
period -0.648*** -0.716***
(-5.893) (-6.139)
Group 1.055*** -0.250
(4.147) (-1.560)
TrE¤ect 0.556*** 0.535*** 0.556*** 0.586*** 0.488** 0.523*** 0.487*** 0.540***
(3.120) (5.790) (3.080) (3.337) (2.583) (5.536) (2.615) (2.847)
Constant 0.952*** -1.349*** 0.292*** 0.868*** 0.428*** -1.043*** 0.602*** 1.102***
(15.36) (-6.210) (3.579) (5.309) (6.969) (-4.823) (6.382) (10.15)
Observations 9,959 9,851 9,959 212 9,959 9,851 9,959 212
R-squared 0.393 0.132 0.377 0.047
Number of id 108 108 108 108 108 108
ID FE YES YES NO NO YES YES NO NO
Day FE YES YES YES NO YES YES YES NO
Display FE NO NO YES NO NO NO YES NO
robust SE YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
AR(1) NO YES NO NO NO YES NO NO
chi2 Haus 40.87 46.14
df Haus 20 20
p Haus 0.00387 0.000772
t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dep. var. is the residual price (i.e. price - OPAL price)
in those stations that were a¤ected by the price comparison policy. However, such a price
increase has a marginal e¤ect on the fuel expenditure of this category of consumers as an
average rell of 40 liters is only 20 euro cents more expensive. The size of the price increase
represents only the 0.4% (on a reference price of 1.3 euro per liter). In terms of annual fuel
expenditure this might be reected in an increase of around 20 euros for a typical consumers
relling her car twice a week62.
As a robustness check we run the same regressions on two other samples. The rst
where we change the dependent variable to be the di¤erence between the posted price and
62This most likely is an overestimate of the e¤ect as it implies that all the rells take place on the highway.
Relling the car twice a week on the highway might be plausible for frequent users of the highway.
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the company specic suggested price, and the second where we reduce the time horizon of the
study and we only select the stations for which we have all the daily price information (i.e.
we construct a balanced panel). The results of these estimates conrm the above ndings
(see 2.10 and 2.11 Appendix A).
By looking at the average price we only test the e¤ect of the policy on uninformed or
inactive consumers. To say something about the other categories of consumers we do need
to look at di¤erent measures of price. The other two categories of consumers are: 1) those
that are informed both before and after the price comparison policy63; and 2) those that
become informed only after the policy change. In table 2.3 we present the econometric
results for a set of regressions in which the dependent variable is the minimum price asked
by the stations belonging to the same submarket, where the submarkets are identied by
those stations which prices are posted on the same display64. In this exercise we run two
di¤erent types of regressions, one in which we have xed-e¤ects and errors clustered at the
display level and one in which we impose an AR(1) error structure.
If we consider the minimum price asked in these submarkets we can estimate the e¤ect of
the policy on consumers that are informed both before and after the policy change. About
this comparison we can see (column 1 and 2 for unleaded, and 2 and 3 for diesel fuel)
that also this category of consumers has not beneted from the policy. The prices that
consumers in this group pay are again slightly higher following the policy change The increase
in the minimum prices are between 0.55 and 0.8 euro cents (depending on the fuel type and
regression specication). These price increases imply an increase in fuel expenditure weakly
higher than the one su¤ered by uninformed or inactive consumers65.
To estimate the impact of the price comparison policy on those consumers that were not
informed before the policy change and become informed only after the policy change we can
63These consumers are those that before the road side price comparison policy had been using the price
comparison website to obtain price information.
64This is the case both for the stations in the treated and those in the control group. Also the stations in
the control group are assigned to a display being a¤ected by the same policy already from the year before.
65We also run similar regressions for the maximum price and for the di¤erence between the maximum
and the minimum price, again at the submarket level. In this regression we nd that for unleaded fuel the
price distribution seems to shift up by the same amount as the maximum price increase by roughly the same
amount of the minimum price and the di¤erence between the two is not signicantly di¤erent. Di¤erently
for diesel fuel we do not nd an increase in maximum price and accordingly the di¤erence between the
maximum and minimum price is marginally reduced. For the estimates see tables 2.12 and 2.13 Appendix.
Notice that we cannot perform an analysis on the distribution of prices within the submarkets as we only
have four stations in each submarket.
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Table 2.3: E¤ect on the (sub-markets) minimum prices, Unleaded and Diesel fuel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
fe xtregar fe xtregar
Measure min p min p min p min p
Dep. Var. unleaded price diesel price
TrE¤ect 0.542* 0.706*** 0.567** 0.893***
(1.827) (4.365) (2.299) (5.569)
Constant 135.3*** -3.828*** 131.2*** -1.503***
(871.9) (-11.96) (1,262) (-5.038)
Observations 2,569 2,542 2,569 2,542
ID 27 27 27 27
ID FE YES YES YES YES
Day FE YES YES YES YES
chi2 Haus 12.20 4.327
df Haus 4 4
p Haus 0.0159 0.364
t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
look, for each single submarkets, at the average di¤erence between the average price, asked
before the policy introduction, and the minimum price available after the policy introduction.
It is indeed plausible to expect that before the policy all uninformed consumers on average
paid the average submarket price. After the policy change those consumers that make use
of the price comparison display can then rell at the lowest advertised price of that display.
The maximum saving available is then identied in this di¤erence. Before the roadside
price comparison policy, on average, in the a¤ected submarkets consumers paid a premium
over the OPAL price of 1.9 euro cents for unleaded and 0.85 euro cents for diesel fuel. After
the policy introduction the average premium asked on the minimum submarket price is of 0.9
euro cents for unleaded and -0.17 euro cents for diesel fuel. This implies that for both fuels
the maximum saving of the newly informed, or activated consumers, is around 1 euro cents
per liter (with a standard error of 0.15 euro cents). This means that this type of consumers
can save 40 euro cents on each 40 liter rell (i.e. the 0.77% of the price, for a reference price
of 1.3 euro per liter) or achieve a saving of around 42 euro if they rell twice a week for a
year.
Finally we can also compute the saving available to an uninformed/inactive consumer
that after the policy change might consider to get informed. This measure is given by the
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di¤erence of the average and minimum submarket prices at the same point in time, after the
policy change. For both unleaded and diesel fuel this measure is around 0.8 euro cents per
liter (with a standard error of 0.09 euro cents per liter). Hence, it is the prospect of saving
around 32 euro cents for a 40 liter rell (i.e. the 0.6% of the price, for a reference price of
1.3 euro per liter) that should activate the uninformed consumers.
2.6 Conclusions
This paper studies the implementation of a price comparison policy implemented with
the explicit aim to help consumers making informed choices and with the implicit aim to
lower retail prices. The market we study is the Italian pay-toll highway refueling market. A
market where we usually nd a service area every 30-40 kilometers and in each service area
there is only one fuel retailer. Retailers sell the same range of fuels (unleaded and diesel
fuel) and fuel is considered a highly homogeneous good The market is highly concentrated
as only eight brands operates in the considered market. Fuel is sold by nal retailers which
margins are relatively thin (around 4 euro cents per liter). Fuels prices are not advertised
along the highway before entering the service area and consumers know fuel prices only after
their decision to stop at the service area.
These features imply that retailers have little incentive to supply price information to
consumers and consumers face relatively high search costs (mostly in terms of cost of time)
that makes it optimal to just shop randomly. This clearly implies that before the implemen-
tation of the price transparency policy each station enjoyed relatively high market power
on its local market. These features are partly reected in the fact that highways fuel prices
are in general higher than prices found on normal roads and that the price range (di¤erence
between maximum and minimum price) is only around 2 euro cents (per liter).
The price comparison policy we study is the deployment of roadside price comparison
displays comparing the fuel prices of the next four consecutive stations. This policy was
introduced on the main Italian pay-toll highway network in summer 2008. Before the policy
introduction fuel prices were already available (and freely accessible) on the website of the
highway network operator (ASPI). Hence it is plausible to assume that retailers had full price
information even before the policy introduction. It is also plausible that some consumers
were already making use of the price comparison website to obtain price information. Nev-
ertheless, the introduction of the price comparison policy, in the form of roadside electronic
displays, dramatically reduces the searching cost for all the consumers passing by the display.
Moreover this policy makes almost simultaneous the supply of the price information and the
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decision to rell bringing relevant price information to the consumers exactly at the time
when they might think to rell their cars.
The aim of this paper is to estimate the e¤ect of the roadside price comparison policy
on the nal retail prices posted to consumers.
Theoretical studies that have looked at the issue of price transparency or that have
more in general modelled consumerssearch and purchasing decision provide contradicting
prediction on the e¤ect of such price comparison policy. Some models conclude that the
provision of price information should lower average prices (for instance the models based
on Varian (1980) and Salop and Stiglitz (1977)) while other models nd ambiguous e¤ects
dependent on the market specic features (see Møllgaard and Overgaard (2006)66, Waterson
(2003)).
It has then been showed that the available theories have limits and are not suitable to
predict or describe market outcomes, unless we resort to strong assumptions (Møllgaard and
Overgaard (2006), Waterson (2003), Hosken et al. (2008)). Hence, the scope of the paper is
to exploit the (exogenous) introduction of the price comparison policy to provide empirical
evidence on the e¤ects of price transparency on fuel prices in the Italian highway market.
It is indeed beyond the scope of this paper to link the empirical ndings with the many
theories proposed to study price transparency and fuel prices. Rather, the aim of this paper
is to contribute to the empirical literature on fuel prices and price transparency and shed
some light on the impact of price transparency policies applied to real (as opposed to online)
markets.
To perform the empirical analysis we have collected a unique dataset with price infor-
mation on 178 service stations (about 40% of total Italian highway service stations and 85%
of ASPI service stations) operating on the ASPI network. The dataset is a panel as we have
collected price information, for unleaded and diesel fuel (both in the self-service typology67),
for a total of 255 days. The days are not consecutive (there are some gaps) and span from
26/10/2007 until 11/11/2008.
In the econometric analysis, we claim that we can exploit some features of the adopted
implementation strategy to consistently estimate the causal e¤ect of price information on
retail prices. We claim that we can exploit the panel structure of the dataset, and the fact
66Møllgaard and Overgaard (2006) refer to Nilsson (1999), Møllgaard and Overgaard (2001), Møllgaard
and Overgaard (1999), Schultz (2004), Schultz (2005).
67Usually stations o¤ers both self and full service. However we restrict our analysis only to self service.
Indeed, price comparison website and road side panels only advertise self service prices and full service prices
are not advertised.
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that we observe the same stations before and after the policy change, to consistently estimate
the e¤ect of price information on fuel retail prices. Moreover, we can use the stations treated
in 2007 (and not a¤ected by the 2008 policy) to control for time varying factors that a¤ect
the pricing for highway fuel retailers but that are not related to the policy. Thus we control
for time varying factors, exogenous to the policy, using two strategies: underlying fuel cost
variations are accounted by di¤erencing price levels with Opal reference price; and time
varying industry specic factors are accounted for using the price variations in the control
group.
In the empirical analysis we look at the e¤ect of price comparison on four di¤erent
measures as di¤erent price measures are informative of the e¤ect of price comparison on
di¤erent categories of consumers. We rst look at average prices as this is the relevant
price paid by uninformed consumers both before and after the policy change. We then look
at the minimum price as this price is the relevant price when we consider consumers that
are informed both before and after the policy change. Third, we look at the savings made
by those consumers uninformed before the policy change that become informed after the
introduction of the policy. Finally we estimate the potential savings that a consumer, still
uninformed after the introduction of the policy, could make if she is to become informed.
This last measure identies the incentive to become informed that is in place after the policy
change.
Table 2.4: Summary: E¤ects of price transparency on di¤erent price measures
Consumers type Gain (Loss) Gain (Loss)
(euro cents) (%)
before after unleaded diesel unleaded diesel
uninformed uninformed (0.55) (0.5) (0.42%) (0.38%)
informed informed (0.5-0.7) (0.6-0.9) (0.38% - 0.54%) (0.46% - 0.7%)
uninformed informed 1 1 0.77% 0.77%
uninformed incentive to become informed 0.8 0.8 0.62% 0.62%
From the empirical analysis we nd that the two types of consumers that do not change
shopping attitude face slightly higher prices after the policy change where the price increase
is around 0.5 euro cents per liter or the 0.4% of the reference retail price ( assumed around
1.3 euro per liter). If we consider the yearly fuel expenditure this might be reected in an
increase of around 20 euro (for a consumer that rells her car twice a week, each time by 40
liters).
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Consumers that after the policy change become informed are marginally better o¤ as
the minimum price they learn with the displays is 1 euro cents per liter lower (or 0.77%
cheaper for a reference price of 1.3 euro per liter) than the average price they paid before
the policy change, when uninformed. This implies potential savings in the order of 42 euro
a year following the above expenditure calculations.
Finally the price incentive to become informed is in the order of 0.8 euro cents per liter
implying yearly potential savings of around 32 euro.
From the above analysis it is clear that the price comparison policy did not foster price
competition among retailers as neither the average price nor the minimum price appears to
be lowered after the price comparison policy. On the contrary these two price measures have
slightly increased.
Admittedly the policy seems to benet only one category of consumers notably the
newly informed ones. Moreover the policy still seems to o¤er some incentives to uninformed
consumers that are willing to become informed. Hence we could conclude that overall the
policy do o¤er some savings to consumers. However the size of such savings seems to be
extremely small compared to fuel expenditure.
The economic signicance of these e¤ects might gain importance if we compare the size
of the above e¤ects to the margin of retailers and to the observed price range. The maximum
saving attainable is in the order of 1 euro cents per liter and this represent 50% of the average
price range found in the highways posted prices (see section 2.4.2.1). Moreover, with average
margins in the order of 4 euro cents per liter both the potential savings from using the display
and the observed price increases gain economic relevance given the thin area within which
prices might move.
It is di¢ cult to reconcile these ndings with the available theories. Nonetheless, it is
clear that in this market the prediction that increasing price information should lead to lower
levels of prices appears to be not consistent with the data.
The pricing decision of retailers seems to be almost una¤ected by the policy. This
might suggest that retailers are not adversely a¤ected by the policy and keep their former
pricing rules (although slightly raising their prices). This can be the case if consumers are
not activated by the available savings and a relevant share of the consumers keeps relling
randomly.
We should then understand why consumers would not shop at the lowest available price
since price information comes at no cost (there are only distraction costs). One explanation
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might be that the available savings are not enough to activate enough consumers. Since only
a small share of consumers is activated the retailers might not nd optimal to lower prices
as to gain this demand. The result is that consumers do not make use of the displays and
prices are not lowered.
Another explanation of these ndings might be that the policy does not yet provide
enough price information to consumers. We do nd price comparison displays only every
four stations. However between these stations drivers are free to enter and exit the highways if
an exit/entrance gate is available. Although ASPI claims that the price comparison displays
should capture the great majority of consumers it might be that the uninformed consumers
in the system are still enough not to lead to lower prices.
In conclusion if the policy was expected to deliver savings up to 8 euro cents the policy
clearly failed. However, this policy can actually help some consumers achieve some small sav-
ing in their fuel expenditure. Moreover, in a dynamic perspective, the policy might "teach"
consumers about price comparison and its potential benets and might prove successful in
the future. The development and application of ICT innovations to price comparison in
o¤-line real market might be an interesting area for consumer policy research.
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2.7 Appendix A: Tables
Table 2.5: Panel Location
Phase id Highway id Km Direction
disp01 A1 Milano-Napoli 9.30 south
disp02 A1 Milano-Napoli 183.35 south
disp03 A1 Milano-Napoli 307.55 south
disp04 A1 Diramazione Roma sud - GRA 17.14 south
Phase 1 disp05 A1 Milano-Napoli 748.75 north
disp06 A1 Diramazione Roma nord - GRA 9.90 north
disp07 A1 Milano-Napoli 259.70 north
disp08 A1 Milano-Napoli 177.00 north
disp09 A8 Milano-Varese 2.00 north
disp10 A14 Bologna-Taranto 38.90 south
disp11 A1 Milano-Napoli 79.80 north
disp12 A8 Milano-Varese 13.15 south
disp13 A4 Torino-Trieste 19.20 est
disp14 A13 Bologna-Padova 104.85 south
disp15 A13 Bologna-Padova 0.82 north
disp16 A14 Bologna-Taranto 95.60 north
disp17 A1 Milano-Napoli 340.30 north
disp18 A11 Firenze- Pisa Nord 0.15 west
disp19 A11 Firenze- Pisa Nord 81.15 est
disp20 A1 Milano-Napoli 432.07 north
disp21 A1 Milano-Napoli 515.80 south
Phase 2 disp22 A1 Milano-Napoli 516.00 north
disp23 A16 Napoli- Canosa 2.58 est
disp24 A16 Napoli- Canosa 53.45 west
disp25 A14 Bologna-Taranto 498.15 north
disp26 A14 Bologna-Taranto 468.20 south
disp27 A14 Bologna-Taranto 411.77 north
disp28 A14 Bologna-Taranto 359.75 south
disp29 A14 Bologna-Taranto 293.57 north
disp30 A16 Napoli- Canosa 131.60 est
disp31 A16 Napoli- Canosa 158.46 west
disp32 A14 Bologna-Taranto 664.00 south
disp33 A14 Bologna-Taranto 703.56 north
disp34 A14 Bologna-Taranto 555.43 south
Source: Autostrade per lItalia
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Table 2.6: Relation between day of the week and price change
Day Obs. Price Increase Price Reduction No Price Change
N. mean(e cents) N. mean(e cents) N.
Monday 1320 113 0.014 46 -0.008 1161
(9%) (3%) (88%)
Tuesday 1320 149 0.010 110 -0.006 1061
(11%) (8%) (80%)
Wednesday 1320 185 0.008 112 -0.007 1023
(14%) (8%) (78%)
Thursday 1320 152 0.011 49 -0.006 1119
(12%) (4%) (85%)
Friday 1320 81 0.013 68 -0.008 1171
(6%) (5%) (89%)
Saturday 1320 124 0.011 141 -0.007 1055
(9%) (11%) (80%)
Sunday 1320 19 0.007 98 -0.014 1203
(1%) (7%) (91%)
total 9240 823 624 7793
(9%) (7%) (84%)
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Table 2.7: Price Di¤erentials
Source Fuel Service Road Range (e cents) Avg. Save (e) Period
(Max-Min) 40 liters rell
ISTAT 1 Unleaded self non-toll 4.23 1.69 10/07-10/08
ISTAT Diesel self non-toll 4.71 1.88 10/07-10/08
ISTAT Unleaded full non-toll 3.50 1.40 10/07-10/08
ISTAT Diesel full non-toll 3.88 1.55 10/07-10/08
FIGISC2 Unleaded full non-toll 11.33 4.53 19/02/2008
FIGISC Diesel full non-toll 13.05 5.22 19/02/2008
PrezziBenzina3 Unleaded self non-toll 5.40 2.16 20/11/2008
PrezziBenzina Diesel self non-toll 6.10 2.44 20/11/2008
A224 Unleaded self toll 1.60 0.64 28/04/2008
A22 Diesel self toll 1.60 0.64 28/04/2008
A22 Unleaded full toll 1.70 0.68 28/04/2008
A22 Diesel full toll 1.60 0.64 28/04/2008
ASPI5 Unleaded self toll 1.93 0.77 06/02/2008
ASPI Diesel self toll 1.65 0.66 06/02/2008
1 ISTAT (Ita lian National Institute of Statistics) m onth ly price collection ;
2 FIG ISC ( Ita lian Federation of the Relling Serv ice Station Managers) La distribuzione carburanti: libro b ianco su lla concorrenza, 3/4/2008
3 A website were registered users can self rep ort fuel prices (www .prezzib enzina.it)
4 Pay toll m otorway (313 Km long) managed by Autostrada del B rennero SpA . Publish weekly price rep ort on www .autobrennero.it
5 Sub sample of ASPI serv ice stations
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Table 2.8: The Service Stations Sample
outcome var. Mean1 Std. Dev. outcome var. Mean1 Std. Dev.
Phase 1 0.21 0.41 Phase 2 0.62 0.49
Agip 0.27 0.45 A1 0.33 0.47
Api 0.04 0.19 A8 0.03 0.18
Erg 0.07 0.25 A11 0.03 0.18
Esso 0.16 0.37 A12 0.02 0.15
Ip 0.00 0.00 A13 0.04 0.21
Kuwait 0.08 0.28 A14 0.30 0.46
Shell 0.06 0.23 A16 0.07 0.25
Som 0.01 0.07 A26 0.06 0.24
Tamoil 0.20 0.40 A27 0.02 0.15
Total 0.12 0.33 A30 0.02 0.15
light transit 17737 11162 South 0.21 0.41
heavy transit 5541 3127 Centre 0.43 0.50
total transit 23274 13768 North 0.37 0.48
1Averages over 178 service stations on ASPI network
Table 2.9: Price Comparison Motorway Price Vs Normal Street
Unleaded (euro cents) Diesel (euro cents)
Normal road1 Highway2 Normal road Highway
Province mean s.e. mean s.e. mean s.e. mean s.e.
Bologna 1.177 0.005 1.194 0.004 1.171 0.005 1.188 0.004
Firenze 1.174 0.005 1.190 0.007 1.166 0.005 1.183 0.008
Milano 1.166 0.003 1.193 0.004 1.159 0.003 1.186 0.004
Napoli 1.235 0.009 1.240 0.005 1.209 0.014 1.208 0.006
Roma 1.173 0.002 1.188 0.004 1.165 0.002 1.178 0.003
1
Mean computed over the twenty cheap est serv ice stations (at the province level).
Data are self rep orted by users on the website www .prezzib enzina.it
2
Mean computed at the province level for the serv ice stations in our sample op erating on the ASPI highway
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Table 2.10: E¤ect on mean prices, Unleaded and Diesel fuel, Full sample, Suggested
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Method FE FE AR(1) FE DID 2 per. FE FE AR(1) FE DID 2 per.
FE unl FE unl FE unl 2 unl FE dies FE dies FE dies 2 dies
Dep. Var. res p unl res p dies
period 0.337*** 0.359***
(3.309) (3.732)
Group 1.051*** -0.235
(4.185) (-1.595)
TrE¤ect 0.576*** 0.551*** 0.577*** 0.600*** 0.529*** 0.579*** 0.529*** 0.564***
(3.530) (6.440) (3.379) (3.718) (3.150) (6.562) (2.939) (3.341)
Constant -0.750*** -1.226*** -1.354*** -1.586*** -1.604*** -0.930*** -1.376*** -1.900***
(-12.73) (-4.463) (-17.38) (-10.12) (-24.72) (-3.544) (-14.66) (-20.11)
Observations 9,959 9,851 9,959 212 9,959 9,851 9,959 212
R-squared 0.206 0.182 0.199 0.195
Number of id 108 108 108 108 108 108
ID FE YES YES NO NO YES YES NO NO
Day FE YES YES YES NO YES YES YES NO
Display FE NO NO YES NO NO NO YES NO
robust SE YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
AR(1) NO YES NO NO NO YES NO NO
chi2 Haus 40.85 50.81
df Haus 20 20
p Haus 0.00389 0.000170
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.11: E¤ect on mean prices, Unleaded and Diesel fuel, Reduced Sample, OPAL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Method FE FE AR(1) FE DID 2 per. FE FE AR(1) FE DID 2 per.
FE unl FE unl FE unl 2 unl FE dies FE dies FE dies 2 dies
Dep. Var. res p unl res p dies
period 0.324*** 0.470***
(3.439) (4.190)
Group 0.892*** -0.313*
(3.067) (-1.721)
TrE¤ect 0.398** 0.380*** 0.398*** 0.438*** 0.405* 0.405*** 0.405** 0.454**
(2.424) (3.779) (2.828) (2.796) (1.948) (3.671) (2.208) (2.415)
Constant 3.952*** 1.922*** 3.387*** -1.593*** 2.914*** 0.695*** 3.093*** -1.902***
(26.18) (52.71) (24.66) (-9.362) (21.40) (18.27) (23.41) (-18.41)
Observations 4,278 4,185 4,278 186 4,278 4,185 4,278 186
R-squared 0.540 0.145 0.497 0.168
Number of id 93 93 93 93 93 93
ID FE YES YES NO NO YES YES NO NO
Day FE YES YES YES NO YES YES YES NO
Display FE NO NO YES NO NO NO YES NO
robust SE YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
AR(1) NO YES NO NO NO YES NO NO
df Haus 9.930 2.663
p Haus 1 1
pH 0.00163 0.103
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.12: E¤ect on the (sub-markets) maximum prices, Unleaded and Diesel fuel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
fe xtregar fe xtregar
Measure max p max p max p max p
Dep. Var. unleaded price diesel price
TrE¤ect 0.642** 0.476*** 0.256 0.208
(2.428) (3.152) (0.925) (1.292)
Constant 136.6*** -2.073*** 132.5*** 0.563
(1,407) (-5.291) (798.4) (1.335)
Observations 2,569 2,542 2,569 2,542
ID 27 27 27 27
ID FE YES YES YES YES
Day FE YES YES YES YES
chi2 Haus 12.63 2.709
df Haus 4 4
p Haus 0.0132 0.608
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.13: Price Range: Maximum - Minimum price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Method FE FE AR(1) FE FE AR(1)
Dep. Var. di¤ p unl di¤ p dies
TrE¤ect 0.0997 -0.145 -0.311 -0.561***
(0.329) (-0.766) (-1.355) (-2.845)
Constant 1.338*** 1.813*** 1.276*** 2.139***
(9.076) (3.333) (6.473) (3.716)
Observations 2,569 2,542 2,569 2,542
R-squared 0.311 27 0.286 27
ID 27 27 27 27
ID FE YES YES YES YES
Day FE YES YES YES YES
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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2.8 Appendix B: Figures
Figure 2.7: Price Comparison Display (source: www.autostrade.it)
Figure 2.8: Example of Display and Stations Location
Figure 2.7 shows the design of price comparison displays installed along the ASPI highway
network. As we can see from the gure, the display post the brand and prices (self service
unleaded and diesel fuel) of four consecutive stations. The stations are ranked by distance
to the display (with the closest being rst) and the cheapest station is highlighted by a green
dot next to its price. ASPI o¢ cials, when enquired about the display design, reported that
the decision to post only four prices is an outcome of a trade-o¤between posting many prices
(as to o¤er more information, but with come physical constraints) and assuring a minimum
level of comparison among brands. Since on the ASPI network there is a maximum of
three consecutive stations all from the same brand they then adopted the 4 stations design.
Both in the design stage and in the location decision the managers of the fuel stations were
not involved. They are only responsible for the communication of the prices through the
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software platform (that serves both the price comparison website and for the price comparison
display).
Figure 2.9: Italian toll-motorway network (source: www.autostrade.it)
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Figure 2.11: Time spent in each quartile of the regional price distribution (unleaded fuel)
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Figure 2.12: Time spent in each quartile of the regional price distribution (diesel fuel)
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2.9 Appendix C: Identication strategy and robustness checks
In this paper we study the price comparison policy introduced in the Italian highway
refueling market in summer 2008 (a¤ecting around 70 refueling stations) and we adopt a
di¤erence in di¤erences (DID) approach to estimate the average treatment e¤ect on the
treated (ATT).
The econometric analysis takes as the unit of interest the single refueling station, builds
a treatment and control group, and exploits the time dimension of the dataset to estimate
the e¤ect of the policy.
The di¤erence in di¤erences approach let us control for two distinct sources of unobserved
heterogeneity, that might otherwise bias our estimates. Firstly, given we observe the same
stations over time we can control for time invariant unobserved individual e¤ects (both in the
treatment and control group). Secondly, through a control group we can also estimate, and
di¤erence out, unobserved time e¤ects common to both the treatment and control group.
The employed di¤erence in di¤erences approach is admittedly not conventional. Indeed,
while the treatment group is conventional, as it includes refueling stations that change their
treatment status over time (not treated before summer 2008 and treated after summer 2008)
the control group is not conventional. Indeed, di¤erently from conventional DID studies
the control groups is not made up of truly untreated stations. The control group consists
of refueling stations that were themselves treated but at an earlier stage, summer 2007
(38 stations). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the treatment status does not change
among the control group in the time period considered for the econometric analysis. Control
group stations receive the treatment in summer 2007 whereas the econometric analysis only
considers the period between April 2008 and November 200868. Indeed, over the all period
that concerns the econometric analysis the control group stations remain equally treated by
the policy received in summer 2007.
The choice of this control group comes at the cost of a further assumption in addition to
the standard assumptions usually made in DID studies. The assumption is that the e¤ect of
the summer 2007 policy is time invariant. Notice that a similar assumption is also usually
made in standard DID studies where the estimated e¤ect of the policy is usually taken to be
constant over time. Indeed, for the sake of this study we make exactly the same assumption
about the e¤ect of the 2008 price comparison policy that we take to be constant over time.
68This allows for the summer 2007 policy to be fully "absorbed" by a¤ected retailers and reduce the risk
of introducing in the sample periods of time in which the response to the policy varied.
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The intuition is that as long as the e¤ect of the summer 2007 policy is constant this
e¤ect is just a xed time invariant e¤ect that adds up to the stationsxed e¤ects and that
is di¤erenced out in the rst di¤erence of the DID approach.
In the following we o¤er a more formal discussion of this identication approach resorting
to a potential outcome exercise (the following follows the exposition in Angrist and Pischke
(2009)).
Adopting a potential outcome approach we have that the prices asked by retailers are:
p0igt = the price asked by retailer i at time t in absence of price comparison (2.3)
p1igt = the price asked by retailer i at time t with price comparison active (2.4)
Moreover we assume that in absence of any treatment the expected price asked by re-
tailers is additive and given by :
E(p0igtjg; t) = g + Dt (2.5)
Where g represents the group dummy with g = 1 identifying the treatment group and
g = 0 the control group. The above equation says that without any policy change the
expected price in a given group is given by a time e¤ect  (in case Di = 1) and a common
group e¤ect g. Notice that the common group e¤ect g can be estimated as the average of
the stationsxed e¤ects g = 1Ng
PNg
i=1 i for all i 2 (G = g) (where Ng is the number of
stations in a given group). Also, for the stations treated in summer 2007 we can decompose
the stationsxed e¤ects in two components, a common part due to the 2007 policy and a
xed e¤ect specic to each station (i.e. i = i +) such that the common group component
can be decomposed in the following way: 0 = 1N0
PN0
i=1 i = +
1
N0
PN0
i=1 

i = + 

0:
Finally, we assume that the causal e¤ect of the policy E(p1igt   p0igtjg; t)69 is constant
and equal to .
Given the above assumptions the single stations prices can be represented by the following
equation:
69This is a hypothetical di¤erence as for each individual station at any given point in time we can only
observe one outcome.
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pigt = i + Dt + TrEffigt + "igt (2.6)
where pigt is the price asked by retailer i at time t70, i is the station specic xed
e¤ect, Dt is a time dummy that takes the value of 1 after the policy change (summer 2008),
TrEffit is the interaction e¤ect that takes the value of 1 only for those stations that are
a¤ected by the price comparison policy after the policy change, and takes the value of 0 in
all the other cases, and "igt is the error term.
Assuming that E( "igtjg; t) = 0 we can compute the following rst di¤erences:
E(pigtjg = 0; Dt = 1)  E(pigtjg = 0; Dt = 0) = o + +    (o + ) =  (2.7)
E(pigtjg = 1; Dt = 1)  E(pigtjg = 1; Dt = 0) = 1 +  +    1 =  +  (2.8)
From the above it follows that the di¤erence in di¤erences would then take out the
common time e¤ect and isolate the causal e¤ect of the 2008 policy change .
Hence, as long as the parameter  is constant and time invariant this is di¤erenced out
in the rst di¤erence together with the station xed e¤ects.
On the other hand, the e¤ect of the treatment received in 2007 (among control group
stations) might be correlated with unobserved time varying variables. This implies that the
common trend assumption fails to hold and the previous estimate is biased.
Suppose that the time e¤ect is group specic such that 0 is the control group time e¤ect
and 1 is the treatment group time e¤ect. Then we would obtain that the ATT is biased
with the bias given by the di¤erence between the two time trends.
ATT =  + (1   0) (2.9)
However, given we have more than three periods, we can estimate the two time trends
(and the parameter ) to assess the extent of the bias (this is a robustness check that also
Angrist and Pischke (2009) suggest to perform).
Table 2.14 presents the results of a model in which we allow for two di¤erent time trends.
From the regression results we can conclude that the estimates of the ATT are similar
70Prices are detrended to account for oil price variations using the OPAL italian reference price. The
OPAL reference price is a daily average of italian retail fuel prices. We use the diesel and unleaded reference
price.
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to the ones found in models with the common time trend, suggesting a slight increase in
prices around 0.5 euro cents per liter. For unleaded prices we do nd that both trends are
positive and statistically signicant, nonetheless we do not reject the hypothesis that the
two parameters are equal. For diesel prices we do nd that the coe¢ cients associated to the
two trends are not statistically di¤erent from zero.
As a robustness check we also perform a simpler before and after (BA) estimation in
order to identify the ATT. The BA estimation is only performed on the treatment group,
where the dependent variable is the detrended fuel price (prices are detrended using the
Italian OPAL reference price). In this BA framework we also allow for stations xed e¤ects
to control for time invariant station specic characteristics.
Table 2.14 presents the results of the BA estimation. Both for unleaded and diesel fuel
we estimate a positive an statistically signicant ATT, conrming the nding of a price
increase after the price comparison policy. However, the size of the coe¢ cients are about
twice the size of the coe¢ cients estimated in the DID analysis.
The ndings of the BA estimation are consistent with the results of the DID analysis.
Indeed, the DID analysis shows that both the treatment and the control group are subject
to a positive trend in their prices. Hence the simpler BA estimation overestimates the e¤ect
of the policy.
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Table 2.14: Robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DID unl DID dies BA unl BA dies
VARIABLES unl dies unl dies
TrE¤ect 0.432** 0.548** 0.879*** 0.923***
(2.251) (2.091) (7.687) (7.509)
dayt0 0.00495** 0.00171
(2.589) (1.246)
dayt1 0.00731*** 0.000577
(3.143) (0.220)
Constant 0.945*** 0.428*** -0.478 -2.091
(14.76) (6.852) (-2.172) (-19.61)
Observations 9,959 9,959 4800 4800
R-squared 0.393 0.377 0.15 0.11
Number of id 108 108 50 50
ID FE YES YES YES YES
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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CHAPTER 3
DOES PRICE COMPARISON MATTER? AN ACE ANALYSIS
OF HIGHWAY REFUELING
Abstract
Price comparison is a market remedy often introduced to lower consumer
search cost and, in turn, intensify price competition among retailers. However,
theoretical and empirical evidence is not conclusive on the e¤ects of such pol-
icy. This paper studies the introduction of a major price comparison policy on
the Italian highway refueling market. We design an agent-based computational
economics (ACE) model of the highway refueling market. We then use the ACE
model as a testing platform on which introducing price comparison and derive
predictions on the likely e¤ect of the policy. The model predicts that the intro-
duction of price comparison has a limited e¤ect on market prices. Consumers
that make use of price comparison might save around 0.5 euro cents per liter.
However, price competition among retailers is only marginally fostered, as the
price asked by stations falls, on average, by only 0.17 euro cents. These results
are consistent with the available empirical ndings.
3.1 Introduction
Lately, the study and design of remedies in consumer markets has received a wide at-
tention by economists. This follows the recognition that consumersbehavior signicantly
impact the competitive performance of industries (Waterson (2003)). Consequently, there
has been growing attention toward policies designed to empower consumers and to facilitate
consumersdecisions (for a survey on consumers market remedies see Garrod et al. (2008)).
Hence, two disciplines that were quite apart in the past, consumer policy and competition
policy, converged signicantly (Armstrong (2008)) and, in Armstrongs opinion, this has to
do with the fact that "behavioral economics" is more and more informing the way economists
think.1.
1For a survey on the empirical evidence supporting behavioral economics see DellaVigna (2009). Also
antitrust authorities are considering the impact of behavioral economics on competition policy for instance
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This paper studies price comparison, a common consumer market remedy that aims to
reduce consumer search cost by providing price information. This remedy received special
attention during the last decade as the use of price comparison is widespread in online
markets, where we can nd price comparison websites for almost any service or product (for
a review on price comparison see Garrod et al. (2008)). However price comparison is not a
peculiarity of the internet as it can also be applied to brick and mortars markets2.
The price comparison policy we study was introduced in year 2007, in the Italian highway
refueling market. The policy consisted in the deployment of road-side price comparison
electronic displays3. The declared objective of the policy was to provide e¤ective price
comparison and foster consumer search and competition among retailers4. The implicit
objective of the policy was to lower fuel prices5.
To study the introduction of price comparison we propose an agent based computational
economics (ACE) model where autonomous consumers and retailers give rise to market
interactions. We then introduce the price comparison policy and study the resulting market
outcomes to derive insights on the likely impact on consumers and retailers.
The designed ACE model, as any other model, is an abstraction of reality. We do not aim
to design an ACE model that represents all the details and features of the highway gasoline
market. Rather, we model the salient institutional details to resemble the Italian highway
refueling market features and the channels that relate price information to purchasing and
pricing decisions.
This paper contributes to the theoretical literature on competition and consumer pol-
icy by o¤ering a model that incorporates three important elements:1) dynamic interactions
see Bennett et al. (2010) and Armstrong and Huck (2010).
2An example are price comparison sections within magazines. Moreover, advancement in information
technologies have made the gathering and distribution of price information increasingly easier and cost
e¤ective opening new posibilities to price comparison (think for instance to price comparison delivered
directly to mobile phones before visiting a brick and mortar shop).
3Displays are positioned on the side of the highway and they post and compare fuel prices of the successive
four refueling stations. We refer to these price comparison devices either as "panels" or "displays". For an
explanatory picture of one display see Figure 3.8 Appendix A.
4The policy was introduced to comply with Law 2 April 2007 n.40 that required highway concessionaires
to introduce remedies to increase price information and to ease price comparison.
5Before the introduction of the policy along the highway there was no price information. Drivers had no
means to choose retailers based on prices and retailers could enjoy local monopolies. Price comparison was
then expected to undermine retailersmarket power and lead to lower prices.
Consumersassociation CODACONS expected savings up to 8 euro cents per litre or 6% of the starting
price (ANSA news 17 July 2007).
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between consumers and retailers; 2) behavioral decision making in consumers and retailers;
and 3) heterogeneous consumers and retailers.
The empirical evidence (see Chapter 2) suggests that the price comparison policy did not
foster competition among retailers. Posted fuel prices do not decrease after the introduction
of price comparison. Nevertheless, the ndings suggest that consumers activated by the
policy might save an average of 1 euro cents (per liter) if they are to use the price comparison
displays to make informed purchasing decisions. Hence, although the policy does not foster
price competition among retailers the presence of price comparison can still be benecial to
some categories of consumers, those activated by the policy. The benets to nal consumers
appear nevertheless minimal6.
Current economic models fall short of providing explanations on the e¤ect of the policy
studied in this paper (for a discussion see section 2.2, in Chapter 2). Moreover, in the
considered setting there are some key elements that increase the complexity of the task.
First of all, given the linear structure of the highway, retailers face very di¤erent levels of
demand and di¤erent shares of potentially activated consumers7. Also, given the complexity
of the setting, it is unrealistic to postulate that retailers know the share of active vs inactive
consumers8 and form their strategies based on that. It is more plausible to assume that
retailers will learn over time what types of consumers they are facing. Models that do not
account for these features might fail to consider important elements that are likely to drive
the results.
The objective of the paper is to use the ACE model rstly to explain and rationalize the
empirical results of Chapter 2 and secondly to explore the role of ACE modelling in guiding
policy design9.
6A consumer that refuels her car once a week (40 litres) might save around 20 euros each year.
7Given the linear structure of the highway not all highway segment have the same potential demand. Also,
the rst refueling station after the price comparison display face the highest share of activated consumers
while the fourth station after the display face the lowest share of activated consumers. This is an important
issue considering the fact that stations are usually at 40 km distance and the average length of trips is 80
km.
8Activated consumers are those consumers that after the introduction of the policy make informed pur-
chasing decisions and select the lowest price retailer. On the other hand, inactive consumers are consumers
that either do not pay attention to the price comparison display or cannot use the price comparison infor-
mation (for instance the lowest price retailer is not along their journey or they enter and exit the highway
without encountering any price comparison display).
9For a recent paper on the use of ACE models for economic policy design see Dawid and Neugart (2011).
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Accordingly we perform two simulation exercises: In the rst simulation (Policy Impact
Simulation) we change some key consumers and retailers parameters to study the relationship
between these model parameters and the estimated policy e¤ects. In the second simulation
(Policy Design Simulation) we increase the density of price comparison display to assess to
what extent higher information dissemination might increase policy e¤ects.
The Policy Impact Simulation nds that retailersprices are only marginally a¤ected by
the introduction of the policy. On average we nd only a small reduction in average posted
prices of 0.17 euro cents per liter. However, consistent with the empirical ndings, we nd
that drivers that are activated by the policy experience higher savings that, on average,
amount to 0.5 euro cents per liter. As expected, we also nd that, as we increase the share
of drivers that are activated by the policy, the gain for consumers increases, as prices are
further reduced. However, even in cases in which a high share of consumers are activated
(75% of consumers) the maximum savings implied by the policy amount to only 1.5 euro
cents per liter.
The Policy Design Simulation suggests that by increasing the density of price comparison
displays the average e¤ect of the policy improves for consumers. The average price paid by
activated consumers decreases by a further 0.3 euro cents whereas the average posted price
decreases by a further 0.14 euro cents.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 briey discusses some related literature;
Section 3.3 describes the policy change (3.3.1) and the refueling market under study (3.3.2
and 3.3.3); Section 3.4 outlines the agent based computational economics model; Section 3.5
presents the simulation exercise and its results; and Section 3.7 draws some conclusions.
3.2 Related literature
This paper is directly related to the literature that studies the relationship between price
transparency and competition and to the literature that applies agent based models to study
retail markets.
Price comparison is a price transparency policy often implemented in consumers markets.
The relationship between price transparency, market competition and consumers policy has
been object of several theoretical and empirical studies (for three recent surveys see Garrod
et al. (2008), SCA (2006), Armstrong (2008)).
The suggestion to use ACE models to inform consumer policy desing and policy assessment can also be
found in a discussion paper of the UK O¢ ce for Fair Trading (OFT) OFT (2009).
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In general, this literature concludes that increased price transparency on the rms side
unambiguously facilitates oligopolistic coordinations while increased price transparency on
the consumers side is not necessarily benecial to consumers. Overall, given the interplay
of consumers side and rms side e¤ects, this literature concludes that the e¤ect of price
transparency is ambiguous and dependent on the market specic features (Møllgaard and
Overgaard (2006)10, Waterson (2003)). This view is somehow in contrast with the conclusions
drawn from traditional models that look at the issue of price dispersion. These models
postulate that increased price transparency leads to lower average prices. The classical
examples are: 1) the Varian (1980)11 model where both the average price paid by informed
consumers and the (higher) average price paid by uninformed consumers decrease as the
share of informed consumers increases; and 2) the Salop, Stiglitz model (Salop and Stiglitz
(1977)) where the average price in the market falls as the search cost decreases.
Also, about price comparison websites there is a vast empirical literature that nds
that online price comparison o¤ers sizable savings although high price dispersions remains
a pervasive feature (among these papers Smith and Brynjolfsson (2001), Ellison and Ellison
(2009), Baye et al. (2004), Morton et al. (2001), Brown and Goolsbee (2002)).
Other studies in the agent based literature that are mostly close to this paper are the
works of Waldeck and Darmon (2006), Kirman and Vriend (2001) and Heppenstall et al.
(2006). Waldeck and Darmon (2006) consider a game similar to the one in Varian (1980).
Similar to Varian they derive a Nash Search Equilibrium (NSE) and compare it to the
pricing of adaptive sellers that use a reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm. They nd that
when there is Bertrand competition the reinforcement learning price distribution converges
to the NSE price distribution. Also, they nd that when there is a change in buyers search
behavior the average price and the variance implied by RL pricing exhibit variations that
10Møllgaard and Overgaard (2006) refer to Nilsson (1999), Møllgaard and Overgaard (2001), Møllgaard
and Overgaard (1999), Schultz (2004), Schultz (2005).
11Some recent papers based on the Varian (1980) model draw conclusions on the e¤ect of increased price
information (Morgan et al. (2006), Waldeck (2008), and Lach and Moraga-González (2009)). The paper by
Morgan et al. nd that as the share of informed consumers exogenously increase, keeping xed the number
of rms, the expected price paid by both informed and uniformed consumers decreases. In the other paper
Lach and Moraga-González introduce an increased heterogeneity in consumers types that results in more
realistic (bell-shaped) price distribution. They conclude that policies aimed at increasing the amount of
price information can a¤ect the distribution of prices and welfare and that the magnitude of the e¤ects
vary depending on the shopping behavior of consumers. Waldeck (2008) establishes that the link between
information and pricing is not trivial. He also nds an inverse-U shaped relationship between price dispersion
and the share of informed consumers. Then he nds that higher price information might lead to higher price
dispersion and that more intensive search by active consumers might lead to higher average posted prices.
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are consistent with the variations found in the NSE. In our paper we use a reinforcement
learning algorithm that is similar to the one proposed by Waldeck and Darmon (2006).
Kirman and Vriend (2001) build an agent based model of the sh market in Marseille,
France. They model adaptive sellers and buyers and their model is capable to explain the
two main stylized facts of the Marseille sh market: relatively high price dispersion and high
loyalty.
Finally, Heppenstall et al. (2006) model retail gasoline market in the UK with an hybrid
model that combines agent based elements on the sellers side and a spatial integrated model
on the consumer side. Their model is able to reproduce the spatial di¤erences seen in the
real market (higher prices in rural areas as opposed to lower prices in urban areas). Also
their model is consistent with the "rocket and feathers" behavior often found in the gasoline
price literature.
3.3 The policy and market framework
3.3.1 The price comparison policy
This section briey describes the details of the price comparison policy under study.
In early 2007 the Italian government, through a decree-law12, committed to foster com-
petition and increase consumers protection in some sensitive markets, among which the
refueling market13. Some months later, the parliament approved the governments decree
and turned it into a law (Law 40/7 henceforth14). For what concerns the intervention on
the refueling market, the objectives of the legislator are clearly stated in the law (article
2) and are the following: (1) foster competition, and (2) price transparency; (3) guarantee
an adequate level of knowledge about cost of service, and (4) facilitate the comparison of
alternative o¤ers.
Autostrade per lItalia (henceforth ASPI), the largest Italian pay-toll highway concession-
aire, decided to implement the proposed price information measures before the 2007 summer
holiday period (taking place usually in August, when millions of drivers use toll-highways to
reach their holiday destination).
In practice, what ASPI did during the months between April and July 2007 was: 1) To
12Decree Law 31st January 2007 n.7
13Other markets considered were: Fixed Line Phone and Mobile Phone, Internet Services, Car Insurance,
Mortgages, Airline Tari¤s, and "best before date" in food products.
14Law 2 April 2007 n.40.
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create a software platform for stations15 managers to communicate, in real time, the fuel
prices o¤ered at their premises; 2) Post the recorded prices in an apposite section within
the ASPI website16 (Figure 3.10, Appendix A); 3) Finally, they started to install physical
road-side price comparison display 17 (like the one in gure 3.8 and 3.9 Appendix A) along
their highway network.
Hence, two price comparison policies were adopted:1) Price comparison website; and 2)
Physical roadside price comparison display. Although both policies o¤er the same type of
informative content they di¤er under some dimensions. On the one hand, the comparison
website is accessible only through an internet connection (thus there is no simultaneity be-
tween information delivery and purchase18), it lists all the stations on the ASPI network, and
it still entails some positive search costs19. On the other hand, the roadside comparison dis-
plays only list the next four consecutive stations, they are freely available to everyone (driving
next to them), they entail almost no search cost20, and the acquisition of price information
and the purchase decision can be potentially simultaneous21. Given these characteristics we
assume that the latter measure (the roadside displays) has the highest potential to e¤ectively
disseminate price information and provide price comparison among stations that are close
substitutes22.
3.3.2 The highway refueling market
This section provides some information about the Italian highway gasoline market. It
is beyond the scope of this paper to model each detail and characteristic of the market.
Rather, in our agent based model we aim to represent and capture the salient characteristic
15We use the words "station", "refueling station", "service station", "retailer" , "lling station" inter-
changeably to refer to a facility that o¤er the refueling service.
16Prices are posted online at www.autostrade.it and are catalogued by highway code, kilometer and
direction.
17We use the words "physical" or "road" comparison panel to refer to a tangible price comparison device
installed next to the roadway.
18Although recent development in mobile technologies make it possible to browse the web also on the
move.
19Be aware of the service, cost of the connection, time to open the browser, locate the desired highway
and set of possible relling stations, etc...
20There could be an attention cost. To process the information on the panel the consumer has to divert
some of her cognitive ability from driving to the acquisition of the price information. Still we assume this
cost is a fraction of the cost required to access the online version.
21The stations listed on the panel are usually within a distance of 2 to 100 km.
22The products sold by the di¤erent retailers are seen as substitutes, this is even more true when we
consider highway tra¢ c that is generally less "loyal" than local/urban tra¢ c.
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and aspects that play a key role in the relationships of interested (i.e. price information,
purchasing decision and pricing decisions). In our model we only consider retailers and
consumers and we remain agnostic about the role of the players that we do not explicitly
model (oil companies, highway concessionaire). Still this section o¤ers an overview of the
market as to guide the interpretation of the model and the evaluation of the ndings.
We study the Italian highway refueling market and more precisely the price competition
between retailers located along the highways. In Italy there are more than 6500 Km of
pay-toll highways and although this network only accounts for the 2% of the national road
surfaces, its accounts for about 25% of the national transportations needs23. ASPI is the main
pay-toll highway concessionaire and has concession for roughly 3000 Km (almost half of the
entire national network). Its network covers almost the entire country with the exception of
very few regions24. On the Italian highways there are more than 450 service stations (of which
210 on the ASPI network) that sell the same range of fuel products (typically: unleaded,
premium unleaded, diesel, premium diesel). The stations operating on the highways represent
only the 2% of the total service stations active nationwide, however they supply more than
10% of total fuel (respectively 6% for unleaded and 15% for diesel fuel). By volume the most
sold fuel on the highway is diesel that accounts for more than 75% of total fuel supply25
The range of fuels sold by each lling station is considered homogeneous. That is, within
each category of fuel, products o¤ered by di¤erent brands are qualitative the same, the only
di¤erences that might arise come from brand di¤erentiation not related to the quality of the
fuel (e.g. advertisement, corporate social responsibility, loyalty programme).
There are eight major brands that operate on the Italian highways: AGIP, ESSO, ERG,
SHELL, Q8, TOTAL, API/IP, TAMOIL (di¤erently from the ordinary roads on highways
there are very few "independent" retailers26). All these competitors are vertically integrated
rms that are active at every stage from the production to the distribution process. For
what concerns the end market they can all rely on an extensive network of service stations
distributed all over the country. Such stations can be directly owned by the oil companies
or given in concession to third parties that own and manage them.
23Source AISCAT Association of Italian Highway Concessionaire, www.aiscat.it
24The regions are Sardinia, Sicily, Calabria, and Trentino Alto Adige.
25Unione Petrolifera, Notizie 4/2006, and Notizie 5/2007, www.unionepetrolifera.it .
26Usually known as "pompe bianche" (white pumps). These independent retailers buy fuel at the whole-
sale market, directly from reneries. They are usually characterized by very low expenditure in marketing
or branding and are popular for o¤ering lower prices or discounts.
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Of importance for our modelling exercise is that the price setting usually happens in
two stages. In the rst stage the oil company indicates to the station manager a suggested
price. At the second stage the station manager can discretionally change that price, within
a range imposed by the oil company. This range is implicitly determined by two contractual
conditions: the lower bound is given by the price at which the station manager buys the
fuel (assuming they do not sell at a loss); the upper bound is usually a ceiling on the price
the station manager can practice (usually determined by the oil company in relation to the
suggested price).
3.3.3 Highway use and customer attitude to refueling
This section provides some evidence about the average use of the highway and customers
attitude to self service refueling. During the year 2007 the average distance travelled on the
ASPI network was 80 Km long. Respectively 75 Km for light weight vehicles (that represent
the 80% of total transits) and 99.7 Km for heavy weight vehicles. During the year the tra¢ c
level seems to be quite constant (except for a peak of light weight travels in August). A
substantial share of trips, 1/3 for light and 1/4 for heavy weight vehicles, is less than 25
Km long and these trips are mainly concentrated around the metropolitan areas on both
inbound and outbound directions27.
For what concerns drivers refueling habits we can draw some information from two
surveys published by ACI (the Italian Automotive Club)28. These studies report that about
40% of drivers favours self service refueling always or often while another 33% opts for the
self service only occasionally. The lower price of the self service seems to be determinant in
the choice of the service for about 45% of the respondent whereas the rest favoured it for
its exibility. The same surveys also provide some information about customer loyalty and
choice of the service stations. They report that proximity and lower price are the two key
determinants for the choice of the refueling station. In the urban area most of the drivers
always refuel from the same station whereas when outside the urban area there is no delity
to the single service station but there is some level of brand loyalty.
27Data come from two surveys: Autostrade per lItalia 2007, Conference Presentation "Estate 2007. "Via
libera in sicurezza "; and Autostrade per LItalia 2008, Conference Presentation "La via per lestate. Le
vacanze iniziano in autostrada".
28ACI, Rapporto Annuale 2002 e Rapporto Annuale 2008.
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3.4 An ACE model of highway refueling
This section describes the agent-based model of the highway refueling market. The
purpose of the model is to study the determinants of price competition among retailers, to
o¤er insights on the interpretation of the empirical results and to study the implications for
policy design.
The model is built and run on the software Netlogo29 and is made up of four main objects:
1) the road network, the space on which agents live, move, interact and vanish (die); 2) the
refueling stations (retailers); 3) the drivers (consumers); 4) the price comparison displays.
Each type of agent has some group specic decision rules and each agent, within the
same type, makes use of the same decision rules (this does not imply that all agents take the
same decisions as decision rules are state dependent). Nevertheless, agents of the same type
di¤er in their state variables.(e.g. for drivers: fuel tank, level of fuel; for retailers: suggested
price, e¢ ciency).
The underlying time dimension is divided into days that in turn are divided in steps.
During each step of the day agents move and interact and once all the daily steps are
concluded some end of the day accountings takes place and, then, the new day starts.
The model is run for a total of 1000 days. The model always start with price comparison
displays turned o¤. These are then turned on from day 501 through day 1000.
The following subsections describe in detail the four objects of the model.
3.4.1 Road network
The road network is the environment on which agents are created and located, on which
agents move, interact, conclude their transactions and nally vanish. The road network is
designed to resemble a possible simplied highway road segment. Notice that the model
only considers the highway environment and does not model the ordinary road environment,
which is necessarily linked to the highway. Figure 3.1 depicts a type of road segment used in
the model (other road settings can be found in Figure 3.11 Appendix A). In these settings
the environment is made up of the following objects. An highway (the straight black vertical
line) on which drivers can drive in two directions (north! south and south! north). Then,
there are various gates from which consumers can enter or exit the highway. Finally, at the
two ends of the straight line there are two other gates that represent the connections of the
studied segments with the other contiguous segments of the highway.
29NetLogo itself: Wilensky, U. 1999. NetLogo. http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/. Center for Con-
nected Learning and Computer-Based Modeling, Northwestern University. Evanston, IL.
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Drivers generated on these latter gates represent the drivers that continue their trips
from the contiguous segments while drivers that vanish at these gates are those drivers that
continue their trips on the contiguous segments. Drivers generated at these two gates can
either travel along the entire segment and vanish at the opposite end or vanish at one of the
urban gates along the segment.
At the other nine gates, represented by the small squares on the east side of the highway
road, are the urban entry/exit points that connect the highway to the ordinary road network.
Also consumers entering the highway at these points can either move north or south. Again,
drivers generated at these gates can either travel along the segment to reach and vanish at
one of the ends or vanish at one of the other gates along the segment
The road network is made up of squares (patches in NetLogo) and each square is taken
to have a nominal length of 6.6 Km. Drivers drive on the right side of the road. The total
length of the highway segment is then taken to be 320 Km. Given that the average distance
travelled on the highway is around 75 to 100 Km we take this segment to be representative.
The road network also identies the places on which we nd refueling stations and price
comparison displays. There are eight pairs of station areas (one area for each direction).
The areas for stations are located at the midpoint between two di¤erent gates.
Stations are located at six patches of distance and that in turn represents a distance
of around 40 Km that is the average distance between refueling areas we nd in the real
market. The map also identies the locations for the roadside price comparison displays.
For example this deployment settings depicts the introduction of two price comparison
displays, one for the north and one for the south direction, and displays are located around
mid-point of the highway segment.
This is not the only network we could implement as we could have varied the distance
between stations or varied the number of gates. Also, we could have made the model more
sophisticated for instance by modeling the normal road network. Brought to an extreme we
could have also used a real road network on which running our model. However, since we
look for predictions that we can generalize and we believe that the exact road design does
not impact on the nal results we decided to implement the simplest possible road network
but that still incorporates all the relevant characteristics of a typical highway segment.
3.4.2 Retailers: refueling stations
In our model the sellers are the refueling stations. Stations are located on the service
areas dened in the road network. There is only one retailer for each service area. Also,
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Figure 3.1: The road network
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there is only one type of fuel (all cars run on the same fuel) and stations are the only supplier
of fuel in the market. In our model each station is an independent entity and there is no
brand a¢ liation. Stations have unlimited capacity to serve customers and independently set
their prices (we do not model coordination).
Retailers choose prices within a given range, although the range and levels can change
from station to station. For each station is drawn a suggested price (on average 100 euro
cents per liter and such price remain constant and does not change over time30). Then for
each station is also drawn a maximum mark-up on the suggested price (on average 1.2 euro
cents per liter31). A minimum price is also drawn and is given by the suggested price less a
random component with an of average 3 euro cents per liter32.
The wholesale cost of fuel is then derived by applying a discount, on average -1.5 euro
cents per liter, on the minimum price. Given this modelling the average maximum margin
that a retailer can realize is around 4 euro cents per liter and this gure is consistent with
the maximum retailer margin found in the market.
The heterogeneity in stations is given by the actual realizations of their suggested price
(that capture brand positioning) and the specic realizations for the maximum and minimum
price and wholesale cost that capture di¤erences in stations e¢ ciency or stations contractual
power (for instance a station with a very low realization for the wholesale cost represent a
highly e¢ cient station or a station with high contracting power).
Given the above dened price range retailers can adopt four pricing strategies: 1) highly
undercut competitorsprices, by 2 euro cents; 2)slightly undercut competitors prices, by 1
euro cents; 3) match the average competitorsprice; 4) price at their own maximum price.
We decided that the minimum undercut had to be of 1 euro cents as to be "visible" to
drivers.
For each station the set of competitors is given by the closest two stations (the closest
to the north and to the south), in case no price comparison display is active (this set span
an area of 80 Km). In case of an active price comparison display, if the station is subject
to the display (the station is treated) then the set of competitors is given by all the other
stations treated by the same display otherwise the previous rule applies.
To decide which price strategy to adopt stations follow algorithm explained below.
30Hence we do not account for uctuations in the oil price for instance.
31The maximum di¤erential of 1.2 euro cents per liter is consistent with the di¤erential found in the
agreements between retailers and the oil companies in Italy.
32Also the gure of 3 euro cents is consistent with the agreements between retailers and oil companies.
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3.4.2.1 Price setting
Each service station decides autonomously its price following the same decision process.
Stations start with a random rule (strategy) and then, after an evaluation period (rst three
weeks of the model), make their price setting decisions once a week. Once the new price is
decided the stations keep it xed for the following week and only at the end of the week,
depending on the rule, on weekly prots and on past prots, might decide to change price
strategy.
Stations set their prices following a reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm. The algo-
rithm we use is similar to the one implemented by Waldeck and Darmon (2006). Stations
can choose between four di¤erent price rules (the four rules seen above) and any rule can
(potentially) be chosen at any stage. Each rule is characterized by a tness value. Where
for tness we mean the ability of the rule to fulll stationsobjective (i.e. maximize prots).
When the model is initialized each rule r (for each stations i) starts with the same tness (as
in eq. 3.1, where start_profits are the median prots realized in the rst weeks of evalua-
tion). As rules are chosen, by stations, their tness is updated accordingly to eq. 3.2. Thus
if at day t rule r is played, the tness of rule r become a weighted average of the previous
tness, given by that rule, and the current prots. The weight is given by the parameter 
that can be though of as the "memory" of the retailer.
F r;i0 = F0(start_profits) 8r; i (3.1)
F r;it=t+1 = (1  )F r;it + t with t = (pt   c)Qt (3.2)
Stations attach a probability to each of their rule depending on their tness. Rules are
thus selected through a trial and error process in which stations tend to select and play more
often those rules that returned higher payo¤s.
As in Waldeck and Darmon (2006) the probability that rule r is played in period t by
station i is given by:
prob (play r)it =
exp(F
r

)
RX
r=1
exp(F
r

)
with  > 0 (3.3)
where F
r
is the normalized tness dened as: F
r
= F
r Fmin
Fmax Fmin ; and  is called the
temperature parameter where for  ! 0 stations tend to play only the rules that returned
the highest prots and for  !1 stations randomly pick rules.
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In our implementation of RL we consider two types of prots33. In a rst implementation
we consider normal prots as given by the di¤erence between retail price and wholesale cost
multiplied by the quantity of fuel sold. In another specication, we correct this prot measure
by the uctuation in the potential demand. Indeed only looking at prots might o¤er a very
noisy picture as demand does not change only on the basis of the asked price but also depends
on the uctuations in the potential demand (drivers on the highway). In the second measure
a stations manager get a noisy signal about the amount of drivers passing by the stations
premise and considers uctuation in demands when comparing prots34.
3.4.3 Consumers: drivers
Drivers are the consumers of our model. Each driver is endowed with a car (cars are
characterized by a fuel tank and an e¢ ciency level (fuel consumptions)). We distinguish
between three types of drivers: active, very active and captive. The three categories should
represent the three types of consumers a¤ected by the policy. The very active are those
consumers that are highly price sensitive and even in the absence of the displays make
use of the price comparison website and are always informed about all prices. The active
consumers are those consumers that are activated by the policy and use only the road-side
display to gather price information. The captive consumers are those that do not use the
price information and keeps unchanged their refueling habits.
3.4.3.1 Refueling decision
In our model on average, every day, there are 1500 drivers that are created and might
potentially be in need of refueling (around 500 do refuel their cars every day). Active drivers
are a xed fraction of total drivers and very active drivers are a xed fraction of active drivers.
Anytime a driver stops to refuel she lls up to tank capacity. All three types of drivers have
two common refueling strategies. 1) Emergency: if they see their low fuel warning light on
they stop at the rst refueling stations. 2) Normal: each driver has a level of fuel after which
she consider to refuel (around 1/3 of the tank), once this level is reached, randomly some
drivers, even if active or very active, might stop at a random station and refuel35.
33When we refer to prots we always refer to (price - wholesale cost of fuel) x quantity. Hence we do not
inlcude other xed or variable costs.
34We believe this is a plausible and realistic assumption. When demand vary the comparison of weekly
prots is not trivial. For instance if after a week of high prots there is a week of low prots the station
manager needs to understand if the low prots are due to the price chosen or to the lower potential demand.
35This account for those stops which main purpose is not relling the car but rather using other services
of the service area (food and drinks, or physical needs for instance). Given that a driver has already stopped
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Active and very active drivers di¤er from captive ones for a third strategy. When they
reach the level at which they consider refueling (1/3 of the tank) they process the acquired
price information and pick the station with the lowest price that is within their autonomy
and travelling direction. Then they will only shop at this station. Notice that not only
highway stations are considered. Active drivers also know the prices they might nd outside
the highway and if the price they know is lower than the one available on the highway,
and their autonomy lets them reach their preferred stations, then they wont refuel on the
highway.
3.4.4 Price comparison displays
Price comparison displays can be installed along the highway and, when turned on, send
price information to active consumers. Displays always send price information about the
next four successive service stations. Displays are also direction sensitive and send price
information only to those drivers going in the direction facing the front of the display. In the
model we test three di¤erent implementation settings of the policy that vary in the density
of displays (see Figure 3.11 Appendix A for the three maps). The rst implementation
introduces only two price comparison displays a¤ecting half of the stations (8 stations out
of 16). The second introduces four displays a¤ecting all the stations in the model (although
a single station can be on maximum one display). The last setting introduces a display for
each highway gate to reach the maximum possible price information coverage. A total of 16
displays are installed and necessarily the same station is covered by more than one display.
3.4.5 Key parameters
The ACE model we design necessarily includes many parameters that remain invariant
along the simulation. For a full list of the parameters and their possible values we refer to
the software code (see Appendix B). In this section we highlight and briey describe what
we consider the key parameters of the model (Table 3.1). Some of these key parameters are
kept xed in the simulation while other vary. By doing so on the one hand we perform a
sensitivity test of the estimates and, on the other hand, we also investigate the impact of
some key parameters on the models behavior and predictions.
for other reasons might well decide to rell instead of losing other time.
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Table 3.1: Key model parameters
Parameter Description Value(s)
memory
reinforcement learning parameters
0.5; 0.75
temp 0.1; 0.05
F0 3
EvalWeeks # of weeks in which the initial prots are evalued 3
week length # of days in a simulated week 7
AvgCars average number of drivers generated in each step of the
model
300
RL-share-based Reinforcement learning algorithm based on a noisy
signal about # of customer as fraction of drivers
passing by the stations. Otherwise the RL algorithm is
only based on the prots made by the refueling station
On; O¤
very-p-stve share of very active consumers 0.3; 0.15
p-stve-t share of active consumers 0.1; 0.25; 0.5; 0.75
fuel-concern treshold at which drivers start considering relling
options
0.33
emergency-fuel threshold of the emergency fuel level 0.1
t-red-bias Share of drivers that enter form the two ends of the
highways. Otherwise drivers enter form the gates along
the way
0.4
per-exit Percentage of drivers that exit at each gate 0.2
The rst three parameters in Table 3.1 enter the reinforcement learning algorithm and
are explained in section 3.4.2.1. We set the parameter F0 at the value of 3 such that the
initial tness of all rule is set to a relatively high value (i.e. three times the value of the
median prots realized during the evaluation period). This ensure that at least during the
rst stages retailers tend to explore all the available rules. The memory parameter enters
the equation of the RL tness function. We model two di¤erent levels of memory, a rst
setting in which memory is set equal to 0:5 (equal weight between current prots and past
prots) and a second setting in which memory is set equal to 0.75 (current prots are valued
more than the past realizations). The temp parameter (temperature of the RL algorithm) is
also varied. It takes the values of 0:1 and 0:05:where the former value implies a tendency to
vary more frequently the price strategy and the latter value imply a tendency to settle for
the strategy(ies) that delivers the highest payo¤s.
EvalWeeks is set equal to 3 and represents the number of weeks in which the model is
run to estimate the starting prots (during this period retailers keep xed and randomly
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assigned price strategy). The week (weeklength) has the standard length of 7 days (although
the model allows for shorter or longer week length). Notice that retailers make their pricing
decisions at the beginning of each week, so by shortening the week length retailers will
consider more often the opportunity to change price strategy.
AvgCars is set to 300 and represents the average number of cars that are generated in
each cycle of the model (cars are generated with a random Poisson process). In each day
there are ve cycles in which cars are generated and the average numbers of cars created in
each day is around 1800:
RL-share-based identies the type of information retailers use to assess their weekly
sales. We distinguish between two cases. In the rst case retailers only look at their weekly
prots. However this measure might be very noisy as the fuel sold in one station depends
on the price of the station, on the average size of the tank of the driver, on the average fuel
level that drivers have when refueling and on the size of the potential demand that varies
randomly each week. To overcome this possible issue we also propose a second method to
assess the e¢ cacy of the chosen rule. We assume that retailers can observe a noisy signal of
their potential customer base (just by looking at the number of cars passing by the stations
premise). Hence, in this second case, instead of prots, retailers will consider the share of
cars refueling at their premises times the margin they earn as a share of costs.
The two parameters p-stve-t and very-p-stve control the share of active drivers and the
share of very active drivers. Active drivers are those drivers that will make use of the price
display, if they see one turned on along their way, whereas very active drivers are a subset of
active drivers and are informed of all prices since they use the price comparison website. For
these two parameters we do an extensive analysis and vary them in the simulation exercise.
Fuel-concern and emergency-fuel set the thresholds (in terms of the size of the fuel tank)
at which drivers start considering refueling and at which drivers are "desperate" to refuel
(as to avoid running out of fuel). The fuel tank capacity is a random number between 35
and 55 liters.
The last two parameters t-red-bias and per-exit determine where cars are been created.
There are two options, cars can be created at the two ends of the highway or at the urban
intersections. The former mimic the travel of drivers coming from other highway segments
while the latter mimic the persistent entrance of cars at each urban segments. The parameter
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t-red-bias identify the share of cars that are created at the two ends of the highway (if t-red-
bias=1 no cars enter at the urban intersections), and the parameter per-exit controls the
share of cars that exits at each urban intersection.
3.5 Simulations
The aim of this paper is to study the introduction of the price comparison policy. The
outcome of interest is the fuel price paid by the di¤erent categories of consumers (captive,
active and very active) and the purpose is to estimate the e¤ect, on retail prices..
To estimate the e¤ect of the policy we use a regression framework where we take the
simulated data and we estimate a before and after OLS regression to estimate the impact of
the policy. This approach replicates what a researcher could do with observational data in
a standard treatment evaluation exercise. The advantage in our setting comes from the fact
that we use experimental data and we can ignore many issues arising in non-experimental
treatment evaluation studies.
For each single simulation run, we can estimate the policy impact. If the policy impact
is not signicantly di¤erent from zero the policy has no statistically signicant e¤ect on
consumersprices otherwise, if the impact is statistically di¤erent from zero, we allow for
positive (lower prices) or negative (higher prices) e¤ects of the policy.
Once we estimate the policy impact, for each run of the model, we can then look at the
distribution of the policy impact for a xed parameter choice. Also, we can investigate the
relationship between the policy impact and the chosen model parameter choice. This can be
done by regressing the estimated policy impact using the chosen parameters as regressors.
Other than the parameter choice, the ACE model we propose depends also on pure
random factors. By varying the random seed of the model we also test the sensitivity of our
results to the random realizations of the model.
In the rst simulation (Policy Impact Simulation) we investigate the role of the following
key parameters: memory (2); temp (2); RL-share-based (2); very-p-stve (2); p-stve-t (4) (the
numbers in parentheses indicate the di¤erent realizations considered, for the values taken
by these parameters please refer to Table 3.1). Given the introduced variation in these
parameters we obtain a total of 64 model variants that are each run for 10 times changing
the underlying random seeds. This implies a total of 640 runs. The analysis of the results is
then performed in a 2-step regression framework where we rst estimate, for each run, the
policy impact. Then, we regress the estimated 640 policy impacts on the model parameters.
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The results of these last regressions shed light on the relationships between the e¤ects of the
policy and the simulated characteristics of the market.
The second simulation (Policy Design Simulation) looks in detail at the impact of the
display settings (the display density) on the estimated policy e¤ect. The aim is to study the
relationship between di¤erent display deployment settings and the resulting policy e¤ects.
The three di¤erent settings vary in the density of price comparison displays introduced in
the market. With a higher density of displays there is higher information di¤usion and
higher inter-relations between retailers (the price of the same station is posted in more
than one display and hence is compared against more stations). Indeed each station can be
compared to a minimum of three stations, in case of minimum display density, to a maximum
of six stations in case of maximum density. This last exercise should highlight the trade-
o¤s between providing more price information (that inevitably entails higher costs) and the
e¤ect on prices. Together with the three display settings we also vary two key consumer
parameters: very-p-stve (2); p-stve-t (4). The total number of model variants is then 24 and
for each of these specications we run the model 10 times with di¤erent underlying random
seeds. We then investigate the generated outcomes with the same regression framework
highlighted above.
3.6 Results
Before presenting the results we briey present the macro evolution of the key variables
that capture the behavior of the simulated model.
Figure 3.2 shows the evolution of the average posted price, between day 0 and day 1000,
for a typical simulation run. Stations enter the simulation with a randomly assigned price,
hence the average price at the beginning of the simulation reects this randomness and
the average price is around 100 euro cents per liter with a price range (di¤erence between
maximum and minimum price) of 4 euro cents. The gure tells that stations learn relatively
quickly to increase prices and the average price during the rst 100 days of simulation increase
by 2 euro cents as most of the stations start to price near their capped maximum price.
The average price then uctuates always around these high levels as only occasional price
dips seem to appear. At day 500 of the simulation the price comparison policy is turned on
and retailers can react to it. The gure suggests that, for this run, the policy has no clear
e¤ect as the average price line does not seem to exhibit structural breaks in proximity of the
policy change.
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Figure 3.2: Evolution of average price (all stations)
Figure 3.3 shows instead the average price paid by the di¤erent categories of consumers.
During the rst half of the simulation we can only distinguish between two types of con-
sumers: very active and captive. Indeed during this rst phase only very active consumers
have access to price information.
Accordingly the price paid by this latter category of consumer is the lowest from the
start of the simulation. Only after the introduction of the roadside price comparison display
we can distinguish between three di¤erent types of consumers. Where, in additions to the
previous two categories we now have active consumers.
During the second half of the simulation we have that captive consumers keep paying
the highest price while very active consumers pay the lowest price and active consumers pay
a price in between. Notice that very active consumers are expected to always pay a lower
price than active ones as they have full information about all prices and can therefore better
plan their fuel rells at the cheapest station, choosing from a higher set of stations.
We can also look at the evolution of the types of rules that stations decide to play. Figure
3.4 shows the share of stations that play the same rule in a given day. The gure tells that
more than 50% of stations play the fourth rule (set price equal to maximum price). A share
between 30 and 40% of stations select the third rule (match the average of competitors
prices) and the rest of stations select the undercutting pricing rule (Rule 2 undercuts by 1
euro cents while Rule 1 undercuts by 2 euro cents).
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Figure 3.3: Average price paid by consumers
Figure 3.4: Pricing rule played
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3.6.1 Policy Impact Simulation
In the rst simulation exercise we estimate the e¤ect of the policy and we investigate
the relationship between some key model parameters and the estimated e¤ects.
The parameters space we explore is found in table 3.2 and the display setting used
is Setting 1 (see gure 3.11). The use of this latter setting let us discriminate between
"treated" and "non treated" stations36. This simulation generates 64 di¤erent combinations
of parameters that are each run 10 times with di¤erent underlying random seeds, for a total
of 640 simulations.
Table 3.2: Sim 1: The changed parameters
Parameter Value(s)
memory 0.5; 0.75
temp 0.1; 0.05
RL-share-based On; O¤
very-p-stve 0.3; 0.15
p-stve-t 0.1; 0.25; 0.5; 0.75
Each simulation is run for a total of 1000 days and every 7 days stations assess their
pricing policy and might change price and price strategy (since price strategy depends on
competitorsprices a station might change price even if it keeps constant the pricing strategy).
The price comparison policy is activated starting from day 501. Each day we retrieve from
the model the outcomes of interest, that we then use in the econometric analysis. Of the
1000 days we exclude the rst 200 days and the days between day 501 and day 700. This is
done to exclude from the regression analysis the two "adjustment periods".
For each of the 640 model specications we then estimate the following OLS regression:
mean_pricet = + 
PolicyD + t (3.4)
where D is a dummy variable taking value of 1 after the policy change (after day 501),
the dependent variable is the outcome variable of interest (e.g. mean price asked by stations
on display or o¤ display; mean price paid by captive consumers), nally the subscript t
identies the day of the simulation. .
36We adopt the terminology treated and non treated (instead of the more usual treated and contol) since
the non treated unit, di¤erently from the treatment evaluation literature, are not used as a proper control
group in this setting.
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Given the above regression we estimate 640 di¤erent policy impact of which we can draw
the distribution.
Figure 3.5 shows the distribution of the estimated policy impact when we run the above
regression for the mean price asked by treated and non treated stations. The estimated e¤ects
are both centered around zero but have a marked di¤erent distribution. The distribution for
the treated stations is clearly left skewed.
The average of the policy impact is -0.17 euro cents for treated stations and 0.014 euro
cents for non treated stations. If we perform a t-test on the policy impact averages we nd
that only the mean associated to treated stations is statistically di¤erent from zero at 5%.
Therefore it seems that on average the policy change is associated with a decrease in the
price asked by treated station while it leaves unchanged the pricing of non treated stations.
Table 3.3: Summary of policy impact
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
b_p_treated 640 -0.17 0.246
b_p_non_treated 640 0.015 0.114
beta_p_capt 640 -0.029 0.091
b_p_active 640 -0.514 0.363
b_p_very active 640 -0.111 0.232
We also look at the average price paid by the three types of drivers (captive, active and
very active). The active category is the category that is expected to gain the most from the
introduction of price comparison while benets to captive or very active drivers might only
come indirectly as an externality.
Figure 3.6 shows the three parameters distributions. The policy impact distributions for
captive drivers and very active drivers are both centered around zero with the average of the
parameters being respectively -0.03 and -0.11 euro cents. The estimated parameter for the
active drivers exhibits much higher variation with an average of -0.51 euro cents.
Hence, from the distributional analysis, it seems that the estimated e¤ect of the policy
on the price paid by active consumers varies substantially depending on the specic choice
of the model parameters.
For the other two categories of drivers, captive and very active, the e¤ect of the policy
does not seem to be too inuenced by the choice of the model parameters.
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Figure 3.5: Simulation 1: Distribution of policy impact (average asked price)
Figure 3.6: Simulation 1: Distribution of policy impact (average paid price)
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Nevertheless, overall the e¤ect of the policy change on the prices paid by drivers seems
again to be limited. The negative support of the distribution of the policy impacts for active
drivers is bounded at around -1.7 euro cents.
Table 3.4: The impact of model parameters on policy impact
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES b_p_treated b_p_non_treated beta_p_capt b_p_active b_p_very active
pstvet  0:543 0:0370  0:0840  0:432  0:365
 0:0325  0:018  0:0141  0:0551  0:0339
temp 0:358  0:0656 0:0597  0:0279 0:435
 0:321  0:178  0:14  0:545  0:336
rlshare  0:0744  0:0039  0:011  0:0756  0:0277
 0:0161  0:00891  0:00698  0:0273  0:0168
verypstve 0:138  0:0644  0:0122 0:335 0:258
 0:107  0:0594  0:0465  0:182  0:112
memory  0:0576  0:116  0:0820  0:141  0:105
 0:0643  0:0356  0:0279  0:109  0:0672
Constant 0:062 0:0938 0:0594  0:288 0:0234
 0:0554  0:0307  0:0241  0:0941  0:0579
Observations 640 640 640 640 640
R-squared 0:325 0:025 0:069 0:105 0:168
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
To study the heterogeneity in the parameter estimates we then employ a regression
analysis to shed light on the relationship between the model parameters and the e¤ect of the
policy. In this part of the analysis the attention is on the same outcome variables object of
the distributional analysis. The regressions take the form of 3.5 where we regress the policy
impact Policy for each simulation run r on the simulation specic parameters.
Policyr = + 1temp+ 2rlshare+ 3verypstve+ 4memory + t (3.5)
Table 3.4 presents the results of these set of regressions.
The most important model parameter seems to be the share of active consumers, the
consumers that make use of the price comparison policy when this is activated. In the
simulation this share takes four di¤erent values: 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75. From the regression
we nd that by increasing the share of active consumers we expect a reduction in all price
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measures except for the price asked at non treated stations that increases. The stronger
e¤ect is found for the price asked at treated station where an increase of 0.25 in the share of
active consumers lowers the asked price by 0.13 euro cents. For the same increase the price
paid by active consumers is reduced by 0.1 euro cents while the price paid by very active
consumers decreases by less than 0.1 euro cents.
The model parameter that controls the share of very active consumers (a share of active
consumers) does not seem to have any signicant e¤ect on the policy impacts for asked
prices and for the price paid by captive drivers. Nevertheless, it has a signicant e¤ect on
the policy impact estimates for the price paid by the two category of active drivers. This
parameter takes two values in the simulation 0.15 and 0.3. Hence by increasing this share
by 0.15 the estimates of the policy impact for both prices paid by active and very active
drivers increase respectively by 0.05 euro cents and 0.04 euro cents. Hence, the more very
active consumers we have in the model the lower is the e¤ect of the policy in reducing the
price paid by consumers using information.
The parameter rlshare is also signicant for some regressions. Rlshare is a dummy
variable and when it takes the value of 1 retailers make their strategy assessment not only
looking at prots but also by looking at prots adjusted by potential demand, as to have a
more precise (although noisy) estimate of the pricing strategy performance. The regression
suggests that when retailers can better assess their strategies the policy is more e¤ective. In
this case, the policy change is associated with a further reduction of 0.07 euro cents in the
price asked and in the price paid by active consumers while the e¤ect on very active driver
is a reduction of 0.02 euro cents.
Of the two reinforcement learning parameters that are varied in the model, temp and
memory, only the latter seems to inuence the estimated e¤ect of the policy. When retailers
put a higher weight on past prots (higher memory) the policy introduction is associated
with a reduction in the price asked by non treated stations and the price paid by captive
consumers. Therefore a higher memory limits the pressure to increase prices for captive
drivers once information is disseminated.
In conclusion the Policy Impact Simulation suggests that the possible maximum savings
implied by the price comparison policy are limited. Drivers activated by the policy (active
drivers) on average might save 0.5 euro cents. Captive drivers are not a¤ected by the policy
whereas very active drivers save an average of 0.1 euro cents.
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Moreover we study how some key model parameters inuence the estimated e¤ect of the
policy. The model parameter that explain most of the variation in the estimated e¤ects is,
as expected, the share of active drivers.
Consistently with the empirical ndings the savings to consumers appear to be low. On
a yearly basis an active consumer might save an average of 10 euro in his fuel expenditure37.
Still a saving of 0.5 euro cents when compared to the average observed price range of 2 euro
cents per liter and the average retailer margin of 4 euro cents gains economic signicance
(the saving represent respectively the 25% and the 12.5% of these gures).
In the next subsection we study how changes in the density of the price comparison
displays inuence the e¤ectiveness of the policy.
3.6.2 Policy Design Simulation
In this second simulation we study how the three proposed display settings (see gure
3.11) inuence the e¤ectiveness of the policy.
In this simulation, together with the display setting we also vary the key model para-
meters that control the share of active drivers (the values taken can be seen in table 3.5).
Given the variation in the model parameters and the three display settings we generate 24
di¤erent model specications. As before, for each of these specications we run 10 di¤er-
ent simulations with a di¤erent random seed. Then we analyze the results using the same
regression analysis outlined in the previous regression.
Table 3.5: Sim 2: Key model parameters
Parameter Value(s)
very-p-stve 0.3; 0.15
p-stve-t 0.1; 0.25; 0.5; 0.75
Figure 3.7 shows the distribution of the estimated policy impact that captures the e¤ect
of the policy on the outcome variable of interest. In this chart we study the policy impact on
four variables: the price asked by treated stations (notice that we have non treated stations
only with Setting 1); the price paid by captive drivers; the price paid by active drivers and
the price paid by very active drivers.
37This if we assume a drivers refuels her car once a week (40 liters) for 52 weeks in a year. This assuming
that quantity demanded is constant.
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For the treated stations we nd that the support of the distribution is similar to the one
found in the above simulation and the implied savings have a comparable magnitude. Also
it seems that Setting 3, the one with higher density of price comparison displays, is the one
associated with the higher savings.
About the price paid by captive drivers we nd that the three distributions of policy
e¤ects can be clearly ranked with Setting 3 being associated with the highest savings. The
same can be said for the charts that look at the price paid by active and very active drivers.
However, in the four charts we nd that the three distributions overlap considerably.
Hence di¤erent densities of comparison displays can be consistent with similar e¤ects of
the policy. We look further into this by means of a regression analysis. In this analysis we
regress the estimated policy impact on the share of active and very active drivers and on the
dummies that capture the density settings.
Table 3.6 presents the results of these four regressions. The regression estimates for the
parameters that capture the share of active and very active drivers are very much comparable
to those found in the above Policy Impact Simulation. About the dummies that control for
the density of price comparison displays we nd the following.
The price comparison density implied by Setting 2, when compared to the baseline given
by Setting 1, is associated with a further reduction of 0.16 euro cents in the price paid by
captive and very active consumers.
The price paid by active consumers does not seems to be a¤ected by this increased
density as the e¤ect of the policy seems constant. Thus expanding the price comparison
coverage to the all network implies lower prices to captive drivers and to very active drivers
but not to drivers that are activated by the policy.
When we look at the impact of the third setting, the one with highest density of price
comparison, we nd that this setting is associated with a higher impact of the price compar-
ison policy and this is true for all four prices considered.
We also nd that although the policy further reduces by 0.14 euro cents the price asked
by treated stations, all drivers seems to benet by a further reduction in prices in the order
of 0.3 euro cents. Increasing the density of displays improves the e¤ectiveness of the policy
and further reduces prices for all category of consumers.
However the size of this reduction, although statistically signicant, might be very small.
For the single drivers such an extra saving only imply a total saving of only 6 euro on an
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Figure 3.7: Simulation 2: Distribution of policy impact
annual basis38. However, if we consider the active consumers as a whole the higher density
of displays might bring higher savings in the order of 6 million euro on a yearly basis39.
Such gure might justify the stepping up of the policy as it could nance around 300 more
displays only in a single year40.
38This if we assume a drivers refuels her car once a week (40 liters) for 52 weeks in a year.
39Assuming that 50% of fuel on the highway is purchased by active drivers: (3.8 billion litres) x 50% x
0.003 euro=5.7 million euro
40We estimate that a single price comparison display could cost up to 20,000 euro. This because in the
rst phase of display deployment Autostrade per lItalia could not issue a tender worth more than 200,000
euro. In this rst phase only 10 displays were installed.
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Table 3.6: The impact of model parameters and display density on policy impact
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES b_p_treated beta_p_capt b_p_active b_p_very active
pstvet  0:680  0:607  0:717  0:764
 0:0492  0:0463  0:0773  0:0736
verypstve 0:555 0:440 0:444 1:012
 0:162  0:153  0:255  0:243
Setting 2  0:0181  0:165  0:0251  0:164
 0:0298  0:0281  0:0468  0:0446
Setting 3  0:140  0:293  0:309  0:312
 0:0298  0:0281  0:0468  0:0446
Constant  0:0274 0:118  0:305  0:00823
 0:0466  0:0438  0:0731  0:0696
Observations 240 240 240 240
R-squared 0:493 0:552 0:378 0:426
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3.7 Conclusions
This paper studies the introduction of a major price comparison policy introduced in
the Italian highway refueling market, starting in summer 2007. The main feature of the
policy consisted in the deployment of road-side price comparison electronic displays. These
displays, positioned on the side of the highway, post and compare fuel prices (unleaded and
diesel fuel) of the successive four refueling stations.
The declared objectives of the policy was to provide e¤ective price comparison to drivers,
which should have fostered competition among retailers and lead to lower fuel prices41.
Indeed, before the introduction of the policy along pay-toll highways there was no price
information, hence drivers had virtually no mean to choose where to refuel based on price
information.
In the previous chapter we perform an empirical assessment, of this policy change, col-
lecting price information before, and after the deployment of the price comparison displays.
41The policy was introduced to comply with Law 2 April 2007 n.40 that required highway concessionaires
to introduce some remedies to increase price information and ease
price comparison.
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The empirical investigation suggests that the price comparison policy did not foster compe-
tition among retailers as posted fuel prices do not decrease after the introduction of price
comparison. Nevertheless, the empirical ndings suggest that consumers activated by the
policy might save an average of 1 euro cents per liter if they are to use the price comparison
display to inform their purchasing decisions. Hence, although the policy do not foster price
competition among retailers the presence of price comparison can still be benecial to some
categories of consumers, those activated by the policy.
This paper models the introduction of price comparison through an agent based compu-
tational economics (ACE) model that rst explicitly design the behavior and characteristics
of consumers and retailers, and then simulates market interactions.
The paper contributes to the theoretical literature on competition and consumer pol-
icy by o¤ering a model that incorporates three important elements:1) dynamic interactions
between consumers and retailers; 2) behavioral decision making in consumers and retailers
(retailers have adaptive learning features); and 3) heterogeneous consumers and retailers.
The purpose is to use the ACE model rstly to rationalize the empirical results and
secondly to explore the role of ACE modelling in improving the policy design.
We run two simulation exercises to study the impact of price comparison on prices. In
addition, in the simulations we change some key consumers and retailers parameters to study
the relationship between these assumptions and the estimated policy e¤ects.
In the rst simulation (Policy Impact Simulation) we investigate the average e¤ect of
the price comparison policy and the role of some key consumers and retailers parameters in
explaining the variation in the policy impact.
The second simulation (Policy Design Simulation) looks in detail at the impact of the
display density. The objective is to study the relationship between di¤erent display densities
(number of display deployed) and the resulting policy impact.
In the rst simulation exercise we nd that retailersprices are only marginally a¤ected
by the introduction of the policy. On average we nd only a small reduction in average
posted prices of around 0.17 euro cents per liter. However consistent with the empirical
ndings, we nd that drivers that are activated by the policy experience higher savings that
on average amount to 0.5 euro cents per liter. On the contrary both captive and very active
consumers on average are not better o¤ after the policy introduction.
As expected, we also nd that as we increase the share of drivers that are activated by
the policy the gain for consumers increases. However, even in cases in which a high share of
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consumers are activated the maximum savings implied by the policy amount to a maximum
of about 1.5 euro cents per liter.
In the second simulation exercise the results suggest that by increasing the density of price
comparison displays the average e¤ect of the policy improves for all consumers. Indeed, the
average price paid by all consumers (captive, very active and active) decreases by a further
0.3 euro cents, compared to the baseline setting. Again we nd that the e¤ect is higher on
the price paid by consumers than on the price asked by retailers that only decreases by a
further 0.14 euro cents.
We conclude that the ACE model is capable to explain the relatively low levels of savings
attained by consumers (drivers) that were activated by the policy. The simulated results are
indeed consistent with the empirical evidence.
Moreover we nd that increasing the share of active consumers, or increasing the density
of price comparison displays, might o¤er some additional gains to consumers and these seems
to be substantials when we consider consumers as a whole (instead of looking at the benet
for the single consumer).
The ACE model explain the low level of savings attainable to active drivers but does not
fully explain the empirical nding that average posted fuel prices increase after the introduc-
tion of price comparison. The ACE model nds that for an average model parameters choice
the posted (asked) fuel price marginally decrease after the price comparison is introduced.
Anyhow, the distribution of the policy impact has also a positive support, hence the model
does not rule out a price increase following the introduction of price comparison.
About this point we note that in the ACE model we do not include any coordination
between retailers. Hence we show how simple unilateral decisions might be consistent with
the observed price rigidity. By introducing minimal coordinations between retailers we might
reconcile the simulated e¤ects with the empirical ndings.
For future research the priority would be to extend the scope of the model and endogenize
consumer search to make it dependent on the available savings and on consumersperceptions
about price comparison e¤ectiveness.
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3.8 Appendix A: Figures
Figure 3.8: Price comparison display (source: www.autostrade.it)
Figure 3.9: Example of displays and stations location
Figure 3.8 shows the design of price comparison displays installed along the ASPI pay-
toll highway network. The display posts the brands and prices (of self service unleaded and
diesel fuel) of the four next consecutive stations. The stations are ranked by distance to the
display (with the closest being rst) and the cheapest station is highlighted by a green dot
next to its price. ASPI o¢ cials, when enquired about the display design, reported that the
decision to post only four prices is an outcome of a trade-o¤between posting many prices (as
to o¤er more information, but with inevitable physical constraints) and assuring a minimum
level of comparison among brands. Since on the ASPI network there is a maximum of three
consecutive stations all from the same brand they decided to adopt the four stations design.
Both in the design stage and in the location decision the managers of the refueling stations
were not involved. They are only responsible for the communication of prices through the
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software platform (that serves both the price comparison website and the price comparison
displays).
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Figure 3.11: Displays settings
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3.9 Appendix B: The code
;; SET GLOBALS VARIABLE
globals [dayw green-areas service-areas intersections hw-intersections
cycles
private-intersections days station-access NumStations Hw-stations
NS-stations
mean-p-t-capt mean-p-t-pstve mean-p-t-vpstve Hw-p-stations
Hw-np-stations rnd
mean-panel min-panel max-panel range-panel mean-np min-np
max-np range-np mean-pstve
info-ref mean-capt no-info-ref mean-vpstve vinfo-ref
panel-status num-rule avg-rule-p avg-rule-np
checked
num-cars
ref-type
]
;; DEFINE BREEDS AND OWN-VARIABLES
breed [stations station] ;; define the stations turtles
breed [cars car] ;; define the cars turtles
breed [panels panel] ;; define the panels turtles
patches-own [intersection? road? road-class road-cl1? road-cl2? road-cl8?
private-intersection? station? hw-intersections? max-hw-int?
min-hw-int?] ;; define patches variables
cars-own [fuel ppl capacity reserve refilled bestp ref-station cheapest
choosen? start n-refill p-stve? consider-refill-level
refill-today? price st-id rnd-t short info? vpstve?]
;; define cars variables
stations-own [ownpmin ownpmax price dprofits sold dsold cumprof wprofits
strategy competitors st-id s-direction t-customer w-customer
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panel? cost competitors-p competitors-p1
max-w-prof min-w-prof sign-thrsld p-incr ref-prof
fitness Nfitness prob-p old-wprofits rule av-margin played rnd-st
d-p-customer w-p-customer avg-prop avg-prop-p start-avg-prop
sugg-price pan-id] ;; define stations variables
panels-own [p-direction list-stations pan-id]
;; CREATE THE ENVIRONMENT AND INITIALIZE MODEL
to setup
clear-all
set world-to-import "highway.csv"
import-world world-to-import
set p-stve-t 0.25
set emergency-fuel 0.1
set memory 0.5
set week-length 7
set AvgCars 300
set EvalWeeks 3
set F0 3
set price-setting "RL-based"
set temp 0.05
set fuel-concern 0.25
set fix-seed false
set very-p-stve 0.15
set Activate-Panel false
set t-red-bias 0.4
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set per-exit 0.2
set checked false
set num-rule 4
set rnd new-seed
random-seed new-seed
set ref-type n-values 3 [0]
set num-cars 0
if-else fix-seed
[
set rnd 137
random-seed rnd ]
[
set rnd new-seed
random-seed new-seed ]
setup-map ;; Setup the map
setup-stations ;; Place stations
if AvgCars > 0 [setup-cars] ;; Place cars
setup-intersection ;; Identify intersections
set dayw 0 ;; Initialize day of the week at 0
set days 0 ;; Initialize days
set mean-p-t-capt [0]
set mean-p-t-pstve [0]
set mean-p-t-vpstve [0]
setup-panels
end
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;; Setup Procedures
to setup-map
set service-areas patches with [pcolor = 68]
ask patches with [(pcolor > 0) and (pcolor < 9)] [set road-class pcolor ]
ask patches [set road? ifelse-value ((pcolor > 0) and (pcolor < 9)) [true] [false] ]
ask patches [set road-cl1? ifelse-value (pcolor = 1) [true] [false] ]
ask patches [set road-cl2? ifelse-value (pcolor = 2) [true] [false] ]
ask patches [set road-cl8? ifelse-value (pcolor = 8) [true] [false] ]
end
to setup-stations ;; Create stations
set-default-shape stations "flag"
set cycles 0
ask service-areas [sprout-stations 1 [set st-id ((count stations) - 1) ]]
ask stations [
set sugg-price precision (random-normal 1.005 0.003) 3
set strategy 1
set label who
set sold 0 set dsold 0
set dprofits 0
set cumprof 0
set wprofits 0
let diff1 precision (random-normal 0 0.003) 3
let diff2 precision (random-normal 0 0.003) 3
set ownpmin (precision (1000 * (sugg-price - (0.03 + diff1))) 3)
set ownpmax (precision (1000 * (sugg-price + 0.012 + diff2)) 3)
set cost (ownpmin - (0.01 + random-float 1 / 100))
set av-margin (precision (ownpmax - ownpmin) 3)
set t-customer 0
set w-customer 0
set d-p-customer 0
set w-p-customer 0
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set avg-prop 0
set avg-prop-p 0
set start-avg-prop []
face one-of neighbors4 with [road?]
set panel? false
set max-w-prof 0
set min-w-prof 0
set sign-thrsld 0
set p-incr 0.01
set ref-prof 0
set rule 1
set price (precision ((ownpmin + random-float av-margin ) / 1000 ) 3 )
set rnd-st random-float 1
set pan-id []
set competitors-p1 []
]
set NumStations count stations
;; set highway station group
set Hw-stations stations with [[road-cl1?] of patch-ahead 1]
ask Hw-stations [set s-direction ifelse-value (heading = 270) [0] [180]]
ask n-of (floor (NumStations / 2)) stations [set strategy -1]
ask stations [
set fitness n-values (num-rule) [(F0 * 1)] ; fitness is set during the
evaluation week
set Nfitness n-values (num-rule) [0] ; normalized fitness
set prob-p n-values (num-rule) [0] ; probability to play rule
set played n-values (num-rule ) [0] ; number of time rule is played
set old-wprofits 0 ; initialize old profit variable
]
end
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to setup-panels ;; Create panels
set-default-shape panels "triangle" ;; change shape
ask patches with [pcolor = 103] [sprout-panels 1 [
face one-of neighbors4 with [road-cl1?]
set p-direction ifelse-value (heading = 270) [0] [180]
set color red
set pan-id who
set label who ]
]
assign-stations-to-panel
end
;; Create cars
to setup-cars
set-default-shape cars "car top" ;; change shape
end
to gen-cars [numcars]
ask patches with [pcolor = 95] [
sprout-cars int ((t-red-bias) * numcars ) [
set color 15
start-cars
set short false
set num-cars (num-cars + 1)
]
]
ask patches with [pcolor = 3] [
sprout-cars int ( ( 0.7 + random-float 0.6)*(1 - t-red-bias)*numcars/9) [
set color 45
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start-cars
set short true
set num-cars (num-cars + 1)
]
]
end
to start-cars
assign-destination-to-cars ;; assign destination to cars
set rnd-t random-float 1
set capacity ( 35 + random-float 20 )
set reserve (emergency-fuel * capacity)
if reserve < 8 [set reserve 8]
set fuel (reserve + random-float (capacity - reserve))
set consider-refill-level (reserve + fuel-concern * (capacity - reserve) )
if fuel > capacity [set fuel capacity]
if fuel < reserve [set fuel reserve]
set label round(fuel)
set ppl (precision (1 + random-float 2) 2) ;; set car efficiency
patches per litres
set refilled 0
set bestp (precision (random-normal 0.985 0.02) 3)
set ref-station []
set cheapest no-turtles
set n-refill 0
set p-stve? ifelse-value (random-float 1 < p-stve-t) [true] [false]
set info? false
ifelse rnd-t < very-p-stve
[set vpstve? true]
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[set vpstve? false]
set refill-today? false
set price 0
set choosen? false
end
to assign-destination-to-cars
if pycor > 24 [set heading 180]
if pycor < -21 [set heading 0]
if pycor > -21 and pycor < 25 [
let rnd-head random-float 1
ifelse rnd-head < 0.5
[set heading 0]
[set heading 180]
]
fd 1
set start 1
end
to assign-stations-to-panel
ask panels [
ifelse p-direction = 0
[
let nextstations min (list 4 (count Hw-stations with [(s-direction =
[ p-direction] of myself)
and (ycor > [ycor] of myself )]))
set list-stations
sublist sort-by [[distance myself] of ?1 < [distance myself] of ?2]
Hw-stations with[(s-direction = [p-direction] of myself)
and (ycor > [ycor] of myself )] 0 nextstations
]
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[let nextstations min (list 4 (count Hw-stations with
[ (s-direction = [p-direction] of myself) and (ycor < [ycor] of myself )]))
set list-stations
sublist sort-by [[distance myself] of ?1 < [distance myself] of ?2]
Hw-stations with [(s-direction = [p-direction] of myself)
and (ycor < [ycor] of myself )] 0 nextstations
]
]
ask panels [
foreach list-stations [
ask ? [
set panel? true
set pan-id fput [pan-id] of myself pan-id
]
]
]
set Hw-p-stations stations with [panel?]
set Hw-np-stations Hw-stations with [not panel?]
ask Hw-np-stations
[ set competitors (other Hw-stations in-radius 7 with
[ s-direction = [s-direction] of myself])]
ask Hw-p-stations
[ set competitors (other Hw-stations in-radius 7 with
[ s-direction = [s-direction] of myself])]
ask Hw-p-stations [
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foreach pan-id [
foreach sort (Hw-p-stations with [s-direction = [s-direction] of myself
and member? ? pan-id])[
set competitors-p1 fput [ycor] of ?1 competitors-p1
]
]
let miny min competitors-p1
let maxy max competitors-p1
set competitors-p (other Hw-stations with [s-direction=[s-direction] of myself
and ycor <= maxy and ycor >= miny])]
end
to setup-intersection ;;setup intersections for road and driving use
ask patches with [road?]
[
set hw-intersections? false
let num-rd-nbrs ((count neighbors4 with [road?]) - (count neighbors4
with [road-cl8?]))
set intersection? ifelse-value (num-rd-nbrs > 2)
[true] [false]
if num-rd-nbrs = 2 [
if ((length remove-duplicates [pxcor] of (neighbors4 with [road?])=2)
and (length remove-duplicates [pycor] of (neighbors4 with [road?])=2))
[set intersection? true]
]
]
set intersections (patches with [road-cl2?]) with [intersection?]
ask intersections [ set min-hw-int? false set max-hw-int? false]
set hw-intersections (patches with [road-cl1?]) with [intersection?]
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ask hw-intersections [
set min-hw-int? false
set max-hw-int? false
set hw-intersections? true
set pcolor 3
if pycor = max [pycor] of hw-intersections [set max-hw-int? true]
if pycor = min [pycor] of hw-intersections [set min-hw-int? true] ]
end
to-report intersection [l1 l2]
let overlap []
foreach l1 [if member? ? l2 [set overlap fput ? overlap]]
report overlap
end
;; ACTIONS
;; Main procedure
to go
tick
set num-cars 0
day-week
drive
set days ticks
if not checked and Activate-Panel [
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ask Hw-p-stations [set competitors competitors-p]
set checked false
]
ask stations [calculate]
if (dayw = week-length) and (days >= (week-length) * EvalWeeks)
[
if price-setting = "RL-based" [ask stations [set-p-RL-based]]
]
end
;; Time Procedure
to day-week
ifelse dayw < week-length
[
set dayw (dayw + 1)
]
[
set dayw 1
]
end
;; BUYERS
;; Driving
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to drive
set mean-p-t-pstve []
set mean-p-t-vpstve []
set mean-p-t-capt []
loop [
set cycles (cycles + 1)
if Activate-Panel = true [
ask panels [send-prices-panel cars in-radius 1 with
[ p-stve? and fuel > 0 and heading = [p-direction] of myself]]
;; panels send price info to cars
]
ask Hw-stations [ ;; station on the highway refills only cars going
in the right direction (stations on North
side serve only cars going north)
refill (cars in-radius 1) with [heading = ([s-direction] of myself)
and (fuel < reserve) and (not choosen?)] 2 0
refill (cars in-radius 1) with [choosen? and cheapest = myself] 2 1
refill (cars in-radius 1) with [heading = ([s-direction] of myself)
and (fuel < consider-refill-level) and (not choosen?)
and ([rnd-st] of myself)<random-float 1 and random-float 1<0.3] 2 2
set d-p-customer (d-p-customer + count (cars in-radius 1) with
[ heading = ([s-direction] of myself)])
]
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if AvgCars > 0 [drive-cars]
if (count cars with [fuel > 0]) = 0 [
set cycles 0
stop]
]
end
to drive-cars
ask cars with [ fuel > 0]
[
fd 1
set fuel (fuel - 1 / ppl)
]
ask cars with [p-stve? and (fuel <= consider-refill-level)
and (not choosen?)] [choose-cheapest-t]
if cycles < 5 [
gen-cars random-poisson AvgCars
]
let num-tour-die int (per-exit * count cars with [[pcolor = 3]
of patch-here and (start = 1)]) ;car that exit highways at intersection
ask n-of num-tour-die cars with [[pcolor=3] of patch-here and (start = 1)][
if refill-today?
[
ifelse info?
[ifelse vpstve?
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[set mean-p-t-vpstve fput price mean-p-t-vpstve]
[set mean-p-t-pstve fput price mean-p-t-pstve] ]
[set mean-p-t-capt fput price mean-p-t-capt]
]
die] ;car that exit highways at intersection
ask cars with [[pcolor = 95] of patch-here and (start = 1) ]
[
if refill-today?
[
ifelse info?
[ifelse vpstve?
[set mean-p-t-vpstve fput price mean-p-t-vpstve]
[set mean-p-t-pstve fput price mean-p-t-pstve] ]
[set mean-p-t-capt fput price mean-p-t-capt]
]
die]
end
;; Refilling
to send-prices-panel [customers]
ask customers [set ref-station [list-stations] of myself]
end
to choose-cheapest-t
if vpstve? [ set ref-station sort Hw-stations
with [(s-direction = [heading] of myself) ] ]
let myycor ycor
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let autonomy (fuel * ppl)
let p []
let poss-ref-stations []
let corr (cos heading)
if not (empty? ref-station) [
foreach ref-station [
if (([ycor] of ? - myycor) * corr) <= autonomy and
(([ycor] of ? - myycor) * corr) > 0
[ set poss-ref-stations lput ? poss-ref-stations set p lput[price] of ? p]
]
set ref-station poss-ref-stations set poss-ref-stations []
]
if not (empty? ref-station) [
set p (min p)
set cheapest one-of filter [[price] of ? <= p] ref-station
set choosen? true
if (bestp < p) and (short = true)
[
let dist-best random 200
if dist-best < autonomy
[set fuel capacity
set choosen? false]
]
]
end
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to refill [customers types id] ;; rule that tells driver to refill
if any? customers
[
let myid st-id let pmyid price
let fsold sold
ask customers [
set n-refill (n-refill + 1)
set fsold (fsold + (capacity - fuel))
set fuel capacity
set price pmyid
set st-id myid
set refill-today? true
set choosen? false
set cheapest no-turtles
if id = 1 [set info? true]
]
let num-ref-type item id ref-type
set ref-type replace-item id ref-type ( 1 + num-ref-type )
set t-customer (t-customer + count customers)
set sold fsold
]
end
;; STATIONS
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;; Accounting
to calculate ;; stations calculates own profits
set dprofits ((price * 1000 - cost) * sold) ;; dayly profits
set cumprof (cumprof + (dprofits / 1000)) ;; cumulative profits
set dsold sold
set sold 0
if dayw = 1 and days = week-length + 1 [set min-w-prof wprofits set
ref-prof wprofits]
if dayw = 1
[
if (days < (week-length) * EvalWeeks) [
if wprofits > max-w-prof [set max-w-prof wprofits]
if wprofits < min-w-prof [set min-w-prof wprofits]
set sign-thrsld (max-w-prof - min-w-prof)
set ref-prof (max-w-prof + min-w-prof) / 2
]
if (days < (week-length) * EvalWeeks) and days >= week-length [
set start-avg-prop fput (w-customer/w-p-customer) start-avg-prop
;set fitness n-values (3) [(F0 * ref-prof)]
ifelse RL-share-based
[set fitness n-values (num-rule)[(F0*( (price*1000 - cost)/cost)
* (median start-avg-prop) )]]
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[set fitness n-values (num-rule) [F0 * ( ref-prof )]]
]
if (days >= (week-length) * EvalWeeks) [
set ref-prof ( (1 - memory) * ref-prof + memory * wprofits)]
set old-wprofits wprofits
set wprofits dprofits
; calculate number of visits
set w-p-customer d-p-customer
set w-customer t-customer
set d-p-customer 0
set t-customer 0
]
if dayw > 1
[
set wprofits (wprofits + dprofits)
; calculate number of visits
set w-p-customer ( w-p-customer + d-p-customer)
set d-p-customer 0
set w-customer ( w-customer + t-customer)
set t-customer 0
]
if dayw = week-length [
set avg-prop ( precision (w-customer / w-p-customer) 5)
let rnd-avg-prop random-normal avg-prop 0.025
set avg-prop-p (((price * 1000 - cost) / cost) * rnd-avg-prop)
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]end
;; Price settings decisions
to Norm-fitness
let Fmin min fitness
let Fmax max fitness
let Fmax-Fmin (Fmax - Fmin)
set Nfitness []
foreach n-values (length fitness) [?]
[
ifelse Fmax-Fmin != 0
[set Nfitness lput (((item ? fitness) - Fmin) / Fmax-Fmin) Nfitness]
[set Nfitness lput 0 Nfitness]
]
end
to calculate-prob-p
let sumf 0
foreach n-values (length Nfitness) [?]
[
set sumf (sumf + exp ((item ? Nfitness) / temp))
]
set prob-p []
foreach n-values (length Nfitness) [?]
[
set prob-p lput ((exp ((item ? Nfitness) / temp ) ) / sumf ) prob-p
]
end
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to select-price
set rule int (random-float 1 * (length Nfitness))
let startp rule
let rnd-num (random-float 1)
loop
[
if rnd-num < (item startp prob-p) [
;set price (precision ((ownpmin + av-margin / 4 * (startp) ) / 1000 ) 3 )
set rule startp
;show "rule 1 used"
;if rule = 0 [ set price (precision (ownpmin / 1000 ) 3 ) ]
if rule = 0 [ set price (precision (min [price] of competitors - 0.02) 3) ]
if rule = 1 [ set price (precision (min [price] of competitors - 0.01) 3) ]
if rule = 2 [ set price (precision (mean [price] of competitors) 3) ]
if rule = 3 [ set price (precision (ownpmax / 1000 ) 3 ) ]
if price < (precision(ownpmin/1000)3)
[set price (precision (ownpmin / 1000 ) 3 ) ]
if price > (precision(ownpmax/1000)3)
[setp price (precision (ownpmax / 1000 ) 3 ) ]
stop]
ifelse startp = ((length Nfitness) - 1)
[set startp 0]
[set startp (startp + 1)]
if startp = rule [
;show "rule 3 used"
set startp int (random-float 1 * (length nfitness ))
;show startp
;set price (precision ((ownpmin + av-margin / 4 * (startp) ) / 1000 ) 3 )
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set rule startp
;if rule = 0 [ set price (precision (ownpmin / 1000 ) 3 ) ]
if rule = 0 [ set price (precision (min [price] of competitors - 0.02) 3) ]
if rule = 1 [ set price (precision (min [price] of competitors - 0.01) 3) ]
if rule = 2 [ set price (precision (mean [price] of competitors) 3) ]
if rule = 3 [ set price (precision (ownpmax / 1000 ) 3 ) ]
if price < (precision (ownpmin/1000)3)
[set price (precision(ownpmin / 1000 ) 3 ) ]
if price > (precision (ownpmax/1000)3)
[set price (precision(ownpmax / 1000 ) 3 ) ]
stop]
]
end
to set-p-RL-based
let Ft-1 item rule fitness
ifelse RL-share-based
[set fitness replace-item rule fitness
(avg-prop-p * memory + (1 - memory)*Ft-1)]
[set fitness replace-item rule fitness
( wprofits * memory + (1 - memory)*Ft-1)]
Norm-fitness
calculate-prob-p
select-price
let num item rule played
set played replace-item rule played (1 + num)
end
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